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Because the authority of science is thought to legitimise governmental regulations to
restrict the emission of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs), in this thesis I study the
making of authoritative scientific knowledge through the lens of a controversy about
climate reconstruction. While controversies in climate science are typically explained
with vested interests that have turned an innocent form of knowledge into the victim of
the political opponent’s misuse, I draw on insights from science studies to illuminate a
more nuanced and symmetrical critique on climate science, the theory of anthropogenic
global warming (AGW) and climate reconstruction in particular.
To  that  end  the  thesis  focuses  on  three  interconnected  ideas  which  dominate  the
controversy: the idea of an objective scientific method, which places emphasis on the
empirical testing of theory, the idea of an unbiased expert, which shifts my analytical
focus  onto  norms  and  markers  of  expertise,  and  the  overarching  idea  of  science
legitimising political programmes of action, which all of the protagonists subscribe to.
First, climate reconstruction promises to be an empirical test for the scientific theory of
AGW, but in the controversy over an iconic reconstruction so-called climate sceptics
accuse  scientists  of  having  violated  the  scientific  method.  Second,  in  public
investigations  examining  these  allegations,  the  scientists  and  their  critics  draw  on
scientific  norms to contest  respective claims to  expertise.  Third,  in  consequence  of
these inquiries and the so-called  ‘Climategate’ affair,  which corroborated the critics,
independent scientists re-analyse climate reconstruction: if climate science legitimises
policies aiming at the restriction of GHG emissions, its authority qua science will have
to be re-established. This dependence on science in difficult political decision-making
puts a heavy burden on the former and obstructs the latter,  and it  characterises the
climate change debate in the United States. Further research on the role of science in
the  politics  of  climate  change  would  benefit  from  taking  more  explicitly  political
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Chapter One
Introduction: Science and the search for political closure
 
1.1 ‘Climategate’
In  December  2009  the  Parties  to  the  1992  United  Nations  Framework
Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC)  gathered  in  Copenhagen  for  the  15th
Conference of the Parties (COP15). Their aim was to agree on a successor to the 1997
Kyoto Protocol,  which has  set  out  binding targets  for reducing GHG emissions.  In
many ways the UNFCCC was following the precedent set out by the 1987 Montreal
Protocol  on Substances  that  Deplete  the  Ozone Layer.  Like  the  Montreal  Protocol,
which  restricted  the  emission  of  a  handful  of  synthetic  chemicals,  most  notably
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),  the UNFCCC was also aiming to regulate atmospheric
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and a few other GHGs affecting the global climate.
But the volume, variety and economic significance of these GHG emissions makes their
control substantially more challenging and politically contentious than the regulation of
CFCs,  and so the UNFCCC followed the path set  out  by the  Montreal  Protocol  in
looking  to  base  its  inevitably  contentious  political  decision-making  on  scientific
evidence. While signatories to the Montreal Protocol were informed by its Scientific
Assessment  Panel  (SAP),  the  signatories  to  the  UNFCCC and  the  Kyoto  Protocol
invoked  the  authority  of  scientific  assessments  produced  by  the  Intergovernmental
Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Nations
Environmental  Programme  (UNEP)  and  the  World  Meteorological  Organization
(WMO).
For  the  IPCC  reports  (IPCC,  1990;  1996;  2001a;  2007a;  2013a)  climate
scientists review and assess the latest scientific climate literature at intervals of 5 to 6
years. Together with decision-makers, they then synthesise their findings in a summary
for policy-makers (SPM). According to the IPCC (2001b), its SPM “provides a policy-
relevant, but not policy-prescriptive, synthesis and integration of information contained
within  the  […] Assessment  Reports.”  For  example,  the  Third  Assessment  Report
(TAR), published in 2001, provides an assessment of new scientific information and
evidence  as  an  input  for  policy-makers  in  their  deliberations  about  what  might
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constitute the “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” to which
signatory states to the UNFCCC have pledged themselves to preventing (Ibid.). Based
on this information politicians are encouraged to act on climate change, for example, by
regulating the emission of GHGs from the burning of fossil fuels. And in the run up to
Copenhagen,  advocates  of  aggressive  action  to  curtail  global  GHG emissions  were
pointing anxiously to  the findings of  the  IPCC as  a rationale  for  action.  After  two
decades and four consensus reports the science was settled; it would demand immediate
action – time was running out.
Yet a few weeks ahead of the Copenhagen Climate Conference, in November
2009 thousands of private emails between leading climate scientists were published
online (EAE, 2009), and within days embarrassing excerpts from them were circulating
among climate bloggers, who concluded that climate scientists had conspired in what a
journalist of the British Daily Telegraph described as  “the greatest scandal in modern
science”  (Delingpole,  2009).  The  emails  were  stolen  from  a  server  at  the  UK’s
renowned  Climate  Research  Unit  (CRU)  at  the  University  of  East  Anglia  (UEA).
Covering the period 1996-2009, the emails, attributed to climate scientists who have
co-authored chapters  of the IPCC reports, document how they lobbied the IPCC to
promote  the  well-known story  of  GHG  driven  climate  change  as  described  in  the
scientific  theory  of  AGW  and  embraced  by  the  UNFCCC  Parties.  In  dozens  of
exchanges they discuss how to highlight the political relevance of their science, thereby
revealing  a  political  agenda  behind  the  authoritative,  supposedly  strictly  scientific
reports. Was the Kyoto Protocol based on fraudulent science?
Among  the  many  thousand  emails  a  few  conversations  between  ‘IPCC
scientists’ suggest that for the TAR in 2001, its lead-authors ignored scientific critique
of a key piece of research, unpinning its infamous conclusion that “there is new and
stronger  evidence  that  most  of  the  warming  observed  over  the  last  50  years  is
attributable to human activities” (IPCC, 2001a). To make their case for AGW, the lead-
authors of the IPCC chapter “Observed Climate Variability and Change” simply copied
into  the  report  the concluding remarks of a  study by the US climatologist  Michael
Mann, who also happened to be one of the chapter’s lead-authors (IPCC, 2001a: 101):
New palaeoclimate analyses for the last 1,000 years over the Northern Hemisphere [Mann
et al  1998, 1999] indicate that the magnitude of 20th century warming is likely to have
been the largest of any century during this period. In addition, the 1990s are likely to have
been the warmest decade of the millennium.
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This palaeoclimate analysis or climate reconstruction, better known as the hockey stick
graph owing to its distinctive shape (figure 1.1, page 12), was reproduced in the SPM
and subsequently became an icon for climate-concerned campaigners.
Because the TAR’s SPM (2001b) featured the hockey stick graph, politicians
across the Atlantic were tempted to use it in their avowal of regulatory climate policy.
In the US, the former Vice President Al Gore presented the reconstruction as part of his
campaign for a political programme of action (Gore, 2006). In the UK, New Labour
Prime Minister Tony Blair (2004) made reference to the graph in his climate change
speech:
Over the last century average global temperatures have risen by 0.6 degrees Celsius: the
most drastic temperature rise for over 1,000 years in the Northern hemisphere […] That is
the evidence [...] through the science we are aware of the problem and, with the necessary
political and collective will, we have the ability to address it effectively […] The 1987
Montreal Protocol - addressing the challenge posed by the discovery of the hole in the
ozone layer - has shown how quickly a global environmental problem can be reversed once
targets are agreed.
Quite evidently, these political authorities, along with many others, have interpreted the
IPCC reports as policy-prescriptive. Their authoritative assessments should legitimise a
target-oriented approach to the problem of climate change: in 2008 the UK Parliament
passed a bill which requires the state to enforce the reduction of GHG emissions of
80% by 2050 (Crown, 2008).
Hacked and released  several  years  after  the 2001 report  and the  politicians’
endorsements, the information from CRU suggests that “the most drastic temperature
rise for over 1,000 years in the Northern hemisphere” was an artefact of politicised
science. Moreover, other published research suggested that the climate was warmer in
medieval times (Soon & Baliunas, 2003). Thus, opponents of emission regulations and
so-called  climate  sceptics  zeroed  in  on  the  hockey  stick  graph  –  if  20th  century
temperature rise  had a precedent  before the industrial  revolution,  GHGs would and
could not be the culprit. And the scientists’ evasion of inconvenient critique, as revealed
in the emails, certainly fuelled allegations of a cover-up – it would delegitimise the
Kyoto Protocol and with it decisions worth many billions of dollars.
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Figure 1.1: The hockey stick climate reconstruction. “The Millennial Northern Hemisphere
(NH) temperature reconstruction (blue) and instrumental data (red) from AD 1000 to 1999,
adapted from Mann et al. (1999). Smoother version of NH series (black), linear trend from
AD 1000 to 1850 (purple-dashed) and two standard error limits (grey shaded) are shown.”
Source IPCC (2001a).
‘Scientific  fraud  exposed!’ read  the  headlines  of  an  unruly  media  just  days
before politicians gathered in Copenhagen.  First  bloggers,  then newspapers and TV
stations reported on what the British journalist James Delingpole dubbed ‘Climategate’
– after the Watergate scandal over the cover-up of the misuse of governmental power
under US president Nixon. Agitated climate sceptics picked a few racy emails which
insinuated that climate scientists had used a “trick” to deliberately “hide a decline”
(EAE, 2009: 16 November 1999) in 20th century temperatures. Though the accused
scientists have always denied any wrong-doing, these revelations would be the final
straw to break the climate establish, andment’s back – the emails would once and for all
prove that climate scientists and their political protégées had invented a global problem
so as to gain power, secure their careers and fill their wallets (cf. Avery, 2010).
Showing how scientists closed ranks and bullied their critics in order to affirm
the orthodox story of human induced global warming (cf. Beck, 2011), the emails also
marked a moment of public moral outcry and a feeling that trust had been breached (cf.
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Leiserowitz  et  al 2013).  In  such a  “moment  of  dislocation,”  argues  the  sociologist
Maarten Hajer (2009), the authority of both scientific and governmental institutions is
called  into  question.  Indeed,  in  the  US and  the  UK,  government  officials  quickly
launched inquiries into ‘Climategate’. In a rare move, a scientist at CRU was ordered to
testify in the British House of Commons (HC, 2010a), and in the US lead-authors of the
original  hockey  stick  reconstruction  faced  a  series  of  lawsuits  and  even  criminal
investigations  for  fraud.  For  these  experienced  researchers  and  their  prestigious
institutions  ‘Climategate’ was a truly serious matter – death threats against  some of
them even circulated on the internet.  But was it  the the greatest  scandal  in modern
science? And did it confirm a political plot to put our blue planet in green shackles as
the Czech president Vaclav Klaus (2006) once remarked? If the Kyoto Protocol and the
success  of  the  Copenhagen  conference  depended  on  science,  ‘Climategate’ would
surely diminish the authority of climate science in the political process.
While  the  emails  gave  compelling  evidence  to  the  politicisation  of  climate
science, it was not the first event to have provoked this kind of accusation. Neither is
climate change the first time politicians have resorted to the authority of science in
order to close down a political debate – climate change exemplifies the latest in a line
of high profile controversies in which political closure has proven extremely difficult.
It is the overall aim of this thesis to show that this deference to science invites the
politicisation of  climate  science,  in  turn provoking  a  debate  over its  authority
whose  resolution  the  adversaries  believe  to  be  instrumental  for  the  difficult
decision-making process to continue. And because they too envision the permeation
of society by scientific  rationality,  several  academic science students engage in that
debate  by  prescribing  the  foundations  of  authoritative  scientific  knowledge.  In  this
thesis,  I  apply  their  theories  of  expertise  to  the  scientific  controversy  over  climate
reconstruction.  I  reflect  on  their  usefulness  as  analytic  tools  and  on their  value  in
political debate on climate change.
This chapter continues with an introduction to the wider class of cases in which
the promise of science to make one’s decisions seem incontrovertibly right has had
unintended consequences. 
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1.2 Science in the modern order
In Western liberal nation states political closure is formally achieved by means
of  representative  democracy:  in  respective  national  governments,  the  elected
representatives formulate and pass legislation upon which regulations of, for instance,
GHG emissions are based. And in their arguments for a particular legislation, like the
UK  Climate  Change  Act,  state  representatives  typically  invoke  the  authority  of
scientific  knowledge in the hope that the electorate accepts science as an arbiter  of
truth.  In  the  modern  world,  which  is  characterised  by  the  success  of  the  scientific
enterprise, they generally do so, not least since science has helped to identify and solve
problems such as the depletion of ozone.
By  leaning  on  science  as  a  referee  in  difficult  political  decisions,  Western
societies build on a centuries-long tradition. At least since Machiavelli, philosophers
have promoted the idea of an objective and universally valid knowledge that transcends
ideological differences between political rivals (Brown, 2009). Machiavelli claimed to
speak  the  objective  truth  to  the  Prince  precisely  because  he  was  not  interested  in
grabbing his power. Whilst previously power had equalled truth, Machiavelli merely
‘spoke truth to power’ (cf. Wildavsky, 1979) – ipsa scientia potestas est, wrote Bacon.
The idea that the authority of science, the quintessence of an objective and universal
truth, legitimises what would otherwise be subjective political decisions is thus very
modern indeed (Ezrahi, 1990). It has been invoked in innumerable political rows in
which the existence of conflicting value systems has made it difficult for politicians to
authoritatively close down the debate.
In arguably the first controversy involving a modern scientific element, in the
Northern  French  town  of  Rouen  in  around  1800,  aristocratic  views  of  nature  and
society came into conflict with those of an emerging industrial bourgeoisie (Pepper,
1984: 127-129). The landed gentry represented a pre-revolutionary political class who
saw their traditional ways of life threatened by the revolutionary capitalists and their
swaths of poor workers that changed the face of good old Rouen. Their dirty factories
were planted in what once was a verdant countryside, and the fumes emitted from the
chimneys darkened the skies, further vexing the aristocrats. More than that, as the new
classes  sought  political  representation,  the  gentry  found  its  long-held  authority
diminished.
In view of their declining political power, the landed class claimed to be the
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victims of air pollution caused by the new chemical industries – their gases would be
toxic to plants and humans – and therefore demanded the capitalists shut down their
industries.  Because  the  capitalists  refused to  leave  the  city,  the  Rouen city  council
sought a new, very modern way to mediate between them: instead of confronting the
political tension that had been building up between the classes since at least the French
revolution of 1789, it ordered experts from the new chemical sciences to assess the
case. In what science student Bruno Latour (1993) calls an act of purification – facts
(about  nature) and values (about  we ought  to do) are separated –,  the experts  took
samples of the emitted gases back to their laboratories in Paris where they studied their
chemical properties and determined their toxicity. With these objective results in hand,
they then returned to the city council to set  out the facts  of the matter,  so that the
council  could base its  political  decision on the chemists’ expert  determination.  The
industries could stay, the council ruled, since according to the latest scientific theory
their gases were found to be harmless.
Because the city council found the gentry’s claims unwarranted, the latter called
upon their own experts for a second opinion. Yet the city council insisted on the new
chemical scientists’ theory-based expertise as it represented the universal knowledge
from which also the modern French nation state would draw its legitimacy. Associated
with pre-modern times, when both political and epistemic authorities were united in one
and the same institution or persona such as the Prince, the claims forwarded by the
‘aristocrat’  experts  were  deemed  less  authoritative.  In  the  new  modern  order,
represented by the Rouen city council and the independent experts, political authorities
invoke the authority of scientific theory, which is true because it is not attributed to a
person or place. Scientific knowledge is disembodied, disinterested, and “part of the
public domain, shared by all  and owned by none,” writes the sociologist of science
Robert  K.  Merton  (1968:  588).  Quite  ironically,  for  this  very reason the aristocrats
refused to accept the council’s decision; because chemical scientists were frequently
employed by industrialists, the gentry denied the purity of their ‘industrial’ expertise.
The chemists’ conflict of interest would have surely impinged on their objectivity, or so
they argued.
In this way the landed class’ opposition to the money-grabbing capitalists and
their dirty labour force got filtered into a purely factual question about whether fumes
are damaging, i.e., they hoped that by authoritatively answering this technical question
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the political one too would be resolved allowing them to return to their traditional ways
of life.  But  since the council  ruled otherwise,  the  political  discussion  became side-
tracked into a yet narrower debate about the political economy of chemical experts and
the  purity  of  their  knowledge.  By arguing that  the  experts’ conflict  of  interest  and
bourgeois economic being biased their  knowledge claims, the aristocrats presaged a
Marxist critique of capitalist science in which the cognitive value is contested via the
infrastructure  of  scientific  knowledge  production  (Hessen,  1971;  Bernal,  2010;  cf.
Werskey, 2007).
Once the focus shifts to the political economy of science and the production of
scientific  facts,  the  institutions  of  science,  including  the  scientists,  their  financial
interests and wider social and economic being, as well as those involved in publishing
and  benefiting  from  scientific  research,  are  also  called  into  question.  There  is  no
scientific academy which does not have links to private industry or lobby groups; today
scientists  are  on  the  payroll  of  the  chemical,  pharmaceutical  and  (bio)technology
industries  as  well  as governmental  and non-governmental  organisations  (cf.  Shapin,
2008).  There  is  no  scientific  journal  which  has  not  once  published  science  of
questionable quality, and no scientist who has not, in one way or another, engaged in a
broader cultural discourse about topics related to their areas of interest, whether it is
toxins  or  carcinogens,  vaccines,  genetically  modified  organisms  (GMOs)  or  GHG
emissions.  And because  both  the  landed class and the  capitalists,  the  left  and their
opponents from the right, Labour and Tories, Democrats and Republicans want science
to speak truth to power, they deny each other’s authority with a nod to the impurity of
respective  scientific  knowledge.  Any  value  judgement  potentially  distorts  the
supposedly rational process by which science informs politics.
With the success of science over the decades ever more policy-makers have
sought to invoke the authority of science to legitimate their decisions and make them
seem incontrovertibly right.  In  what  sociologists  have  dubbed ‘the  linear  model  of
science and society’, in a sequential process, basic or fundamental, pure or undirected
research would result in technical innovation, industrial production and public policies
(Bush,  1945).  The  ‘linear  model’ implies  a  straightforward  transfer  from scientific
knowledge to political  decision making. The ‘linear  model’,  summarises sociologist
Reiner Grundmann (2009),
has an inbuilt assumption that decision making is rational. In essence, it is assumed that
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decision makers will alter their practices on the basis of new information. Or at least, it is
assumed that  decision  making  should  be  rational,  i.e.  the  ‘barriers’ to  this  mechanism
should  be  removed.  Examples  of  such  barriers  are  manifold,  including  ignorance  of
practitioners, vested interests, unavailability of data, or ideological factors […] According
to the linear model, it would seem that ‘getting the science right’ is precondition for good
policies. Sound science will help to put an end to ongoing political and ideological debates.
Reducing scientific uncertainty leads to political consensus and ‘good policy decisions’.
Whether practicable or not, the modern idea behind the ‘linear model’ has been
highly influential. In late modern times science has become a regular feature on the
front pages of newspapers and makes headlines on TV and the internet. Hardly any
topic of public interest passes without scientific experts having taken centre stage: they
have been invited to advise politicians on the application of petrochemical pesticides
and  carcinogens  such  as  DDT  and  benzene,  the  risks  of  measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR) vaccination (cf. Leach, 2005), the health effects of tobacco smoke (cf. HSHE,
1994),  drugs  classification  (cf.  Nutt,  2012),  GMOs  (cf.  Mayer  &  Hill,  1996),  the
mysterious bee die-off, fiscal policy, even gay rights. In all of these political decisions
with  some  (however  puny)  scientific  element  –  is  homosexuality  genetically
predetermined or nurtured? – the protagonists want to rely on the authority of science to
settle their value disputes, i.e., because the various parties are committed to different
ethical and ideological positions they are united in their focus on science and claim to
derive the legitimacy of their policy position in one way or another from scientific
evidence. The authority of science, it is understood, trumps the opponent’s ‘irrational’
value judgements.
Compared to early 19th century France, societies today have developed much
more elaborate institutions and tools to facilitate decision-making. For example, in the
US the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) serves to bridge the gap between the
environmental  sciences  and  politics.  Using  the  numerical,  mechanistic,  analytic
language of so-called environmental impact assessments (EIAs), the regulatory agency
informs politicians as to the most rational, such as the economically most viable, course
of action – for example, the calculated costs of environmental pollution caused by the
spraying of DDT outweigh the benefits from protecting cash crops from pests. Such an
approach to decision-making has great normative force as “[i]t allows governing bodies
to claim the cognitive high ground, a place from which they can be seen to be acting for
the  benefit  of  all  without  bowing  to  any  particular  interests  of  the  governed,”
summarises science student  Sheila Jasanoff (2005: 265). By declaring a ban on the
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petrochemical benzene a rational decision (cf. Jansanoff, 1987), the US EPA eventually
managed to circumvent a value-laden discussion about the capitalist political economy
that has allowed a few industries to benefit at the cost of the general public (cf. Hardin,
1968). In the Rouen of today, the controversy between the landed class and capitalists
would surely have resulted in an EIA by the French EPA.
Working  at  the  interface  of  science  and  policy,  these  regulatory  agencies
perform a precarious balancing act. On the one hand they must ensure that the boundary
between  science  and  politics  is  porous  enough  to  allow  for  policy  relevant
interpretation  of  fundamental  scientific  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand  they  must
insulate  science  from  overtly  political  interests  so  as  to  avoid  the  impression  of
partiality – they keep science and politics apart  and in tension with each other (cf.
Jasanoff, 1990). The EPA, for instance, “has taken major steps to ensure that it carries
out a program of sound science to inform Agency decisions without allowing regulatory
objectives  to  distort  scientific  findings  or  analyses”  (EPA,  undated).  “Major  steps”
refers  to  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  products  of  scientific  advisory  processes,
dubbed  ‘regulatory science’, are certified. In the US, this includes open, transparent
research planning, independent review of science publications, audits and site visits,
public comment, judicial review and legislative oversight of the science used (Jasanoff,
1995ab).  The  principal  requirement  for  openness  and transparency is  diagnostically
American;  in  the  US,  more  so than  in  any comparable  Western  liberal  democracy,
public accountability of scientific expertise is based on the assumption of distrust (cf.
Jasanoff, 2005).
In  other  liberal  democracies  there exist  similar  tools  (EIAs)  and institutions
(EPAs). Within the European Commission, for example, regulatory impact assessments
are now carried out to assess the costs and benefits of all EU regulations (Torriti, 2007),
and they are now used across a number of EU member states (Radaelli, 2005). Like
EIAs,  regulatory  impact  assessments  also rely on the  universal,  objective  image of
science. Yet the processes by which scientific findings and policy options are linked are
neither universal nor objective. They differ across (cf. Jasanoff, 2005) and within (cf.
Keller, 2009) nation states resting upon factors that have more to do with accountability
in terms of national democratic politics than with the quality of a universal science.
Public reasoning, writes Jasanoff (2005: 249),
achieves its standing by meeting entrenched expectations about what authoritative claims
18
should look like and how they ought to be articulated, represented, and defended. Science,
no less than politics, must fit itself into established ways of public knowing in order to gain
political support—and these ways of knowing vary across well-defined cultural domains
such as nation states.
In order to gain political support in the US, scientists are frequently asked to
articulate,  represent  and defend their  knowledge at  the legislative  stage  of  decision
making that is in Congressional hearings. To this end, and much like in Rouen where
the city council and aristocrats chose their own experts, Democrats and Republicans
choose experts independently. They then put the scientists under oath and start their
cross-examination, which is considered the most effective way to exercise and probe
transparency.  This  adversarial  procedure  –  a  Congressional  hearing  is  modelled  on
adversarial legal proceedings in which the majority side in Congress usually sets the
agenda – is typical for how the litigious US society warrants scientific knowledge for
policy-making, finds Jasanoff (2005: 263):
The U.S. accountability system owes its special flavor to the extraordinary prevalence of
litigation  as  a  means  of  achieving  repose.  In  scientific  as  in  other  areas  of  policy
disputation,  the  adversary  process  remains  the  dominant  approach  to  establishing
credibility. Truth, according to this template, emerges only from aggressive testing in an
adversarial forum.
By contrast, in the UK the assumption of trust and mutual respect guides the
relationship between scientific advisers and government. Also the demand for openness
and  transparency  is  less  pronounced  in  the  UK.  And  the  option  of  subpoenaing
testimony  from  scientists  is  rarely  exercised.  Instead,  in  a  consensual  decision,
Parliament typically invites and  asks for advice representatives of the Royal Society,
which is recognised as the authoritative and trusted voice on scientific matters of fact.
Trust is a precious resource, knows the UK Science and Technology Committee (2009:
Ev21):
[T]he overarching requirement for smooth operation of the system for scientiﬁc advice to
government is trust. [...] trust is earned, needs to be constantly reinforced and is a two way
process. Committees have an obligation not to ambush ministers when inﬂuences other
than scientiﬁc evidence become the prime drivers for decisions, just as committees do not
want to be ambushed by Government criticism of their advice. 
Jasanoff  calls  these  different  styles  of  reasoning  about  decisions  involving
science  and  technology  ‘civic  epistemologies’  (Jasanoff,  2005).  These  “culturally
specific,  historically  and politically  grounded,  public  knowledge-ways”  evolve  with
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experience and experimentation (Jasanoff, 2005: 249; cf. Doubleday & Wynne, 2011).
And with the prominence of science in all spheres of social life inevitably come
bad experiences and resistance towards decisions involving science and technology.
Echoing those in the US, in the UK the made-cow-disease (BSE) scandal has provoked
calls for more openness and transparency. As a consequence, in the contentious politics
of GMOs, the UK government invited both scientists and members of the public to
deliberate solutions to the fears the prospect of genetically modified food in British
supermarkets has triggered. During the 2003 “GMNation?” exercise, experts explained
their science and its uncertainties to more or less deeply concerned citizens. While a for
the  UK untypical  openness  and  public  exposure  to  scientific  uncertainty  calls  into
question the hope modernists have invested in the boundary drawn between science and
politics, it would be a promising mechanism to “[liberate] politics, law and the public
sphere from their patronization by technocracy,” believes the sociologist Ulrich Beck
(1992: 109). To be sure, different liberal  democracies have traditionally approached
decision-making involving a scientific element differently (cf. Löfsted & Vogel, 2001). 
It  so  turns  out  that  the  modern  separation  of  science  and  politics,  and  the
reliance on the former to achieve administrative closure on political  programmes of
action,  has  had  unintended  consequences.  Science  has  been  transformed  ‘‘from  a
relatively minor institution encapsulated from social influence to a major institution that
influences and is influenced by other social spheres,” observe Etzkowitz and Webster
(1994: 488; cf. Frank & Meyer, 2007). In all important decisions science has “[become]
more and more necessary, but at the same time less and less sufficient for the socially
binding definition of truth,” concludes Ulrich Beck (1992: 156). The more we want to
insulate facts from values in order to make rational decisions, the more they become
bound up with each other (cf. Latour, 1993). 
And  yet  the  modern  idea  of  a  universal  scientific,  by  definition  a-political
authority dies hard: the promise of reducing practical questions about the good life to
technical problems for experts, thereby eliminating the need for democratic deliberation
and discussion of values, is all but appealing. What is more, scientists have been highly
successful in shaping public  discourse by bringing topics onto the political  agenda:
because of  new scientific  knowledge  concerning climate  change,  carbon-consuming
behaviours  that  were  once  tolerated  and  applauded  are  increasingly  perceived  as
undesirable or immoral. It so seems as if need science to inform our decisions. But how
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should this be done, and what do these decisions look like?
In the next section, I show how the idea behind the  ‘linear model’ has been
formally, at the legislation stage of decision-making, applied to the problem of climate
change.  Nowhere has the model  been more influential  and do politicians put a
higher premium on science to resolve their ideological disputes than in the US, and
the controversies in climate science give further evidence to the Americanisation of
the climate debate, the thesis will  show.  But even though the climate controversy
thrives in the US it has now taken on an almost global significance. Facilitated by the
English language and internet media in which it is conducted, the debate over climate
science gives support to those in other countries where US climate sceptics’ talking
points  have  become  part  of  the  political  rhetoric  (e.g.,  Klaus,  2006  in  the  Czech
Republic; Lawson, 2009 in the UK; Plimer, 2009 in Australia; Vahrenholt & Lüning,
2012 in Germany; Ball, 2014 in Canada). Moreover, climate change is global in nature
(cf. Edwards, 2009) and a global agreement is not possible without getting the US as
the world’s second largest gross emitter and largest economy on board.
1.3 Climate policy-making in modern liberal nation states
The phenomenon of human induced climate change has been well-known for at
least a century (Weart, 2008) – even before the scientific theory AGW was described in
the early 1900s, people were concerned, or thrilled indeed, about humanity’s impact on
climate – and the engineering of climate was often hailed as yet another feat of human
ingenuity (Fleming, 2010). Only from the 1960s and 1970s on has climate change been
understood in predominately negative terms as potentially having an adverse impact on
agricultural  production and water  and energy supply (NRC, 1976,  1977ab).  It  took
another two decades for climate change to be recognised as something to be managed
within the context of the modern nation state in an economically globalised world (cf.
Elzinga,  1996;  Miller,  2001,  2004).  By  no  means  was  climate  change  destined  to
become a global issue to be tackled in the ways described in this section (cf. Howe,
2014: chapters 3 and 4).
With the end of the Cold War (and the war on terror yet to emerge) and the new
internationalism of the 1990s, political and business leaders across the Atlantic saw an
opportunity to make capital out of the climate crisis (cf. Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994).
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The idea of a concerted effort to tackle global warming gained political momentum and
bi-partisan support when the UK’s conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and
the Republican US president George H. Bush urged international co-operative action.
“It may be cheaper or more cost-effective to take action now than to wait and find we
have  to  pay much more  later,”  argued Thatcher  (1990).  Speaking at  the  Rio  Earth
Summit,  Bush  (1992)  noted  that  “[e]conomic  growth  provides  the  resources  for
environmental  protection,  and  environmental  protection  ensures  that  growth  is
sustainable.” At this Summit the UNFCCC (1992) was adopted and ratified by 195
countries. Its ultimate objective, the document stated,
is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
A few years  later  in 1997, parties to  the UNFCCC agreed to tackle climate
change head-on via a set of binding targets for industrial countries to reduce their GHG
emissions:  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol  the  industrialised  world  agreed  to  reduce  their
emissions by specified amounts, called ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, by
2012,  relative  to  the  1990  baseline.  The  success  of  the  1987  Montreal  Protocol
encouraged optimism, while the example of US EPA’s experiments with the trading of
sulphur  dioxide  (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions to  provide  a  least  cost
solution to acid rain provided the idea of a carbon emission trading scheme. 1 Climate
change  too would be  dealt  with  the  policy  tools  of  the  neoliberal  nation state:  the
taxation of GHGs and the so-called cap-and-trade scheme should function as incentives
for nations to invest in climate-friendly  energy, i.e., to modernise on an ecologically
sustainable path (cf. Hajer, 1995; Bäckstrand, 2004). Seeing environmental protection
and  economic  development  as  compatible,  this  so-called  ecological  modernisation
“indicates the possibility of overcoming the environmental crisis without leaving the
1 In the cases of acid rain and the hole in the earth’s ozone layer political decisions are explicitly based 
on science: scientists showed how SO2 and NOX emitted from factories or cars could mix well with 
rain and travel long distances in the atmosphere to affect rivers, soils, and wildlife far from the source 
of the pollution. This also holds true for ozone depletion, which scientists found to have been caused 
by the emission of CFCs stemming mostly from refrigerators, freezers and air conditioning systems. 
A depletion of the ozone layer in the lower portion of the earth’s stratosphere, which absorbs most of 
the sun’s ultra violet radiation, has been linked to an increase in skin cancer caused by that radiation. 
Here too the affected often lived far away from the source of the emissions. Thus, both acid rain and 
ozone depletion became a topic of international environmental policy and regulatory regulatory 
schemes which include market-based approaches, whose intention is to give polluters economic 
incentives to install pollution controls: every polluter is allocated or may purchase an emissions 
allowance for each unit of the pollutant it emits. Operators then install pollution control equipment to 
measure and sell portions of their emissions allowances they no longer need for their own operations.
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path  of modernization”  (Hannigan,  1995:  183). Scientific  assessments  such  as  the
IPCC’s provide the epistemic authority  ecological  modernisers among others would
refer  to. An optimistic Sir  John Houghton noted in  his  preface to the  IPCC’s First
Assessment Report (FAR) in 1990 (IPCC, 1990: v):
I am confident that the [IPCC] Assessment [...] will provide the necessary firm scientific
foundation for the forthcoming [...] negotiations on the appropriate strategy for response
and action regarding the issue of climate change.
All the politicians had to do was to pass legislation upon which regulations and cap-
and-trade policies were executed.
However enormous the task at hand, several national governments have since
attempted to give legal expression to the Kyoto Protocol. In the UK, amidst  heated
public debate over its involvement in the war in Iraq, in 2004 Tony Blair announced
national initiatives to tackle climate change.2 To this end the administration ordered a
cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment upon which the most rational course of action
would be decided (Stern, 2006). The so-called Stern Report essentially corroborated
Thatcher and Bush: it is more cost-effective to take action now than to wait and find we
have to pay much more later. As a result, in 2008 the Labour government passed the
Climate Change Act, which makes it the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that by
2050 the UK will have reduced its GHG emissions 80% under the baseline of 1990.
Four  years  later  in  Australia  the  Labour  administration  under  Prime  Minister  Julia
Gillard  formally  enforced  a  carbon  tax  that  requires  large  businesses  to  purchase
emissions permits. And according to Klein (2012), Germany, where the implementation
of ambitious climate change policies has been strongly supported by public opinion
(UBA, 2010) and is facilitated by the collapse of inefficient firms in East Germany after
1990 (OECD, 2001), is on the way to meeting its Kyoto targets.
These success stories overlook that there is ongoing political debate about new
taxes and regulations. First, in Australia only a year and a half later the succeeding
administration under Prime Minister Tony Abbott from the Liberal Party announced the
introduction of a package of bills that would repeal the carbon tax as of 2014. Because
carbon taxes are particularly unpopular in times of austerity, Abbott’s promise may well
have won him the national elections. And climate sceptics celebrated about what they
2 Tony Blair’s announcement of radical climate policies came at a time when discontent over his war in
Iraq grew within the population and in particular among the left. It can been argued that his climate
change initiative, quite opportunistically, helped New Labour to regain popularity.
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see as  a  confirmation  of  their  arguments  against  climate  science and the  theory of
AGW.3 Second, in the UK it is by no means certain that the policies survive further
administrative changes – what has been formally legitimated can be repealed or even
ignored by any elected administration. And here too a handful of high-profile climate
sceptics including Lord Christopher Monckton and Lord Nigel Lawson (2009) decided
to leave no science unturned so as to sink the Climate Change Act. But the 2050 target
the British government set itself may well be too herculean to be feasible in the first
place.4 Third, in Germany the so-called Energiewende, whose costs are estimated to top
€1 trillion, is highly contested and “full of contradictions,” writes John Rhys (2013):
[A] fundamental weakness of German energy policy [is] its inability to confront adequately
the biggest single global challenges of this century – securing low carbon sources of energy
to fuel modern economies, while reducing CO2 emissions with urgency. The harsh reality
is that in this respect Germany underscores the failure of the EU as a whole.
Also German climate sceptics sharpen their knives: In  Die kalte Sonne: Warum die
Klimakatastrophe  nicht  stattfindet,  the  German  politician  Fritz  Vahrenholt  and  the
geologist Sebastian Lüning (2012) asserted that climate change is driven by variations
in solar activity rather than human activity.
In  the  US,  the  historically  largest  emitter  of  GHGs,  the  2003  Climate
Stewardship  Act  was  introduced  to  Congress  by  John  McCain  (R-AZ)  and  Joe
Lieberman (ID-CT) and reintroduced on modified terms in 2005 and 2007. If passed,
the legislation would have required the EPA authority to enforce the capping of 2010
GHG emissions at the 2000 level. However, that bill never passed Congress and under
the Bush Administration the EPA refused to regulate CO2 as a pollutant under the Clean
Air Act. This refusal prompted a number of states to file suits in federal court to force
the hand of the EPA. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US
497  (2007),  the  Supreme  Court  ordered  the  Bush  Administration  to  begin  the
3 http://www.climate-sceptics.com.au/ (Accessed on 12 May 2014)
4 Writes political scientist Roger Pielke, Jr., (2009): “Given the magnitude of the challenge and the 
pace of action, it would not be too strong a conclusion to suggest that the Climate Change Act has 
failed even before it has gotten started. The Climate Change Act does have a provision for the 
relevant minister to amend the targets and timetable, but only for certain conditions. Failure to meet 
the targets is not among those conditions. It seems likely that the Climate Change Act will have to be 
revisited by Parliament or simply ignored by policy makers. Achievement of its targets does not 
appear to be a realistic option”. In an update Pielke, Jr., affirms his critique: “If the UK is to hit its 
2022 emissions target, then assuming a 2 percent annual GDP growth implies a rate of 
decarbonization of the economy of 4.4 percent per year over the next 9 years (for 1 percent annual 
GDP growth it is 3.3 percent and for 3 percent GDP growth it is 5.4 percent). Since the Climate 
Change Act was passed in 2008 the UK economy has actually decarbonized at a rate of 1.1 percent 





administrative process to assess whether or not to regulate CO2 as a pollutant under the
Clean  Air  Act.  In  making  that  determination  the  EPA is  required  to  consider  the
scientific evidence of the danger these emissions pose to public health and the costs of
controlling those risks. Science, wrote the Administrator (EPA, 2009),
must be the backbone for EPA programs. The public health and environmental laws that
Congress  has  enacted depend on rigorous adherence to the best  available science.  The
President [Barack Obama] believes that  when EPA addresses scientific issues, it  should
rely on the expert judgement of the Agency’s career scientists and independent advisors.
[...] EPA will stand ready to help Congress craft strong, science-based climate legislation
that fulfils the vision of the President.
As the primary scientific and technical sources of the so called Endangerment Finding
(EPA, 2009a), the Administrator relies on the IPCC, the US Climate Change Science
Program (CCSP), the US Global Change Research Program (GCRP) and the National
Research Council (NRC) (EPA, 2009c).
Unsurprisingly, the fossil fuel industry and their political protégées have been
opposing emission controls. What is more, carbon taxes are hardly welcome by the
large swaths of US Americans whose prosperity is built on the burning of fossil fuels.
According  to  its  opponents,  the  failure  to  consider  these  societal  welfare  benefits
created  by  the  energy  sources  that  produce  GHG  emissions  would  undermine  the
rationality of the Climate Stewardship Act (see HSCCT, 2011: 83; cf. Adler, 1997). And
because science forms the backbone of these sorts of calculations and risk assessments,
they contest the veracity of scientific evidence presented by the IPCC,  CCSP, GCRP
and NRC. Congressman Michael Burgess (R-MN) exemplified this argumentation in a
Congressional  hearing  dedicated  solely  to  the  hockey  stick  climate  reconstruction
(HCEC, 2006: 23):
We have already taken out the VOX, the POX, NOX, the SOX, the TOX. Now it is the
carbon dioxide and water that are coming out of those smokestacks that has to be stopped
[…] It is false to presume that a consensus exists today or that human activity has been
proven to cause global warming, and that is the crux of this hearing. What we are here
today to discuss is the [...] the hockey stick temperature studies […] As the U.S. Congress
and even the international policymaking bodies look to the scientific community to provide
information and analysis, it is especially important to make certain that the processes are in
place to ensure that we are using sound and unbiased science.
For Congressman Burgess, several fellow Republican party members and other
opponents of regulations to restrict GHGs, the 2009 ‘Climategate’ scandal was further
evidence of a bias in the climate science being used to justify government action on
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climate change. “The CRU information undermines [...] particularly the work of the
IPCC. […] ‘Climategate’ destroyed EPA’s basis for concluding that it could rely on the
procedures for ensuring the quality, integrity and transparency of the information on
which the IPCC relied […],” read a petition to the EPA presented by a Republican-
chosen expert witness in Congress (HSCCT, 2011: 91). ‘Climategate’ “appears to have
contributed  to  an  increasing  disavowal  of  climate  change  and  rejection  of  climate
policy  in  the  Republican  Party,  at  the  state  and  federal  levels  and  among  2012
presidential  candidates,”  summarise  communications  experts  (Maibach  et  al 2012:
289).
Ever  since  the  science  of  climate  change  has  been  used  to  justify  state
regulation, opponents of that regulation have responded by trying to criticise the theory
of AGW as scientifically unsubstantiated fear-mongering. In the eyes of many climate
sceptics, global warming is a fear Democrats, environmentalists, leftists and ‘mobbed-
up’ experts spread in order to gain political influence and power. Climate concerned
commentators on the other hand blame the political impasse in the US and globally on
these sceptics. “This virulent strain of anti-science infects the halls of Congress, the
pages of leading newspapers and what we see on TV, leading to the appearance of a
debate  where  none  should  exist,”  stated  the  lead  author  of  the  hockey stick study
Michael Mann (2014) in the New York Times (NYT). “Our present crisis over the rise of
anti-science has been coming for a long time and we should have seen it  coming,”
complained  historian  Naomi  Oreskes  about  climate  sceptics  among the  Republican
candidates in the presidential elections (The Observer, 2012). “We are sliding back into
a dark era [...] and there seems little we can do about it. I am profoundly depressed at
just how difficult it has become merely to get a realistic conversation started on issues
such as climate change or genetically modified organisms,” added the president of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Nina Federoff (Ibid). 
Climate  policy  is  not  the  first  time  such  accusations  have  been  exchanged.
Similar arguments dominate the politics of GMOs in which anti-GMO activists resist
big  capitalists  controlling  the  world  market  of  seeds  (cf.  Arjó  et  al 2013).  The
accusations  of  anti-science  or  scientific  fraud  also  prevail  in  the  politics  of  MMR
vaccinations (cf.  Flaherty,  2011),  the smoking ban,  DDT and so forth.  In 2004 the
conservative, climate sceptical Heartland Institute published “DDT: A Case Study in
Scientific Fraud” in which the late entomologist Gordon Edwards (2004, cf. Kinketa,
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2011) concluded: 
The chemical compound that has saved more human lives than any other in history, DDT,
was banned by order of one man, the head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).  Public  pressure was generated by one popular  book and sustained by faulty  or
fraudulent  research.  Widely  believed  claims  of  carcinogenicity,  toxicity  to  birds,  anti-
androgenic  properties,  and  prolonged  environmental  persistence  are  false  or  grossly
exaggerated. The worldwide effect of the U.S. ban has been millions of preventable deaths.
In all of these controversies the political opponents claim to speak in the name
of  science  and  dispute  each  others’  pretensions  to  expert  authority.  The  overall
objective of this thesis’ empirical part is to introduce analytic rigour to the debate over
climate science, not least because quite a few academic commentators, too, believe it to
precede if not legitimise the difficult and contentious political decisions. To achieve this
objective I systematically examine the adversaries’ claims for and against its authority
qua science. 
In a first step (Chapters 3 and 4), I situate their arguments within the philosophy
of science literature: here my aim is to see whether, and if so how, agreement on a
universally valid and logically consistent foundation of scientific authority can help in
the  resolution  of  the  so-called  hockey  stick  controversy,  which  culminated  in
‘Climategate’.  If  the adversaries can  agree on the principles by which authoritative
knowledge is arrived at, they must – if one takes their arguments seriously – also agree
on how to act upon it. 
In a second step (Chapters 5 and 6), I analyse my protagonists’ arguments using
certain concepts from the sociology of science literature that deal with the problem of
expert  legitimation:  here  my  aim  is  to  see  whether,  and  if  so  how,  theoretical
sociological claims about the nature of scientific knowledge qua expertise can settle the
hockey stick controversy. If the adversaries can agree on the markers of expertise, they
must – if one takes their arguments seriously – also agree on how to act upon what the
experts say.
With the results of my empirical investigation, I return to the thesis’ overall aim,
which  is  to  show  that  the  scientisation  of  climate  politics has  provoked  the
politicisation of science along with  a debate over its authority, whose resolution the
adversaries  believe  to  be  instrumental  for  the  difficult  decision-making  process  to
continue, i.e., because government bodies in the US more than anywhere else hand over
their  responsibility  in  difficult  political  decisions  to  ‘science’,  thereby claiming the
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cognitive high ground, political opponents question the nature of its authority.
In the next section, I rehearse important concepts in the outline of the thesis’
respective analysis chapters. In the analysis chapters, I will return to that theoretical
framework in more detail. I so hope to make the story flow.
1.4 The foundations of scientific authority
When faced with difficult political decisions, modern societies habitually look
to science as an arbiter of truth. As explained above, science promises a placeless and
disembodied form of knowledge: it describes an objective world external to the minds
of  all  humans;  society  and nature,  mind and matter,  subject  and object  are  clearly
divided realms, and scientific knowledge refers directly to this natural, material and in
this sense objective reality. Thus, its authority qua science rests in a scientific method
which allows scientists to bridge the gap between reality and representation by means
of inductive reasoning. Here the scientist first observes the natural world and induces
from these observations a scientific theory. The information with which the scientist
assesses the truth value of the induced theory must then be derived from reports of
empirical  observation,  called  a  posteriori  sentences,  and  clearly  demarcated  logical
statements, called a priori sentences. By following this procedure, a scientist verifies a
scientific theory qua truth. Its authority is foundational, given by God or Nature, as it
were. In a nutshell this is how the so-called logical empiricists of the early 20th century
viewed science. 
But at least since Karl Popper’s 1934 (1980) treatise on The Logic of Scientific
Discovery philosophers  of  science  have  noted  that  the  scientific  method  based  on
inductive reasoning is not as logical as it seems. Because there is no logical end to
testing  –  how  many  observations  suffice  to  consider  a  theory  verified?  –,  Popper
famously  replaced  induction  and  associated  verificationism  with  deduction  and
associated  falsificationism.  In  deductive  logical  reasoning  a  theory  which  fails  to
predict a certain observation is falsified by the latter. And according to Popper, a theory
that cannot potentially be proven wrong is dogma and as such no different from poetry
or  religion;  it  is  not  scientific.  While  the  principle  of  falsification  poses  obvious
problems for realism – if theories are scientific only if they can be proven wrong, no
theory has ever described the world as it really is – it does so too for the authority of
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science. In fact, science has no authority whatsoever, argues Popper (1980: 259-260):
It is all guesswork, doxa rather than epistēmē […] Science, one might be tempted to say at
times,  is  nothing  but  enlightened  and  responsible  common  sense  –  common  sense
broadened by imaginative critical thinking. But it is more. It represents our wish to know,
our hope of emancipating ourselves from ignorance and narrow-mindedness, from fear and
superstition. And this includes the […] the fear of being proven wrong, or of being proved
‘inexact’, or of having failed to prove or justify our case. And it includes the superstitious
belief in the authority of science itself (or in the authority of ‘inductive procedures’ or
‘skills’).
Popper’s insight must be ignored by those who insist on the indisputable authority of
the scientific method. But since inductive reasoning requires scientists to consent on the
terms of verification (such as what constitutes a sufficient number of observations), the
authority of science can hardly be indisputable or foundational either. 
The first analysis chapter of the thesis (Chapter 3) deals with the search for that
foundational authority of climate science. It is an exercise in empirical philosophy of
science in which I examine my protagonists’ ideas of the scientific method.  Although
the debates in US Congress about climate change are pitched as political debates, they
are in fact drawing on these philosophical ideas about the scientific method. By putting
the long and distinguished history of philosophy of science into conversation with these
political  debates,  my  aim  is  to  clarify  whether,  and  how,  different  sides  actually
disagree about the fundamentals of the scientific method. The chapter concludes with a
characterisation of the philosophy of ‘sound science’ that has served sceptics to criticise
climate science.
In the second analysis chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4), I revisit the scientific
controversy  on  climate  reconstruction.  The  chapter  both  provides  the  reader  with
necessary background information and assesses the  idea  of  ‘sound’ climate  science
against the practice of climate reconstruction. In the so-called hockey stick controversy
the disagreement between scientists and sceptics over the practical implementation of
sound scientific principles has come to the fore: although they agree that science is the
sober  representation  of  a  complex  material  reality,  scientific  closure  on  climate
reconstruction is difficult to achieve by means of the scientific method alone; it seems
as if closure requires consent and agreement among scientists, rather than strict logic.
At least since Thomas Kuhn’s seminal  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962),
that  question  of  how to achieve  closure has  interested  scholars in  the  sociology of
scientific knowledge (SSK).
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Presaged by Popper’s attack on verificationism, scholars in the SSK decided not
to study methodological questions but the scientists as “people with bodies, situated in
time, space, culture and society, and struggling for credibility and authority” (Shapin,
2010). Methodological questions would still  play a role in science,  but they do not
sufficiently  explain  how the institution  of  science  and its  experts  have achieved an
authoritative standing in modern societies. In the SSK, analytical focus shifted from
those philosophical debates about the foundational authority of the scientific method
onto the practitioners and the construction of scientific expertise, i.e., the SSK showed
that  scientific  closure  was  a  social  as  much  as  a  cognitive  achievement;  scientific
authority was relative, it was embodied.
The SSK may be divided into at least two traditions or what the sociologists
Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002) dubbed ‘Wave One’ and ‘Wave Two’ science
studies.  Taking  the  truth  of  science  for  granted,  the  aim  of  ‘Wave  One’ studies
(alternatively  called  the  ‘social  institutional  constructivist’ tradition,  see  Sismondo,
1993) is to trace the social pressures that mould science, and to explain the falsity of
theories through social bias. Representative of  ‘Wave One’ scholarship is Robert K.
Merton’s The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Merton,
1968;  also Mannheim, 1954).  In  his  attempt to  save  science from the onslaught  of
totalitarian  regimes,  Merton  was  not  interested  in  philosophical  questions  over  the
method but in how science remained independent of political pressures. Only if science
was free as an institution, Merton held, would its practitioners remain authoritative and
their  advice  valuable  to  decision-makers.  Failures  of  scientific  advice  can  thus  be
explained by reference to vested interests and political ideology that have turned an in
principle innocent form of knowledge into a chaste victim of misuse.5 Such ideology of
science  and  its  concomitant  belief  in  science-led  social  progress  has  been  highly
influential in the 1950s and 1960s (Habermas, 1971); it continues to appeal to decision-
makers.
But if social bias precipitated the demise of an established but ultimately false
theory, would social factors not also account for a theory’s truth? And how is it possible
5 Arguably  the  most  famous  example  is  that  of  Soviet  biologist  Trofim  Lysenko  who  rejected
Mendelian genetics  that  described Darwinian competition between individuals as the natural  law.
That  idea  conflicted  with  the  staunch  Communist  belief  in  the  superiority  of  mutual  assistance
between individuals.  Accordingly,  Lysenko’s research was heavily biased towards the idea of co-
operation. Communist rulers then used his supposedly objective science as convenient legitimation
for political intervention in the Soviet agricultural sector.  And because this application led to mass
famine  and starvation,  Lysenko’s  name still  acts  as  a  deterrent  in  many a  scientific  controversy,
including that over AGW. 
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that  people  in  all  times  and  places,  including  our  own,  have  believed in  scientific
theories that later turned out to be false? These are the fundamental questions asked by
the then new SSK or ‘Wave Two’ science studies (e.g., Barnes & Bloor, 1982). In the
late  1970s  the  new  SSK  criticised  structuralist  sociology  like  Merton’s  for  its
historicism – as if science inevitably converged to truth, destined to progress. Truth,
argued David  Bloor  (1991),  cannot  be  the  cause  of  any belief’s  credibility  –  truth
formation  and  scientific  consensus  too  would  need  a  historical  and  sociological
explanation. Their response to this methodological dilemma was to adopt what they
termed the ‘Strong Programme’ in the SSK. Instead of treating scientifically accepted
truth as self-evident and only falsehood as amenable to sociological explanation, the
‘Strong Programme’ treated them symmetrically; it assumed an agnostic stance about
the truth and falsehood of science. The sociologists’ task is to describe how scientists
qua experts demarcate themselves from the non-expert (cf. Gieryn, 1983; Gieryn, 1999;
Shapin & Schaffer,  1985).  In this way they seek to avoid the trappings involved in
previous accounts of science by revealing that “there is no guaranteed path from the
material  world  to  scientific  truths,  and  no  method  identifies  truths  with  certainty”
(Sismondo, 2004: 43).
Through the lens of the SSK, in the third analysis chapter of the thesis (Chapter
5)  I  examine how the  protagonists  in  the  hockey stick controversy  demarcate  their
proclaimed expertise from that lay knowledge ascribed to others. I describe the various
mechanisms and discourses by which they demarcate science from politics or pseudo-
science so as to secure their privileged status among ways-of-knowing. Once again we
find these discussions at the legislative stage of decision-making in US Congressional
hearings where the scientists have been cross-examined and scrutinised to an extent that
makes the basis of their claims to expert knowledge particularly clear. The aim of this
chapter is to put these debates into conversation with  ‘Wave One’ and  ‘Wave Two’
science studies as well  as a theory (‘Wave Three’)  recently proposed by Collins &
Evans (2002).
In the fourth and last analysis chapter of the thesis (Chapter 6), I describe and
analyse new, open and transparent, attempts to close the scientific debate on climate
reconstruction against a certain theory of expertise, which the philosophers of science
Funtowicz  and  Ravetz  (1993)  dubbed  ‘post-normal  science’ (PNS).  Other  than  the
‘Strong Programme’, which argues that the authority of science rests on boundaries and
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the  affirmation  of  exclusion,  and  Collins  &  Evans,  2002,  who  want  to  prescribe
boundaries  to  save  its  authority  in  decision-making,  PNS negates  the  existence  of
boundaries. Funtowicz and Ravetz insist that anyone with a stake in political decisions
with a scientific element should be allowed to participate in the making and reviewing
of  scientific  knowledge.  Because  science  has  become so  pervasive,  decisions  have
become so urgent, and publics have a stake – they will have to pay carbon taxes, – the
demand for  openness  seems only  reasonable.  What  is  more,  an  inscrutable  climate
science, as revealed in the ‘Climategate’ email disclosures, has resulted in a loss of trust
in institutions and decisions whose authority would depend on science’ authority qua
science.
Will openness and transparency help in the resolution of the controversy and the
authorisation of contentious climate policy? With the answer to this question, in the
conclusion of the thesis (Chapter 7), I shall also be able to answer whether it is the
violation  of  the  scientific  method,  the  violation  of  certain  scientific  norms,  or  the
implications of accepting the science as legitimation of public policy which provoked
‘Climategate’. In other words, does the problem rest within the science or within the
politics of climate change? If it rests within science, philosophers should engage with
open  questions  surrounding  the  scientific  method,  and  sociologists  of  scientific
knowledge  should  elaborate  more  deeply  on  a  theory  of  expertise  or  else  demand
openness and transparency in every aspect of climate science. If, however, the problem
rests within the politics of climate change, politicians need to search for an alternative
course of climate action. In that case, we sociologists of science need to ask different




2.1 How to study scientific controversies?
At least since Thomas Kuhn’s  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962),
scientific controversies have been an important part of the sociology of science; they
offer  opportunities  to  study  the  making  (Knorr-Cetina,  1995:140)  and  unmaking
(Yearley 1995, 465) of authoritative scientific knowledge. Using historical examples
such  as  the  Copernican  Revolution  –  initiated  by  Copernicus,  Newton  unified  the
advances of Kepler and Galileo, – Kuhn showed how inconsistencies in an established
theory have led to significant changes in the basic assumptions within a ruling theory.
Inconsistencies  within  the  geocentric  “paradigm”  led  Kepler  on  the  path  of  the
heliocentric “paradigm”; a scientific revolution unfolded with Galileo’s observations,
and the scientists after him, including Newton, could not ignore the new theory since it
explained more observations than the previous one. A new “paradigm” had been firmly
established and all scientists after Newton worked within its theory of gravity – until
Einstein came along and offered  a  more comprehensive explanation in  the form of
relativity.
In the transition period from one accepted theory to a more comprehensive one,
scientists engage in controversies about the elements constituting the paradigm. In these
scientific  revolutions  Kuhn observed changes in  both the cognitive  content  and the
social fabric of science: since older scientists are reluctant to change their minds it is
usually younger scientists who challenge the established theory. A scientific revolution,
as Kuhn described it, is at the same time a social revolution.
In line with Kuhn, the ‘Strong Programme’ has focused quite explicitly on the
role of social factors in scientific controversies. Since people are prone to believe in
what  may turn  out  to  be  false  theories,  they  have  been interested  in  “the  socially
contingent manner in which the objects of science are constructed and knowledge about
them  is  socially  validated,”  summarises  Demeritt  (2006:  455).  They  found  that
scientific theories are often either welcomed or rejected based on the onlookers’ world
views. For example, whilst Darwinian natural selection rang true in imperialist Britain,
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it  was  denounced  by  communist  onlookers,  who  would  highlight  the  role  of  co-
operation,  not  competition,  between  species.  Quite  evidently,  wider  socio-political
controversies are reflected in scientific ones (cf. Shapin, 1975).
In  this  thesis  the  scientific  controversy  surrounding  climate  reconstruction
provides an excellent opportunity to study the making of scientific truth. If the latter is
as much a cognitive as a social achievement, we can expect to see conflicts over both
the cognitive content of climate reconstruction and its social fabric, such as the cultural
authority of its practitioners. Before I describe my data and methods of analysis, in the
next section I review the existing body of scholarship on the climate controversy and
locate gaps in the literature.
2.2 Sociologies of climate science
In  the  SSK,  the  ‘Strong  Programme’’s  social  constructivism  has  become  a
methodological  principle  for  the  empirical  study  of  knowledge  production.  In  the
analysis  of  climate  science,  however,  few  have  followed  David  Bloor’s  advice  to
remain agnostic about scientific truth. Arguably because an agnostic stance on climate
science  would  serve  the  coalition  of  climate  sceptics,  “[s]ocial  scientists  are  [...]
reluctant  to  turn  their  deconstructive  frameworks  lose  on  IPCC-sanctioned  climate
science,  scientists,  and  assessment  processes,”  suspects  Myanna  Lahsen  (2013).
Without much scrutiny sociologists have, by and large, accepted or even endorsed the
consensus  presented  by  mainstream  scientists  (Lever-Tracy,  2008;  Giddens,  2009;
Oreskes & Conway, 2010; McCright, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; 2011; Dunlap
& McCright, 2011; Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013; Brulle, 2013; Lewandowsky et al 2013).
As Grundmann and Stehr (2010: 3) aptly note,
[t]he inherent alarmism in many social  science contributions on climate change merely
repeats the central message provided by mainstream media. It is curious that little guidance
is provided in terms of what could be done to deal with climate change, or at least pointing
out what options we have. Can sociology deliver on this? One would expect substantial
proposals besides the exhortation to listen more to what the natural sciences have to tell us.
A popular vantage point for such an alarmist and partisan academic scholarship
is  the  sceptics’ political  economy and the  multi-million dollar  campaign of  climate
denial.  These  analysts,  many  climate  scientists  and  their  political  protégées  have
dismissed the sceptics’ scientific critique with a nod to its smoothly oiled anti-climate
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change PR machine led by the fossil fuel industry and its conservative political servants
(cf. Hoggan & Littlemore,  2009; Brulle,  2013). Because some sceptics have indeed
given  in  to  the  temptation of  industry  money (The Guardian,  2011),  the  historians
Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway (2010) dismiss their critique on mainstream climate
science.  Serving  as  the  fossil  fuel  industry’s  expert  front  group,  these  sceptical
scientists would vocally distort the truth as it suits their free-market ideology and fills
their wallets (cf. McCright & Dunlap, 2010; 2011; Dunlap & McCright, 2011). 
As important as this critique is, it does not satisfactorily explain why a quite
heterodox contrarian movement stubbornly resists the putative authority of mainstream
climate science. Not each and every sceptic is in denial for personal profit (cf. Hulme,
2009; chapter 6; Norgaard, 2011; Kahan et al 2011). And why should climate scientists
be resistant to such ulterior  motives. That argument can easily be turned around as
sceptics  have  spotted  behind  climate  science  an  ideology  powered  by  the  rising
renewable energy industries. And the emails certainly reveal the scientists’ attempts to
produce facts that fit and serve this environmentalist agenda.
Therefore, in a second line of critique, climate-concerned scholars dismiss the
sceptics’ epistemic markers of expertise. Lacking what Oreskes and Conway (2010)
deem appropriate scientific qualifications, sceptics are said to know little about climate
science.  And  indeed,  many  prominent  sceptics  are  physicists  who  have  no  formal
training in climatology but later in their career became interested in climate science (cf.
Lahsen  2008).  Equally  revealing,  at  least  in  Oreskes  and  Conway’s  view,  is  the
contrarians’ failure to publish in the peer-reviewed climate scientific literature. In an
essay  published in  the  journal  Nature, Oreskes  (2004) argues  that  none of  the  928
scientific articles she surveyed disagrees with the IPCC consensus position that “[m]ost
of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase
in greenhouse gas concentrations” (IPCC, 2001c: 21).
Yet these too may prove rather weak-kneed arguments against the authority of
climate sceptics. When investigative journalist Donna LaFramboise (2011) speaks of
the IPCC as  Delinquent Teenager Mistaken for the World’s Top Climate Expert, she
employs many of the same arguments against mainstream climate scientists. She notes
that  quite  a  few IPCC authors  are  yet  little  credentialed  PhD students,  and  that  a
substantial part  of its referenced literature is not peer-reviewed. Bjurström and Polk
(2010) too found that out of 14,000 references in the IPCC 2001 report, 38% referred to
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books,  conference  proceedings  and  grey  literature.  As  Tora  Skovdin  (2000:  414)
presciently  remarked,  “...[u]sing  information  from  non-published  sources  may
compromise the scientific authority the IPCC has gained over the years it has been in
operation” (cf. Hulme & Mahony, 2010).
As representatives of the partisan divide on climate change Naomi Oreskes’ and
Donna LaFramboise’ analyses exemplify the problems social institutional constructivist
or  ‘Wave  One’-type  critique  can  entail.  If  used  to  deny  the  other  side’s  epistemic
authority,  it  quickly  loses  its  punch,  leading  to  an  irresolvable  stand-off  between
convinced and sceptics in which the analysts preach to their own choirs (cf. Kahan et al
2011).6 In particular after the revelations of ‘Climategate’ the arguments against biased
sceptics can be easily returned:  In his  take on ‘Climategate’,  the sociologist  Reiner
Grundmann (2013) concludes that the involved scientists had acted out of self-interest;
his analysis also serves as a reminder or warning to scientists who have a reputation to
defend: by virtue of their office they are ethically obliged to preserve the authority of
science.
With  a  few  exceptions  (e.g.,  Demeritt,  2006;  Ryghaug  &  Skølsvold,  2010;
Grundmann & Stehr, 2010; Beck, 2012; Grundmann, 2013) analysts have studied the
climate science controversy from a barely disguised partisan point of view. To date
(2014)  only  science  scholars  Marianne  Ryghaug  and  Tomas  Moe  Skølsvold  have
followed the ‘Strong Programme’ taking an agnostic stance on scientific truth. In the
tradition of so-called artefactual constructivism (cf. Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; 1988;
1999;  Pinch & Bijker,  1987),  Ryghaug and  Skølsvold (2010) describe  how climate
scientists tried to convince their colleagues of their proposed facts’ truthfulness. Using
the scientists’ emails (EAE, 2009) as a data source, they show how the experts of what
Harry Collins (1981) called the “core-set” of scientists struggled to persuade critical
colleagues of the methodological choices in the hockey stick climate reconstruction.
Ryghaug  &  Skølsvold  conclude that  climate  scientists  must  have  felt  “signiﬁcant
6 Taken from there the analysis of climate scepticism becomes a phenomenon to be studied in the 
public engagement process rather than in the ‘republic of science’ (Krosnick et al 2006; Boykoff, 
2007; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Carvalho, 2007; Nisbet, 2009, Nerlich et al 2010, Gavin & 
Marshall, 2011). Communication scholars thus stress a need for improved communication and public 
engagement efforts (Maibach et al 2012). Others again argue that the public engagement process via 
communication efforts have a minor influence, but are “dwarfed by the effect of the divide on 
environmental issues in the political elite” (Brulle et al 2012). Sociologist Robert Brulle and 
colleagues conclude that “any communications strategy that holds out the promise of effectiveness 
must be linked to a broader political strategy.” For the purpose of all these studies climate science is 
understood as a no-brainer (see Lahsen, 2008 for a rare exception).
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political pressure” to express the “voice of climate science” as uniﬁed voice, or as a
“nice tidy story about  unprecedented warmth” (p.  302, see Grundmann,  2012 for a
critique). Apparently that pressure influenced the scientists’ methodological choices. 
A typical  critique  on  any  analyses  of  the  climate  controversy,  including  on
Ryghaug & Skølsvold’s ‘Wave Two’ account, concerns the disregard for the role of the
scientific method. Whilst ‘Wave One’ analyses take its authority for granted, the ‘Wave
Two’ generally ignores or merely mentions in  passing the scientific  method and its
concomitant  common-sense  realist  stance  on  truth  (cf.  Sismondo,  1993).  This
conventional image of science people refer to when they seek its authority is viewed as
outdated  and  little  worthy  of  discussion:  “In  the  long  run,”  suggest  Ryghaug  and
Skølsvold,  “scientists  may be better  served by greater  openness with respect  to the
actual  practice  of  science,  rather  than  upholding  the  conventional  image  of  cool,
restricted display of instrumental rationality” (2010: 304). In a similar vein, Brigitte
Nerlich  (2010)  concludes  her  study  of  ‘Climategate’  arguing  for  a  “...public
understanding  of  modern  science  [...]  based  [...]  on  appreciating  the  nature  of
uncertainty and the impossibility, even undesirability, of establishing universal truths.”
To no surprise, climate scientists have received such statements with puzzlement and
discontent. Most of the scientists who venture into the world of constructivist social
science “come away at best confused and at worst shaking their heads at what they
often see as self-cited social theories devoid of real word knowledge of what scientists
do,” remarked the late climate scientist Stephen Schneider (2001: 338). If scientists did
not believe at least in the possibility of establishing universal truths via instrumental
rationality, they would hardly practice science.
This  ‘ignorance’ has failed analysts in as far as they have not explained why
sociological  studies  of  climate  science  may  be  important.  Thus,  they  have  been
criticised by both mainstream climate scientists and climate sceptics, as neither of them
wants  their  (dis)belief  in  AGW explained  as  social  construction.  Scientists  are  not
happy with accounts describing them as a ‘bullying tribe’ but seek to illuminate the
context which provided a fertile ground for ‘Climategate’ to happen (cf. Skrydstrup,
2013). And from the sceptics’ point of view,  the climate scientists  have not merely
violated an ethos by excluding them, or misrepresented scientific practice, but meddled
with  the  scientific  method,  to  say  the  least.  Other  than  the  existing  sociological
accounts, in this thesis I take the arguments against mainstream climate science, and
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climate reconstruction in particular, seriously – without the sceptics’ critique we would
not have known of the scientific controversy – but remain agnostic about their truth
value. Before we delve into the scientific debate in Chapters 3 and 4, in the remaining
sections of this chapter, I describe the sources from which I gathered data as well as the
methods by which I processed and analysed them.
2.3 Data sources
In  controversy  studies  the  sociologist  usually  sifts  through  the  scientists’
notebooks, holds interviews and follows the actors into their laboratories, where they
closely observe how they reason, negotiate, persuade and convince, reject or confirm
their colleagues’ criticism (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). 
In the hockey stick controversy this has proven to be quite a difficult task. As
the  waves  after  ‘Climategate’  had  not  calmed  enough  by  then,  my  request  for
interviews with whom I consider the main protagonists, notably Michael Mann, were
almost unanimously ignored or turned down. Due to the subject’s sensitivity, it is also
highly unlikely that interviewees would have answered complaisantly. Some principals
I approached at  side-events such as conferences were indeed reluctant  to go on the
record  and  insisted  on  informal  conversations  preferably  not  to  be  quoted  from.
Unsurprisingly,  climate  sceptics  were  more  willing  to  engage  with  me.  But  these
conversations, mostly held on Skype and via email, offered little information different
from the one available on easily accessible sources such as blogs. I eventually decided
against using interview material; only twice, in Chapter 5 on pages 112 and 122, do I
use excerpts from interviews since I could not find comparable information on publicly
accessible sources. 
For two reasons I do not see the lack of any such data as a shortcoming. First,
other sources such as the infamous emails (EAE, 2009) offer much better and most of
all un(self)censored data. Showing actual comments in real time, rather than ex-post
interview  reflections  offered  to  justify  their  actions,  the  email  conversations  are
arguably much closer to the revealed preferences of the climate scientists  and their
critics. As such they are less prone to self-justifying rationalisation in front of a critical
sociologist  of  science  (or  the  news  media).  In  fact,  with  the  emails  in  hand,  the
sociologist can participate in the scientific controversy as the proverbial fly on the wall
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with access to  ‘oral’ communication not made for public consumption (cf. Traweek,
1988: 117).
The material hacked from CRU consists of 1,073 text files containing e-mails as
well as nearly 3,500 other documents, which I have not dealt with. The first e-mails
date  back to  March 1996;  the last  was sent  on November  12th,  2009.  Many more
emails were stolen but it  is thought that the perpetrator chose to release only those
which contained certain key words. In these emails are recorded conversations between
dozens of climate scientists most of who have been involved in the production of IPCC
assessment  reports.  Therefore  many conversations  show scientists  discussing (their)
scientific research and its representation in IPCC assessment reports. They are shown to
struggle with the task of both agreeing on the basic facts and turning them into policy-
relevant findings, that is, to insulate science from political influences. Often they failed
in this most precarious task, giving credence to claims from sceptics about a politicised
scientific environment. However, most emails do not directly deal with the scientific
controversy, nor with the IPCC, but show scientists and administrators discussing grant
applications, media relations and administrative work. In comparably few conservations
the scientists actually deal with climate sceptics and the question of how to respond to
their often openly hostile critique.
The authenticity of the stolen CRU material is difficult to verify; they do not
exist in a formally published version, nor can they be accessed from officially certified
sources;  they  can  only  be  downloaded  from non-governmental  websites.  A similar
qualification  applies  to  other  data  stemming  from  non-official  publicly  available
sources. But the fact that none of the involved scientists, nor their institutions, have
denied  the  veracity  of  the  emails  strongly  suggests  that  these  are  indeed  my
protagonists’ opinions  and  not  simply  made  up.  Bearing  this  lack  of  official
certification in mind, I consider these data verified. I accessed the e-mails online via a
blog  run  by  the  climate  sceptic  Jeff  Condon.  On  November  19th,  2009,  his  blog
noconsensus.wordpress.com first published excerpts from a 62 megabite file that had
anonymously been sent to him. 
Second, I do not see the lack of interview data as a shortcoming because in the
making of authoritative scientific knowledge the scientists’ public rationalisation is at
least  as  important  as  the  construction  of  scientific  objects  behind closed  doors.  In
Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama the sociologist Stephen Hilgartner
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(2000) makes this point by distinguishing between backstage and front-stage processes.
Backstage, scientists engage in debates about data and methodological questions, whilst
front-stage their aim is to make the construction of the objects of science look like mere
discoveries. In front of a sceptical audience, this public rationalisation is arguably more
important than esoteric methodological questions. Therefore, the public record where
scientists and sceptics give an account of themselves provides another valuable source
of data.
The formal public record stems primarily from US Congressional but also from
a UK Parliamentary hearing on ‘Climategate’. As gestured at in the introduction, these
are important venues on which scientific knowledge is warranted as public truth fit for
decision-making. And  because politicians look at  science to  authorise  their  political
programmes, which meet greatest opposition at that legislative stage, the supposedly
legitimating knowledge is meticulously scrutinised. For practical reasons I identified
and chose only hearings that in one way or another addressed the science of climate
reconstruction.  Whilst  at  least  five hearings in the US covered the scientific debate
(SCEPW, 2003; 2005; HCEC, 2006; SCCST, 2007; HCSS, 2010; HSCCT, 2011), in the
UK only one hearing dealt  explicitly  with  the issue of  climate reconstruction (HC,
2010a; see table 2.1).
Further publicly available material came from policy and technical documents,
floor  speeches,  notes  submitted  to  Congress  and Parliament,  published accounts  of
‘Climategate’ by both climate sceptics (e.g., Mosher & Fuller, 2010; Montford, 2010;
2012) and climate scientists (e.g., Mann, 2012), as well as interviews in newspapers,
climate blogs and other social media platforms; in principle any published statement
related to the controversy is data (cf. Charmaz, 2006). To this end I did an extended but
unstructured media review sifting through online newspapers and blogs; both climate
sceptics and mainstream scientists run their own blogs on which they authorise and
contest  each  other’s  knowledge claims,  front-stage  as  it  were.  And because  on  the
internet the principals appear much more relaxed than on formal venues, where they
have to swear an oath and there is a physically present audience that needs convincing,
these  blogs  have  proven  a  most  valuable  source  of  data  (see  table  2.2).  On blogs
scientists and their critics engage with commentators in interview-like situations during
which they are more likely to offer a private opinion than in formal settings; they are in
control of their audience and can decide whose arguments they want to deal with (and
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how) and whose to exclude.
A last important source of information was the scientific literature on climate
reconstructions. Through the course of my research, readings and interactions, I have
developed enough of what Collins and Evans (2007: 14) call “interactional expertise,”
that is, “the ability to master the language of a specialist domain in the absence of its
practice” so as to engage with experts intelligently without necessarily being able to do
the specialist work myself. This has enabled me to understand the contentious scientific
issues  debated  in  the  controversy,  despite  not  possessing  the  “core-set”  expertise
actually  needed  to  practice  in  or  contribute  to  the  advancement  of  those  specialist
fields.
The time period covered by the thesis is ca. 18 years starting with the first of the
unlawfully released emails (March 1996), and ending with the publication of the IPCC
fifth assessment report (AR5) in April 2014 (IPCC, 2013a). The deadline of the thesis,
April 2014, meant that later developments were not included.
Table 2.1: Public hearings on climate reconstruction in the US and the UK
Title Date Location Committee Chairs Key Witnesses
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Dr. David R. Legates1 
Dr. Leonard Levin2 
Dr. Michael Mann3 
Dr. Gary Myers4 
Dr. Deborah Rice5
Dr. Willie Soon6 
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Majority
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Dr. Benjamin Santer33 
Dr. Richard Alley34
Dr. Richard Feely35 
Rear Admiral David Titley36 
































Research Unit at 


















Lord Lawson of Blaby46 
Dr. Benny Peiser47
Mr. Richard Thomas48
Dr. Edward Acton49 
Dr. Phil Jones50
Sir Muir Russell51
Sir John Beddington52 
Dr. Julia Slingo53 
Dr. Bob Watson54
1 Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware
2 Electric Power Research Institute
3 Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Virginia
4 Department of Neurology, University of Rochester Medical Center
5 Maine Department of Environmental Protection
6 Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Harvard University
7 US National Council for Science and the Environment
8 Author, medical doctor
9 Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado State University
10 Division of Tropical Public Health, US Department of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics, 
11 Environment and Energy Project, The Brookings Institution
12 Center for Computational Statistics, George Mason University
13 Department of Atmospheric Sciences, Texas A&M University
14 National Climatic Data Center, NOAA
15 Department of Earth Science, Duke University
16 Institute for Coastal Research, GKSS Research Center, Germany
17 Mining consultant, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
18 Earth System Science Center, The Pennsylvania State University
19 Earth System Science Center, University of Alabama in Huntsville
20 National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
21 Pew Center on Global Climate Change
22 University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR)
23 US Climate Change Science Program, NOAA
24 Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, NOAA
25 Environmental Consultant
26 Climate Science Watch, Government Accountability Project
27 Department of Chemistry and Earth System Science, University of California, Irvine
28 National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
29 Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Science, MIT
30 National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
31 Climate Central 
32 Cato Institute 
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33 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California Berkeley
34 Department of Geosciences and Earth and Environmental Systems Institute, Penn State University
35 Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, NOAA
36 Oceanographer and Navigator of the U.S. Navy 
37 US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
38 Center for Western Lands, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership 
39 Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology 
40 The Wharton School of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. 
41 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California Berkeley 
42 Earth System Science Center, University of Alabama in Huntsville 
43 Troutman Sanders Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)
44 Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Science, MIT
45 Independent economist and consultant
46 Global Warming Policy Foundation
47 Global Warming Policy Foundation 
48 UK Information Commissioner
49 University of East Anglia, Vice-Chancellor
50 Climatic Research Unit (CRU)
51 Independent Climate Change E-Mails Review
52 Royal Society, Government Chief Scientific Adviser
53 Met Office
54 UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
Table 2.2: Selected climate blogs
Blog Operators url
Air Vent Jeff Condon http://noconsensus.wordpress.com
Climate Audit Steven McIntyre http://climateaudit.org
Wattsupwiththat Anthony Watts http://wattsupwiththat.com
Real Climate G. Schmidt, E. Steig, S. 
Rahmstorf, M. Mann, R. 
Benestad,
R. Bradley, R. Pierrehumbert, D. 
Archer
http://www.realclimate.org
Bishophill Andrew Montford http://bishophill.squarespace.com
Steven Mosher’s blog Steven Mosher http://stevemosher.wordpress.com
Skeptical Science John Cook http://www.skepticalscience.com
Climate Depot Marc Morano http://www.climatedepot.com
Desmog Blog James Hoggan http://www.desmogblog.com
Climate Progress Joe Romm http://thinkprogress.org/climate/issue
Dot Earth Andy Revkin http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/aut
hor/andrew-c-revkin/
Climate Etc. Judith Curry http://judithcurry.com/
Die Klimazwiebel H. von Storch, R. Bray, R. 
Grundmann, W. Krauss, E. Zorita, 
B. Hünicke
http://klimazwiebel.blogspot.com
Bob Tisdale – Climate 
Observations
Bob Tisdale http://bobtisdale.wordpress.com
Climate Skeptic Warren Meyer http://www.climate-skeptic.com
Junk Science Steve Milloy http://junkscience.com
Climate Science: Roger Pielke Sr. Roger Pielke Sr. http://pielkeclimatesci.wordpress.co
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Stoat William Connolley http://scienceblogs.com/stoat
Tallbloke’s Talkshop Tim Channon http://tallbloke.wordpress.com/about
-tim
2.4 Data processing and data analysis
Although the scientists have not denied the emails’ veracity, they complain that
climate sceptics have cut, copied and pasted certain statements in order to accuse them
of fabricating evidence for AGW. Indeed, certain statements and notably the “trick” to
“hide a decline” (EAE, 2009: 16 November 1999) in 20th century temperatures were
immediately singled out, circulated widely, and even became the topic of a 268 page
long treatise (Montford, 2012). The selection of a few among a very heterodox set of
conversations by what has been dubbed the ‘hockey team’ has also been taken up by a
sensationalist and opportunist (and mostly anglophone) news media. In the US,  Fox
News cited the most racy e-mails to insinuate “a possible conspiracy to distort science
for political gain” (Fox News, 2009). In the UK the yellow press too cited from ‘the
damning emails’, and though much less extensively, the story has also been covered in
its quality press. Shocked by the revelations,  The Guardian’s environmentalist writer
George Monbiot demanded the resignation of CRU’s director, Phil Jones. 
The “trick” to “hide the decline” in particular fuelled allegations of scientific
fraud. But like many other excerpts it too has to be understood in context, which can
hardly emerge from a single email alone. In fact, the scientists argue that the emails
themselves have to be understood in the wider context of climate denial, which they
have  tried  to  illuminate  ever  since.  In  their  view,  the  ‘dirty  laundry’ has  been de-
contextualised  and  re-contextualised  to  fit  the  sceptics’ unsubstantiated  theory  of
scientific fraud.
Because I had to start somewhere, I too began my investigation with the emails.
But  other  than  the  agitated  commentators,  I collected,  processed,  interpreted  and
analysed the data in a way that counters the marginalisation efforts of the news media
(see also Ryghaug & Skølsvold, 2010: 292).  As a first step I read the 1,073 text files in
chronological  order,  highlighting  passages  I  deemed  important  for  my research
questions. I then jointly coded, grouped, and analysed those emails in ways that would
speak  to  my theoretical  framework.  For  example,  one  group  of  emails  contained
‘questions on methodology’, another showed ‘scientists discussing the presentation of
44
their findings in the IPCC’, yet another one was about ‘the certification of scientific
knowledge’, ‘conversations with or about sceptics’, and so forth. These central themes
emerged in the course of reading the emails.  And once I  understood which themes
would  speak  to  which  of  my  chapters,  and  whether  they  were  indeed  helpful  in
answering respective research question, I used them accordingly. But I also identified
and used search terms, which I then applied to other sources of data, and vice versa.
The  public  hearings  on  climate  science  provided  a  source  that  allowed  for
relatively  easy  data  compilation.  I  first  listened  to  the  audio  files  available  from
governmental  web-sites to  get  a feeling for  the ‘climate’ of  public  hearings.  I  then
downloaded the transcripts and highlighted important passages. Once again I jointly
coded  and  analysed  the  data.  And since  my understanding  of  the  scientific  debate
together with my analytical sensibility improved in the course of researching, I read
through all transcripts time and again looking for different themes. If new search terms
seemed  suitable,  or  proved  more  effective,  I  would  return  to  the  emails  and other
sources so as to counter-check observations. This allowed me to search for regularities
in the research data and to cross-check data from multiple sources. Such triangulation
ensures the quality and credibility of my findings (cf. O’Donoghue & Punch, 2003). 
In other publicly available sources a systematic data compilation proved much
more difficult. Because there are dozens of climate blogs, I had to draw a somewhat
arbitrary boundary around the ones I  consider  useful;  many more blogs could have
made it onto the list presented in table 2.2. I made my choice after I had spent many
dozens of hours familiarising myself with the often esoteric disputes, many of which
are not  published elsewhere,  and the characters populating the ‘blogosphere’.  Once
again I applied the search terms I had previously used across other sources.
Overall, the compilation and processing of data turned out to be an instructive
process in which I had to go back and forth within and between different materials, to
revise or discard search terms. I spent significant time reading across different sources
so as to develop a feeling for the venues and characters under study. Having compiled
data  from various  sources,  I  can  map out,  or  explain  more  fully,  the  richness  and
complexity of the protagonists’ behaviour in the scientific controversy; I can provide a
more  inclusive  picture  than  the  one  presented  by  climate  sceptics,  the  accused
scientists,  the  news  media,  but  also  the  few  academic  studies  on  ‘Climategate’.
Lamented a reader of Ryghaug & Skølsvold’s study:
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Amazing that a stack of hacked emails is now apparently enough to form the scientific
basis for an analysis on how climate scientists tick. In the past, scholars of the philosophy
science had to interview the pertinent actors or (especially if already deceased) had to sift
through lab  books,  notebooks,  published  and  unpublished  work or  reminiscences  from
contemporary  colleagues.  Nowadays  a  few emails  suffice to  make a  story that  can  be
published. Sheds a sober light on the standards employed in the field of the history or the
philosophy of science.7
On  all  of  these  venues,  including  the  blog  on  which  I  found  this  comment,  the
commentators, analysts, scientists, sceptics, and politicians are actively engaged in the
making of authoritative scientific knowledge. 
In my interpretative analysis I followed Lasswell (1948) and asked: Who says
what,  to  whom,  why,  to  what  extent,  and with  what  effect?  For  example,  who do
scientists address in the various forums, via the scientific literature, the emails, public
hearings and blogs? In the scientific literature and public hearings one can expect much
more carefully phrased arguments than in the emails in which scientists quite carelessly
expressed their opinion. In the informal but publicly accessible records, scientists and
sceptics too are purposeful and adapt their behaviour and language according to the
audience they want to convince. In terms of hermeneutics, the people I studied adapted
their behaviour and language to the ‘interviewer’ – in order to maximise their goal.
To translate the interpretative approach into an analytical structure I eventually
drew upon the concepts introduced in 1.4, which are described in detail in each of the
analysis chapters. To be sure, the data can be interpreted within different theoretical
frameworks, the marker of quality being intellectual rigour. 
Although the study is largely driven by the available data, it is important to note
that  there are  always theoretical  considerations  which are  never clearly demarcated
from the empirical work of data collection. No less than in any other human inquiry, the
researcher has to have some idea about what they are looking for and where to find it;
they make use of predetermined ideas, hypotheses, concepts and categories which are
used to inform the development of other categories.  For example,  in this thesis the
concept of ‘climate sceptic’, however ambivalent it may be (Hulme, 2009), signifies
people who oppose climate policies via arguments over the reality of climate change as
described in the scientific theory of AGW, i.e., by using the term sceptic, opponents of
climate policies invoke the motif of scepticism as scientific virtue. 
7 http://klimazwiebel.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/marianne-ryghaug-and-tomas-moe.html (Accessed on 19
March 2012)
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Like  any  other  researcher,  I  am  “necessarily  engaged  in  understanding  the
human  world  from within  a  specific  situation.  The  situation  is  always and at  once
historical,  moral and political,”  state Rabinow & Sullivan (1988: 21).  And to some
degree, one could add, it is also personal since for many years I have had an interest in
environmental  and  climate  history.  As  undergraduate  student  I  learned  how  to
reconstruct past environments from dead plant material (pollen) stored in a bog, and
since  2007  I  have  been  casually  following  the  scientific  debate  on  climate
reconstruction on blogs. In autumn 2009 I spent a term at the UEA and frequented the
CRU building from which the emails were leaked. This is where and when the idea to
write this thesis was eventually born.
Finally,  any generalisation of the findings herein or from any account of the
controversy is difficult. The drive towards overarching generalisations in sociological
analysis would not only distort the subject of study to fit a mode of analysis intent on
developing  universal  laws,  but  also  ignore  meaning  in  favour  of  prediction,  i.e.,
although I  sometimes draw comparisons  with  other  scientific  and political  debates,
“Climate Reconstruction and the Making of Authoritative Scientific Knowledge” must
be understood in its historical and geographical context. The authority of the thesis then




Philosophies of ‘sound science’
The impersonal rigor of the method has produced enormously powerful results for 400
years. The scientific method is utterly apolitical. A truth in science is verifiable whether
[…] you know the experimenter, or whether you don’t. It’s verifiable whether you like the
results of a study, or you don’t […] It is not a matter of honesty or good intentions. 
Michael Crichton in Congress (SCEPW, 2005: 52)
3.1 Introduction
In the thesis’ introductory chapter I argued that climate sceptics’ talking points
have  become  part  of  the  rhetoric  whenever  policy-makers  want  to  legitimise  their
programmes of action with the universal authority of scientific knowledge.  Arguably
more so than anywhere else, this strategy is prevalent in the US. Political scientists,
sociologists and historians of science typically ascribe climate scepticism in the US to
party-political and ideological commitments (Hoggan & Littlemore, 2009; Oreskes &
Conway, 2010; McCright, 2011; Leiserowitz  et  al 2011; McCright & Dunlap 2011;
Maibach  et  al 2013;  Elsasser  &  Dunlap,  2013).  Whilst  Democrats  have  always
favoured  regulatory  policies  to  manage  the  adverse  effects  of  industrialisation,  the
Republicans support small government, an enabling state, and free-market solutions.
They typically oppose governmental interference in private affairs. Thus Democrats are
frequently portrayed as pro-environment, pro-science and pro-climate policy, whereas
Republicans are belittled for their ‘irrational’ stance on the environment, science and
climate  policy  (cf.  Mooney,  2006;  2012).  And  the  scientific  experts  that  the
conservatives  invite  to  testify  in  Congress  are  denounced  as  a  handful  of  bribed
scientists who “obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming”
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
The analytical focus on ideological commitments and the underlying political
economy  of  funding  that  drives  climate  scepticism  provides  a  constant  stream  of
research  material,  yet  it  ignores  the  fact  that  in  their  opposition  to  climate  policy
conservative sceptics also invoke the authority of science.  Quite often they turn the
argument around: “We have concluded that [forecasting global warming] is basically an
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anti-scientific political movement,” announced professor of marketing Scott Armstrong
(HSCCT,  2011:  14).  What  is  more,  the  analysts  have  generously  overlooked  that
protagonists  across  the  political  divide  share  the  same  idea  of  science.  Both
Republicans  and  Democrats  put  a  high  premium  on  ‘sound  science’ to  minimise
controversy, help close down political debates, and defend the impartiality of decision
making.  In  fact,  many requirements  for  ‘sound science’ have  been written into US
legislation on scientific risk assessment (Herrick, 2004).
Because the ideas of science have remained unexamined in those a-symmetrical
accounts of the climate controversy, as if they were not worthy of a discussion, this
chapter  aims  to  fill  this  gap.  Using  Congressional hearings  as  its  main  source  of
information,  in  this  chapter  I  excavate  the  philosophies  of  science  underlying  the
demands from policy-makers on both sides of the climate debate for sound scientific
knowledge.  To that  end the  chapter  is  structured as  follows.  First  I  present  the  bi-
partisan  idea of  ‘sound science’.  Second I  parse  its  underlying philosophy.  Third I
subject the oft-repeated criticisms climate sceptics hold against the theory of AGW to a
practical test informed by the philosophy of science and science studies literature. I
conclude with a characterisation of the climate sceptics’ philosophy of science.
3.2 The bi-partisan idea of ‘sound science’
Although climate policy debates have stalled over the question of whether the
theory  of  AGW  is  ‘sound  science’,  the  underlying  ideal  of  ‘sound  science’ as  a
foundation for rational policy-making has remained largely unexamined. The climate
establishment posits a scientific consensus on climate change (Oreskes, 2004; Anderegg
et al 2010; Rosenberg, 2010) and climate sceptics counter their claims with charges
about its ‘unsound’ knowledge base. In recent years much of their criticism has focused
on potentially ‘unsound’ reconstructions of Northern hemispheric temperatures (Mann
et al 1998; 1999) which the climate establishment counts as evidence for the theory of
AGW. In the US, Republicans with a Congress majority have amplified the scientific
debate on climate reconstruction by holding Congressional investigations into charges
from sceptics about  the scientific  flaws in the reconstruction (SCEPW, 2003, 2005;
HCEC, 2006). 
Here and elsewhere Congressional Republicans have loudly endorsed the view
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that sound policy should be based on ‘sound science’. Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)
reasoned in Congress (SCEPW, 2003: 1):
One of my primary objectives as chairman of the committee is  to improve the way in
which science is used. I think that when I became chairman of this committee, I announced
[...] we are going to try to base our decisions, things that we do, on sound science […]
When science  is debated openly and honestly,  public  policy can be debated on firmer
grounds. Scientific inquiry cannot be censored. Scientific debate must be open. It must be
unbiased. It must stress facts rather than political agendas.
On the possibility of climate legislation, Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO) noted (SCEPW,
2003: 12): 
This is why it is so important to me that we be cautious when dealing with situations such
as these  and why we should place  strong emphasis  on the  use of  sound science.  Our
regulations must be thoughtful reflections of what we know – they should not be reflexive
or reactive attempts to legislate a cure before we know what the disease is.
This same view was articulated three years later by Congressman Ed Whitfield (R-KY)
in a House hearing dedicated solely to climate reconstruction (HCEC, 2006: 5): 
At the end of the day, the issues of climate change require open and objective discussion.
Some of the work we’ll consider today points to the value of policy decisions that  are
informed by sound science and objective advice.
The use of ‘unsound’ science may even have disastrous consequences, warned
Senator Kit Bond (R-MO): “[U]nsound scientific guesses have led to the possibility of
flooding and risking lives” (SCEPW, 2005: 10). Not only would ‘sound science’ help
decrease the vulnerability of populations to natural disasters, it would speak the truth
against political extremism, suggested Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA): “The
propaganda campaign of the man-made global warming alarmists has much more in
common with Stalinism than does insisting that both sides of the issue be heard at a
Congressional hearing”  (Rohrabacher,  2008:  5039);  assuming the  mantle  of  Robert
Merton (1968), Rohrabacher casts himself in the role of defender of rational science
against Lysenkoist ideology. Fellow party member George Voinovich (R-OH) wrapped
up (SCEPW, 2005: 17): 
I  have  long  believed  that  sound  science,  not  politics,  should  drive  our  Nation’s
environmental  policy.  In  fact,  I  believe  that  in  harmonizing  our  Nation’s  economic,
environmental, and energy policies, that sound science should be the uniting factor.
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Though  it  is  associated  with  the  Republicans  and  sympathetic  think  tanks
(Jaques  et  al 2008),  the  idea  of  ‘sound  science’ is  not  solely  mobilised  by  them.
Because  the  prefix  ‘sound’  indicates  a  scientific  ideal  insulated  from  political
interference,  politicians  from across  the  partisan  divide,  and  in  particular  from the
regulatory agencies charged with making contentious administrative rules in the face of
partisan scrutiny, make ample use of its rhetorical force. The EPA (undated) remarks in
its  Science  Policy:  “The EPA has  taken major  steps  to  ensure  that  it  carries  out  a
program of  sound science  to  inform Agency  decisions  without  allowing  regulatory
objectives to distort scientific findings or analyses.” Testifying before Senate, David B.
Sandalow of the US Department of Energy agreed with Voinovich: “[S]ound science
should guide all government policy” (SCEPW, 2005: 81). As regards the Republican
critique  of climate  reconstruction,  Democrat  Senator Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin
warned that  “[p]oliticians  ignore  sound science  showing evidence  that  the  Earth  is
warming at an unprecedented rate, that carbon dioxide levels are rising, and that human
activities are largely the cause” (HCEC, 2006: 32). Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who
introduced the Climate Stewardship Act with former Democrat Joe Liebermann (ID-
CT) against the wishes of his party members, urged that “[emission] reductions must be
feasible and based on sound science” (SCCST,  2007: 82).
By and  large,  scientists  and scientific  bodies  seem to  agree.  In  a  pledge to
restore scientific integrity in policy making, Nobel Prize winning scientists lamented
the “advocating of policies that are not scientifically sound” (UCS, 2004). In a review
on scientific procedures, the Inter-Academy Council (IAC) opened by recognising that
“[s]ound scientific, technological, and medical knowledge is fundamental to addressing
critical issues facing the world today” (IAC 2010: i). NASA scientist Gavin Schmidt
remarked on the science of climate reconstruction: “[T]he conclusion, the conclusion
about the conclusion, and the conclusion about the conclusion of the conclusion, is that
[…] the Hockey Stick is sound science and portrays the temperature record in a robust
manner” (Schmidt, 2010). Last but not least, the climate scientist Jay Gulledge from the
Pew Centre on Climate Change invoked ‘sound science’ to confirm that “[t]he warming
over the past 5 decades has been attributed (through sound science) to human activities
associated  with  greenhouse  gases”  (HCEC,  2006:  693).  Only  when  they  discuss
scientific issues among themselves, scientists do not see a need for using the prefix
‘sound’ (EAE, 2009).
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Because  it  creates  an  incentive  to  demonstrate  that  science  supports  their
positions, none of the protagonists is willing to give up the ideal of ‘sound science’. For
politicians, its function as a symbolic aspiration is invaluable, and for scientists, in front
of a critical audience, it reinforces their status as objective experts. Thus, protagonists
across the climate divide continue to press for the soundest science. And even if their
demand is provoked by and directed towards opposite ends, does a shared ideal not
foster rather than stifle the policy process? After all, it may indeed reflect a genuine
belief  in  the  objectivity  of  science,  acknowledges  the  sociologist  John  Turnpenny
(2012:  402).  The  next  section  describes  the  philosophy  of  science  climate  sceptics
appeal to when they speak about ‘sound science’.
3.3 ‘Sound science’ in theory
Verification and falsification
In their critiques of climate science as ‘unsound’, sceptics frequently invoke the
principle  of  induction  as  the  grounds for  scientific  truth.  Famously  championed by
Francis Bacon, in inductive reasoning a general theory is arrived at by the accumulation
of  unique  observations.  In  the  textbook example,  the  observation  of  a  white  swan
verifies  the  theory  that  “all  swans  are  white.”  For  Senator  John  Thune  (R-SD)
“scientific truth has to be verifiable, that is a key thing” (SCEPW, 2005: 38). “The basic
rule of science is that hypotheses must be validated by observed data before they can be
regarded as facts,” notes the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI, cited in Herrick,
2004:  426).  In  a  floor  speech,  Dana  Rohrabacher  (R-CA)  (2008)  explained  that  a
scientist “doubts, tests, verifies, and repeats.”
Alternatively,  climate  sceptics  invoke  the  principle  of  deduction  in  which  a
conclusion is reached reductively. The scientist starts out with a general rule or theory
and evaluates it against observations to reach their conclusion. Thus, deduction lends
itself  to  falsification (Popper,  1980).  In the textbook example,  the observation of  a
single black swan falsifies the theory induced from x-observations of white swans only.
When a theory’s prediction (“all swans are white”) is falsified by a single instance (a
black swan) it has to be rejected. Dana Rohrabacher (2008) explained:
A scientist does not “believe” something to be true. Nor does he negotiate a solution with
his colleagues. He does not reach consensus. A scientist engages in a search for answers by
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forming a theory and trying to tear it apart. He invites his colleagues to prove him wrong
[…] A scientist will do everything he can to prove a theory wrong. Only then, when he and
his colleagues are unsuccessful at disproving a concept, will he accept it.
To be sure, mainstream climate scientists too allude to the principle of falsification:
“Science  […]  means  objectivity,  transparency,  repeatability,  and  in  principle  the
possibility  of  falsification,”  wrote  the  geophysicist  Rasmus  Benestad  on  the  blog
realclimate.org (2007).
Verification and falsification are cornerstones of the scientific method, which is
at  the heart  of ‘sound science’; it  demands of scientists  to either verify or falsify a
scientific  theory  with  observations.  These  observations  can  be  relatively  simple
measurements  of  natural  phenomena  or  the  results  of  more  or  less  complicated
experiments. Observation and experimentation are central  activities of scientists and
their importance cannot be stressed enough: testifying in the House of Representatives,
Jay Gulledge explained that “[t]he primary evidence [of AGW] is based on physical
principles  and  observational  and  experimental  analysis  of  contemporary  climate
dynamics (HCEC, 2006: 177). 
Observation
In  the  classical  experimental  sciences,  there  is  theory on the  one  hand,  and
experiment  or  observation  on  the  other.  The  theorists  produce  hypotheses  and
calculations,  and  the  experimentalists  produce  measured  results  or  data  from
observations. These are indeed two different and quite distinct communities in pursuit
of  different  objectives  (cf.  Galison,  1987;  Sundberg,  2005).  At  some  point  the
calculations are confronted with the experimentalists’ data to either verify or falsify
certain hypotheses that are unified in a scientific theory. In order to do that the scientific
method demands of the scientists to strictly demarcate observation from theory, and the
question  philosophers  of  science  have  struggled  with  is  how  to  do  that:  how  to
eliminate  the  observational  bias  in  which  the  scientist’s  theoretical  predisposition
influences what and how they observe. 
The  so-called  logical  empiricists  have  found  a  compelling  answer  to  this
question.  Adapted  from  Kantian  empiricism,  in  logical  empiricism  observational
statements are strictly demarcated from logically reasoned, theoretical sentences. The
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latter cannot be derived from observation but are based solely on the rules of logic and
language – they are true as such. Scientists can then make both analytic a priori and
synthetic a posteriori statements: in the textbook example, the sentence ‘All unmarried
men are bachelors’ is analytic because the idea of a ‘bachelor’ is already contained in
‘unmarried’.  It  is  analytic  a  priori since  logical  reasoning  exists  in  the  mind
independent of observation or experience. By contrast, the statement ‘Some bachelors
are  very  unhappy’ is  a  synthetic  statement  because  the  idea  of  ‘unhappy’ is  not
contained in ‘bachelor’. This statement can only be justified a posteriori. The sentence
is a synthetic  a posteriori statement since the observation of unhappy bachelors does
not exist in the mind independent of observation or experience. And because the truth
of synthetic statements can only be derived from observation, and the truth of analytic
statements is based on the rules of the language, from a logical empiricist view there
cannot be synthetic a priori statements. For the testing of a scientific theory this means
that the making and selecting of observations must be based on analytic a priori terms.
All scientists implicitly subscribe to the logical empiricist distinction between
analytic  a  priori  and  synthetic  a  posteriori  sentences.  They  often  employ  ‘a  priori
language’ to justify the selection of observations, but these terms are rarely described in
the scientific literature as it is generally assumed that fellow scientists know what is
meant  by a  priori  and a  posteriori.  In  scientific  controversies  the  opponents  would
typically check and challenge what could be an analytic a posteriori selection of data:
“To ignore aspects that don’t  fit  the hypothesis is  definitely not science.  Neither is
adjusting data so to provide a good fit without a solid and convincing justification,”
avered Rasmus Benestad (2007) in a rebuttal of scientific claims made by the sceptics.
And  about  the  selection  of  observational  data  for  the  hockey  stick  climate
reconstruction, complained the ‘climate auditor’ Steven McIntyre (2005): “Without a
statement of these “clear a priori” criteria, it is obviously impossible to replicate the
proxy selections of MBH98.” In his statement McIntyre both agrees with the tenets of
logical  empiricism and  points  to  a  last  important  principle  of  ‘sound science’:  the
replicability of observations or experiments is a key motor of scientific progress and
success.
Replication
Replication  is  a  universally  accepted  principle  of  the  scientific  method.
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According to the principle of replication, scientific observations and experiments are
credible if and only if anyone with the right skills and material resources is able to
reproduce them. As the American Physical Society (APS) explains, ‘‘[t]he success and
credibility of science are anchored in the willingness of scientists to [...] expose their
ideas and results to independent testing and replication by others […] (cited in HSCCT,
2011: 2). “Replication of results is a key component of science,” affirmed the Director
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s National Climatic
Data Center (NCDC) Tom Karl in his testimony to US Representatives in the House
(HCEC, 2006: 130). Likewise, novelist and climate sceptic Michael Crichton explained
in his Congressional testimony (SCEPW, 2005: 18):
In essence, science is nothing more than a method of inquiry. The method says an assertion
is valid – and will be universally accepted – only if it can be reproduced by others, and
thereby independently verified. The impersonal rigor of the method means that it is utterly
apolitical.
Any failure of replication raises important questions about the veracity of the
original  experiment.  “If  the  work cannot  be replicated and verified by independent
experts, then that work’s conclusions become more speculation and possibly some will
say it  should be open to classification as outright scientific dishonesty,” warned the
Republican  Congresswoman Marsha  Blackburn  of  Tennessee  against  the  premature
acceptance of climate reconstructions by Mann, Bradley and Hughes (HCEC, 2006:
32). Mann had repeatedly claimed the soundness of his reconstruction, arguing “...[t]he
precise details of our early work have been independently reproduced and confirmed by
climate  scientists”  (HCEC,  2006:  641).  Climate  sceptics  in  turn  question  the
independence of these scientists, notably Mann’s PhD student Scott Rutherford’s. But
for the purpose of this chapter it suffices to know that both sides agree on the principle
of replication as an essential component to the scientific method.
In summary, in the philosophy of ‘sound science’ a scientist has to follow the
scientific  method in which observations serve to  verify or falsify a  theory.  Only if
observational  sentences  are  logically  demarcated  from theoretical  sentences  can  the
theory  these  statements  describe  be  considered  true.  Finally,  any  observations  and
experiments have to be independently replicated. Thus, in broad terms the philosophy
of ‘sound science’ describes the common-sense-realist attitude to truth,  stressing the
importance of observation over theory and denying the scientists any agency in the
55
discovery of truth. Both climate sceptics and mainstream climate scientists subscribe to
this common-sense realism, and the more binding they consider the ideals of ‘sound
science’, the more critical they will be of any practice in which they are violated.
In the next section I subject the ideals of ‘sound science’ to a practical test. In
the second half of the 20th century, philosophers of science have increasingly argued
that agreement about the scientific method and knowing quite whether its principles
apply in practice is conventional. If it is indeed conventional, not logical, we can expect
to see disputes over these conventions,  for example,  over the terms of verification,
falsification, and replication.
3.4 Theory testing, validation and replication in climate science
The role of observation in inductive logic
A scientific  theory  is  a  well-substantiated,  unifying  explanation  for  a  set  of
hypotheses  that  lend themselves  to  testing,  though  as  we  have  seen  there  is  some
ambiguity among advocates of ‘sound science’ about whether the aim of such testing is
verification or falsification. Climate sceptics have certainly argued that there are not
enough observations of climate change for AGW to be considered verified. In this vein,
the former president of the National Academy of Science (NAS), Frederick Seitz, held
that AGW has not been substantiated by observations (in Singer, 2008: iii):
It is foolish to [impose drastic measures and harsh economic penalties] when the [climate]
problem is  largely  hypothetical  and  not  substantiated  by  observations  […]  we  do  not
currently have any convincing evidence or observations of significant climate change from
other than natural cause
Alluding to the principle of induction, in Seitz’ opinion there have not been enough, if
any,  observations  that  would  verify  AGW.  And  the  existing  observations  have  not
convinced him of the explanation of significant climate change. Also climate sceptic
and geographer David Legates professed in Congress “not [to be] entirely convinced,
based  upon  the  proof,  that  carbon  dioxide  is  a  driving  force  [of  climate  change]”
(SCEPW, 2003: 34).
In his critique of the principle of induction, Karl Popper (1980) notes that there
is no logical end to testing; there is no logical reason to choose y over x number of
observations to consider a theory proven. Rather, in testing a theory, scientists decide to
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accept  a particular,  inevitably somewhat  arbitrary number  of observations and their
decisions are based on agreement – they are conventional not logical. For this reason
“[s]cientists don’t speak in terms of ‘proof’ but in terms of likelihoods and the strength
of evidence in support of a particular hypothesis,” Michael Mann corrected Legates
(SCEPW,  2003:  181). The IPCC,  for  instance,  has  gone to  great  lengths  to  find  a
common language that describes scientific confidence in the likelihood of AGW being
real. Their probability statements are assigned numerical values – in the IPCC 2007
report ‘very likely’ means 90%-99% likelihood – and degrees of confidence scientists
have in that statement:  ‘very high confidence’ means that the degree of confidence in
being correct is at least 9 out of 10. These standards of proof have changed over the
years and may vary from study to study; they are socially constructed.8 Thus, what
constitutes a significant number of observations for both scientists and their critics to
accept  the  truth  of  AGW  has  to  be  agreed  upon.  And  because  agreement  is
conventional, it can easily fail opponents in scientific controversies.
The role of observation in deductive logic
Alternatively, and as it suits their argument, climate sceptics and mainstream
scientists  invoke  the  principle  of  falsification.  The  advantage  of  falsification  over
verification is that a single observation can, in principle, refute an established theory. In
a controversy about  satellite  observations,  instrumental  surface  temperature records,
and climate models,  sceptics proclaimed the falsification of AGW: because satellite
observations by climatologists Roy Spencer and John Christy (1990; 1992; Christy et
al 1995)  reported  less  warming  than  instrumental  surface  observations  do,  and
contradict climate models depicting a much higher rate of tropospheric warming, the
physicist-turned-climatologist  and  conservative  political  activist  Fred  Singer  (2008:
108) concluded:
Climate models all predict that, if GH gases are driving climate change, there will be a
unique fingerprint in the form of a warming trend increasing with altitude in the tropical
troposphere, the region of the atmosphere up to about 15 kilometers […] This mismatch of
observed  and  calculated  fingerprints  clearly  falsifies  the  hypothesis  of  anthropogenic
global warming (AGW). We must conclude therefore that anthropogenic GH gases can
8 So-called social object constructivist critique (cf. Sismondo, 1993) is particularly effective in 
attribution and detection studies in which also single weather events are increasingly taken as ‘proof’ 
that man-made climate change is already happening. But social object constructivists may also 
deconstruct the ways by which scientists portray and communicate uncertainty in these studies (Van 
der Sluijs, 2005; Van der Sluijs et al 2005). This in turn requires and understanding of how different 
uncertainty metrics are agreed on, hence socially constructed (Guy & Estrada, 2010).
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contribute only in a minor way to the current warming, which is mainly of natural origin.
Also for the palaeontologist Robert Carter (2007) “[t]he satellite data signal not
only  the  absence  of  substantial  human-induced  warming  […]  but  also  provide  an
empirical test of the greenhouse hypothesis as understood by the public – a test that the
hypothesis  fails.”  By calling  it  a  greenhouse  hypothesis,  sceptics  insinuate  that  the
theory of AGW is anything but close to the truth. Mainstream scientists in turn consider
falsified the hypothesis linking late 20th century temperature rise to cosmic ray activity
(e.g., Benestad, 2007). In their books there is no established theory which attributes
contemporary climate change to solar variability.
For an observation such as satellite data to count as falsification of a scientific
theory,  analytic  a  priori  and  synthetic  a  posteriori  sentences  have  to  be  logically
demarcated.  But  no  observational  sentences  are  ever  completely  independent  of
theoretical commitments, and vice versa. Satellites do not record  ‘pure’ temperature,
but the upwelling microwave radiation from atmospheric oxygen, which, in physical
theory, is proportional to the temperature of broad vertical layers of the atmosphere.
Also the seemingly simple observation of temperature using a thermometer involves a
theory  which  describing  the  properties  of  mercury  used  in  thermometers.  Even the
analytic  a  priori  sentence  ‘All  unmarried  men  are  bachelors’ builds  upon  certain
assumptions that  require explanation.  One first  has to  qualify the characteristics by
which we might define and measure whether any individual qualifies as a bachelor. Any
such theoretical statement too involves auxiliary assumptions and may need to be re-
evaluated.  And  here  too  we  need some kind  of  experience,  writes  the  philosopher
Willard Quine (1951: 39-40, cf. Hanson, 1958; Duhem, 1991):
The total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience,  that  there is
much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single
contrary experience […] Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others,
because of their logical interconnections – the logical laws being in turn simply certain
further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-evaluated
one  statement  we  must  re-evaluate  some  others,  whether  they  be  statements  logically
connected  with  the  first  or  whether  they  be  the  statements  of  logical  connections
themselves.
The fact that the statements logicians call analytic a priori are simply the more
recalcitrant ones makes the principle of falsification particularly equivocal. Too many
background assumptions might be wrong or unknown, wrongly disregarded physical
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processes  may have  affected  the  (satellite  or  any other)  observations,  and so forth.
Following Quine (1951) and Duhem (1991), the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos
(1970) considers a theory falsified if and only if troublesome evidence forces a great
host of changes in the auxiliary hypotheses, which are built  around and protect  the
theoretical  core.  Together  with  the fall  of  an established theory,  a  new theory with
greater explanatory force and predictive power has to be articulated. Because satellite
data  are  not  compared to  AGW but  to  the  auxiliary  hypothesis  which  suggests  an
increase of tropospheric temperatures over the tropics, the theory has not been falsified.
And should such an isolated observation be used to refute a theory, philosophers of
science speak of  ‘naïve’ or  ‘trivial’ falsification. What is more, a new comprehensive
theory that replaces AGW has not yet been articulated.
Though the standard theory of AGW and its predictions may begin to prove less
appealing, scientists do not take the existence of anomalies as an indication that the
theory is falsified (Fyfe  et al 2013). But observations may be interpreted within the
framework of a variety of hypotheses, argues climate scientist Judith Curry (2012): they
may be used to argue for the “multi-decadal oscillations plus trend hypothesis” which
explains  20th century climate change by the  large  multi-decadal  oscillations  with a
superimposed trend of external, that is, anthropogenic forcing. Observations may also
support the “climate shifts hypothesis” which explains 20th century climate change as
synchronised  chaos  arising  from  non-linear  oscillations  of  the  coupled  ocean-
atmosphere system plus  external  forcing.  Either  anomalous observations become so
overwhelming that a new core theory comes to replace AGW, or the latter undergoes
defendable adjustments in its auxiliary hypotheses. But since no theory can be falsified
by  logical  inference  alone,  a  crucial  test  of  AGW  of  the  sort  lauded  by  logical
empiricists  and their  doyens who insist  on ‘sound science’ is  logically  impossible.9
Much  like  in  the  disputed  verification  of  AGW,  mainstream  scientists  and  their
sceptical critics cannot agree on the necessarily conventional terms of falsification.
Climate model experiments as a special case of observation
Together with observational data from classical experiments, computer models
have  been  a  preferred  tool  in  climate  science.  These  general  circulation  models
9 Scientists certainly continue to speak of falsification and declare for example intelligent design as
falsified. But one cannot base the refutation of intelligent design on logic alone as this would invite
its proponents to question most basic statements such as ‘All unmarried men are bachelors’.
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(GCMs), which have been applied for some time in numerical weather prediction, are
now used to predict climate change. Like in weather forecasts, climate modellers use
observational data to initialise a model run to produce their own data, modelled data.
Yet other than weather forecast models, which are continually reinitialised with updated
real-world  observations  to  keep  in  line  with  the  weather’s  rapidly  evolving  actual
course, climate models cannot be continuously updated. Thus, and given the chaos in
the system, any predictions soon stray from an initial  state leaving no chance for a
unique climate prediction (for a given set  of initial  conditions) to be accurate.  And
because climate modellers can only calculate probable future climate states from so-
called  ensembles  runs,  climate  sceptics  have  criticised their  products.  Testifying  in
Congress, the meteorologist and hurricane expert William Gray fumed (SCEPW, 2005:
25-26):
Around the globe there are 30 numerical models that are trying to predict climate. None of
them gives you a forecast. I say, look, if these climate models are OK, why don’t they tell
us next season, next year whether the global temperature is going to rise or not? They don’t
do that. The reason they don’t, they know they have no damn skill in doing so. So should
we believe them 50, 100 years down the line, when they can’t forecast 6 months or a year
in the future? It is ridiculous. I predict that in 15 or 20 years we are going to look back on
this whole business as the Eugenics movement. You know, there used to be, 400 years ago,
the majority of the scientific opinion felt the sun went around the earth. Now, damn it,
don’t tell me the sun rises, goes around.
While the difficulty of forecasting climate in a chaotic system is evident, climate
models also violate the principles of logical empiricism and ‘sound science’. In climate
model  experiments,  scientists  use  classical  observational  data  to  test  their  climate
models, which are in turn used to test different hypotheses, and vice versa. Other than
in classical experimental sciences where hypotheses and experiments are distinct, in
numerical modelling the hypothesis to be tested and the numerical experiment are in a
continuum. And because there is no clear distinction between observation and theory,
the products of climate models are epistemologically different from real world data.
This makes  it  difficult  to  verify or  validate  hypotheses,  summarises  philosopher  of
science Hélène Guillemot (2010: 244):
[T]o verify a hypothesis, one ﬁrst has to translate it into algorithmic form and insert it into
the model, then one carries out a simulation by running this model. In this way, the model
is at once theoretical and experimental [...] but it is a limited virtual experiment, cut off
from the experiment’s fundamental capacity for confronting the real world.
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In order to validate a climate model, scientists use real-world observations with
which they test the performance or “skill” of a climate model (Hargreaves, 2010), i.e.,
a model that can simulate past climate as observed by instruments is more likely to
predict  future  climate  change.  But  in  practice  there  is  no  systematic  protocol  of
validation: “one never validates a model in general,  but the capacity of a model to
account for a deﬁned climatic phenomenon or characteristic,” states Guillemot (2010:
242). If the model cannot reproduce the instrumental record well, modellers adjust its
parameters in the hope that next time around the model performs better. To the Alabama
state  climatologist  and  remote  sensing  expert  John Christy  this  ad  hoc  adjustment,
which is common practice in climate science, does not count as scientific success. In
his role as Republican-chosen expert witness, Christy explained (HSCCT, 2011: 65):
I view the whole modeling effort with more skepticism than most, perhaps because I do not
receive funding to produce model results. Each global modeling group has had 20 years to
look at the global surface temperature record and devise clever ways to reproduce what is
in the record. This is “a posteriori” science in my view. No one has from first principles
actually reproduced the record […] Modelers are working to reproduce observations, and
when a match is finally constructed, the insinuation is that the models are successful. In my
view, this procedure is not a scientific success.
Alternatively,  climate modellers may question whether the observational data
are reliable. In particular when observational data are sparse or come from questionable
sources,  modelled  data  are  considered  more  reliable  than  data  from  real-world
observations.  In his  testimony on ‘Climategate’ in the UK House of Commons, the
physicist Michael Kelly warned of such a practice (HC, 2010b: 18):
I take real exception to having simulation runs described as experiments (without at least
the  qualiﬁcation  of  “computer”  experiments).  It  does  a  disservice  to  centuries  of  real
experimentation and allows simulations output to be considered as real data. This last is a
very serious matter, as it can lead to the idea that real “real data” might be wrong simply
because it disagrees with the models! That is turning centuries of science on its head.
In  fact,  if  reliable  long-term observational  data  are  absent,  modelled  data  may  be
compared  to  modelled  data.  Here  scientists  have  to  use  “the  internal  variability
atmosphere-ocean  general  circulation  models […]  as  a  substitute  for  instrumental
observations” (Hegerl, 1998: 759, cited in Demeritt, 2001), i.e., model runs simulating
the  internal  climate variability  are compared to  model runs with GHGs as  external
forcing. Echoing Kelly’s critique, William Gray complained about the modellers’ lack
of experience with the real world (SCEPW, 2005: 34; 59): 
The trouble [with climate modellers] is that they don’t know how the atmosphere ticks […]
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They are people that make assumptions that are not valid and they believe them […] Few
have ever given real-world weather briefings or made operational weather forecasts.
It is easy to see how climate model experiments become hostage to the political
controversy: “To a large degree these debates [about the epistemology of climate model
simulation] are in fact about the model/data relationship: whether model results agree
with observations, how much each of these can be trusted, and what role these model
projections should play in policymaking,” avers science scholar Paul Edwards (1999:
439).  Hélène Guillemot and fellow philosophers of science tend to view models as
useful  for  guiding  further  study  rather  than  as  ‘policy-tools’.10 Depending  on  the
question scientists ask, some models are simply better experimental (Gramelsberger,
2010) or heuristic (Oreskes et al 1994) tools.11 Others again have described models as
metaphors (Ravetz, 2003) or as mediators that function more like portraits or maps do
(Morgan & Morrison, 2000). Anything but insinuating a lack of natural agency these
scholars make a point about the interpretative freedom that is constantly exploited in
the political controversy, as John Christy, who is well known for his scepticism about
the existence and scale of AGW, explained in Congress (HSCCT, 2011: 48):
The first basic problem with the entire issue here is that climate science is a murky science,
not  a  classic,  experimental  science.  As  an  emerging  science  of  a  complex,  chaotic
atmospheric  and  oceanic  system,  it  is  plagued  by  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  in  both
observations and theory. Lacking classic, laboratory results, it easily becomes hostage to
opinion,  groupthink,  arguments-from-authority,  overstatement  of  confidence,  and  even
Hollywood movies.
While Christy is correct about the difference between classical and computer-
based climate science – data from numerical climate models are different with respect
to how they have been arrived at and in terms of the phenomena they constitute, – he
10 Betz (2009) argues that GCMs are more useful to falsify rather than predict possible future scenarios
of climate change. He criticises the IPCC’s “modal inductivism,” in which possible scenarios are
constructed based on what is well-known. Like classical inductivism “modal inductivism” assumes
the existence of a secure epistemic foundation or background knowledge in the form of empirical
data. For Betz only those creatively constructed future scenarios (hypotheses or theories) that have
not been falsiﬁed shall be accepted as possible. Since few scenarios can be falsified, and there are no
robust  upper  bounds  for  future  temperature  rise  (Stainforth  et  al  2005)  “modal  falsification  [...]
prescribes even more drastic efforts to curb CO2 emissions than currently proposed,” concludes Betz
(2009: 133).
11 Naomi Oreskes compares a model simulation to poetry: “A model, like a novel, may resonate with
nature, but it is not a “real” thing. Like a novel, a model may be convincing-it may “ring true” if it is
consistent  with our experience of  the  natural  world.  But just  as  we may wonder how much the
characters in a novel are drawn from real life and how much is artifice, we might ask the same of a
model: How much is based on observation and measurement of accessible phenomena, how much is
based on informed judgement, and how much is convenience?” (Oreskes et al 1994: 644).
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implies  that  classic  experimentation  is  proper  science  and  does  not  easily  become
politicised. But also classic laboratory results have been controversial because classic
or real data are not truly real in the sense of being direct, unmediated representations of
the  world  either;  any  observations  are  laden  with  theory,  or  a  priori  theoretical
commitments. In principle  they too are modelled data,  although the term has much
broader  significance than in numerical  models  (Cartwright,  1999).  And because the
difference between modelled and real data is one of degree not kind, as if the latter
were  simply  given  by  nature,  even  the  observation  of  rain,  involving  theoretical
commitment of what constitutes rain (Hesse, 1980: 65-83), may become hostage to the
political debate. This is why in contentious political issues so much emphasis is put on
the replication of scientific experiments (e.g.,  The Lancet, 2010; Food and Chemical
Toxology, 2012).
The replication of observations
In order to test the veracity of observational data, whether from numerical or
classical  experiments,  advocates  of  ‘sound  science’ insist  on  their  replication.  In
principle, any skilled scientist and team of scientists should be able to independently
replicate any kind of climate observation. “And so before we go off the deep end I
really do want to make sure that these models are independently reviewed and really
are scientifically accurate and really can be replicated,” urged Congressman Joe Barton
(HCEC, 2006: 67). He may know that the principle of replication, too, is practically
difficult to sustain.
Even if the independent scientists have command of all the resources necessary
to perform an experiment, the practical skills and tacit knowledge of experimentation
(cf. Polanyi, 1958; Collins, 2010) ensure that “it can never be clear whether a second
experiment has been done sufficiently well to count as a check on the results of a first,”
writes  Harry  Collins  (1985:  2)  in  his  seminal  study  on  scientists  searching  for
gravitational waves. What Collins called the experimenter’s regress is a paradox which
arises  for  those  who  want  to  use  replication  as  a  test  of  the  truth  of  a  scientific
knowledge claim. Assigned to perform a replication, the independent scientists may not
possess the original experimenters’ intimate knowledge of the data, the instruments, or
the field site where conditions are particularly difficult to control (cf. Kohler, 2002;
Rees,  2009).  Moreover,  scientists  often  form  opinions  about  both  the  original
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experiment and the replication before the results of the latter are in; they have made
theoretical commitments (Collins, 1981). 
Replication can fail or be considered a failure for a host of reasons. To be sure,
Collins’ observation does not mean that replication is impossible – replication remains
a standard repertoire in any natural science – but that it too is a practical achievement
requiring some and however  small  a  degree of taste and discernment  (cf.  Godin &
Gingras,  2002).  Chances  of  a  successful  replication  would  certainly  increase  if  the
scientists provided a detailed description of the original experiment. And in order to
share their tacitly held knowledge, which is difficult to teach since it cannot be written
down,  the  original  experimenters  and  the  independent  scientists  would  have  to
collaborate, in turn negating the demand for independence.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I showed that the convinced and the sceptics have a similar idea
about what science is and what it  should do for them. They share the principles of
verification as described in logical empiricism and falsification as described by Karl
Popper; both use inductive and deductive logic as it suits their arguments for or against
AGW. But  the  sceptics more  so than mainstream scientists  lean  in  their  arguments
against AGW on the impracticality of the principles’ strict implementation: By insisting
on the logical demarcation between observations and theory, they seize on the fact that
their opponents would agree but cannot live up to it. Their important scientific tools,
numerical  models,  contain  both  observations  and  theory  and  thereby  violate  the
method; if modellers thoroughly complied with these demands, they would never be
able to practice their science. 
I should not come as a surprise that in the climate modelling community there
appears to be not one climate sceptic. Scientifically credentialed sceptics who speak on
the venues from where I gathered data almost exclusively populate the community of
classical experimentalists;  they are meteorologists and climatologists.  As empiricists
they criticise an understanding of the climate system based on theoretical principles,
numerical  models  and  modelled  data,  and  insist  on  the  primacy  of  real-world
observations. To them the difference between real/empirical and modelled/theoretical
data must be in kind – their claims against AGW hinge on this logical demarcation.
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Informed  by the  logical  empiricists’ ideals,  sceptics  have  so  concluded  that
AGW has not  been substantiated by real  observations: whenever  scientists  claim to
have  attributed  an  empirical  observation  to  AGW,  sceptics  would  declare  it
unconvincing or insignificant. Here they seize on the fact that resolving any scientific
debates must inevitably rest on some however small a degree of convention. And they
agree to disagree over the conventional terms of verification and falsification.
Because sceptics assume the mantle of empiricists, they eventually turn towards
the  existing classical  experiments  which  are  thought  to  have  tipped the  balance  of
evidence in favour of AGW. If these empirical observations cannot be replicated, the
theory  of  AGW must  be  discarded,  or  so  they would  argue.  That is  the  scientific
rationale  for climate  sceptics  to  focus  on climate  reconstruction,  and  the  email
disclosures  suggest  that  certain  scientists  tried  to  avert  the  replication  exercise  for
political reasons. In the next chapter I tell the story of its attempted replication.
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Chapter Four
Replicating the hockey stick graph
In climate science, it is permissible for raw data to be touched or modified by many hands.
Gaps in temperature and proxy records are filled in. Suspect values are deleted because a
scientist deems them erroneous. A researcher may elect to use parts of existing records,
ignoring  other  parts.  But  the  fact  that  the  data  has  been  modified  in  so  many  ways
inevitably raises the question of whether the results of a given study are wholly or partially
caused by the modifications themselves […] What is at issue is whether the methodology
of climate science is sufficiently rigorous to yield a reliable result. At the very least, we
should want the reassurance of an independent verification by another lab in which they
would make their own decisions about how to handle the data and yet arrive at a similar
result.
Michael Crichton in US Congress (SCEPW, 2005: 19)
4.1 Introduction
In the late 1990s the physicist-turned-climatologist Michael Mann together with
the palaeoclimatologists Raymond Bradley and Malcolm Hughes published studies on
Northern hemispheric temperature patterns in the prestigious scientific journals Nature
and  Geophysical  Research Letters (GRL),  the first  reconstructing a six century-long
time series and the second extending the first reconstruction back 1,000 years (Mann et
al 1998,  1999,  typically  referred  to  as  MBH98  and  MBH99).  Their  climate
reconstructions  showed  global  temperature  wiggling  along  the  x-axis  over  nine
centuries before rising sharply at the end of the 20th century, and for this reason earned
the moniker ‘the hockey stick’, because the nine centuries of variability around a broad
stable mean resembled the shaft of a hockey stick whose ‘blade’ was formed by the
sharp upturn in mean annual temperatures over the 20th century (see figure 1.1 on page
12).  The  scientists  used  climate  models  to  attribute  the  changes  in  temperature  to
various forcing factors, including volcanic activity,  variations in solar radiation, and
GHG concentrations. They concluded that the dramatic temperature increase in the late
20th century could only be explained by an increasing concentration of GHGs in the
atmosphere.  Furthermore,  the  flat  shaft  of  the  hockey  stick  contradicted  previous
scientific wisdom about pre-industrial global warming during the so-called medieval
warm period (MWP) around 1200-1500 AD, which is apparent in European records but
not, they insisted, over the hemisphere as a whole.
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The publication of MBH98 and MBH99 served the climate policy establishment
well. In his 2000 State of the Union Address, US President Bill Clinton referred to the
graph:  “Scientists  tell  us  that  the  1990s  were  the  hottest  decade  of  the  entire
millennium. If we fail to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, deadly heat waves and
droughts  will  become  more  frequent,  coastal  areas  will  be  flooded,  economies
disrupted” (Clinton, 2000). It had been this belief, of course,  that drove the Clinton
administration  to  sign  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  committing  the  US  to  controversial
reductions in its GHG emissions. And in the hockey stick Clinton and his vice-president
Al Gore saw a legitimisation of their climate policies.
Climate sceptics saw in the Mann team’s study a threat potentially undermining
their  opposition  to  climate  policy:  because  climate  reconstruction  presented  an
empirical test of AGW it  was difficult to dismiss based on the principles of ‘sound
science’, which are particularly useful in the critique of computer experiments. Unless
the  hockey stick  failed  the  crucial  test  of  independent  replication,  climate  sceptics
would have to accept its truth, and with it their contention that the science was still too
uncertain to justify emissions reduction that would cost billions. “[L]et us see if it can
be replicated. Let us see if in fact the facts as purported in that report are in truth the
facts,”  announced  Congressman  Joe  Barton  (R-TX)  (HCEC,  2006:  34)  in  a
Congressional hearing featuring the expert witness who tried to reproduce the hockey
stick  study from scratch,  Steven McIntyre.  If  the  climate  reconstruction  cannot  be
replicated it must not to be used as policy legitimation, the climate sceptics in Congress
insisted.
We saw in the last  chapter how advocates of emissions reductions and self-
styled climate sceptics both subscribe to similar ideas about basing policy on ‘sound
science’. In turn, their shared philosophy of science rests on ideas about observation,
experiments, and verification that are difficult to square with accounts of the messiness
of science in practice offered by science students. The aim of this chapter is to use the
scientific controversy over the of the hockey stick graph to explore in more detail the
practice  of  climate  reconstruction.  It  is  a  story  in  two  acts.  First,  I  describe  the
methodological choices with which the scientists  assembled the most heterogeneous
materials  to  finally  present  to  the  world  the  hockey  stick  graph.  Second,  I  follow
McIntyre’s replication exercise which provides a unique insight  into the practice of
scientific work and the tension arising between idea and practice.
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4.2 The science of climate reconstruction
In  order  to  arrive  at  a  hemispheric-to-global12 climate  reconstruction,  Mann,
Bradley, and Hughes (henceforth the Mann team) collected climatic information from
dozens of  the  most  heterogeneous materials.  Information  came from wherever  they
were  believed  to  hold  information  about  climatic  conditions  –  the  deep seas,  high
mountains, vast woodlands and even deserts. Dendrochronologists core trees to analyse
tree  ring density and ring width,  palaeoecologists  take samples from peat bogs and
examined  their  pollen  distribution,  glaciologists  core  into  glacial  ice  to  determine
oxygen and other isotope ratios in the glacial  ice,  marine scientists measure atomic
isotope and chemical compound ratios in corals and other marine organisms, geologists
measure  sedimentation  rates  and  plankton  abundance  in  lake  and  sea  beds,
environmental  historians  interpret  written historical  accounts  related to  weather and
climate, and so forth (cf. Bradley, 1999).13 Scientists call these tree, peat bog, glacier,
coral, sediment, and historical accounts climate archives, and the measured variables of
these  entities  (ring  width,  isotope  ratios,  etc.)  are  climate  proxies.  Michael  Mann
explained to Congress (SCEPW, 2003: 173):
One area of active current research of mine involves the analysis of climate ‘proxy’ records
(that  is,  natural  archives  of  information  which  record  past  climate  conditions by  their
biological, physical, or chemical nature). These data are used to reconstruct patterns of
climate variability prior to the period of the past century or so during which widespread
instrumental climate records are available. 
 
Measured  variables  from  these  climate  archives  are  used  to  approximate
temperature  and  other  climate  parameters.  For  their  so-called  multi-proxy
reconstruction, the Mann team first collected and then calibrated those variables against
instrumental temperature data, which are thought to be the most accurate measurements
of atmospheric temperature. To this end, scientists take a sample from the proxy dataset
and compare it against instrumental records to derive a statistical transfer function to
relate features of the proxy record (i.e.  tree ring density, or pollen counts) to some
climatic feature, like average annual temperature, that is theorised to determine it. They
12 Mann: ‘‘Although this record comes mostly from the Northern Hemisphere, it is likely to be a good
approximation  to  the  global anomaly  based  on  comparisons  of  recent  patterns  of  temperature
fluctuations” (SCEPW, 2003: 179).
13 Documentary  proxies  include  historical  descriptions  of  directly  or  indirectly  climate-related
phenomena. Sources include annals, pictures, almanacs, diaries, memoirs, ship log books and church
records. Inferences about climatic conditions can also be drawn from tax, trade or newspaper reports,
from stall-keeper and market songs and epigraphic sources such as (high water) marks chiselled into
stones,  houses,  trees  and so forth (cf.  Jones  et  al 2009).  Temperature  reconstructions have  been
published  based  partly  or  entirely  on  either  (bio)physical/chemical  or  documentary  data  and  on
combinations of both.
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then apply this transfer function to convert past measures of the phenomenon to the past
climate  said  to  have  determined it.  The  calculated  relationship  between  proxy and
instrumental temperature is applied to the period when only proxy data are available. 
Once an individual proxy record has been estimated, it must then be combined
with other records of varying lengths and types into a single measure. In order to do
this the original point measurements have to be transformed into a gridded record for
the hemisphere and the globe as a whole. This is roughly how the Mann team combined
millions  of  records  from thousands  of  places  to  arrive  at  figures  for  the  Northern
hemispheric climate. For each year a number representing the hemispheric temperature
anomaly is calculated against a reference period and plotted chronologically over six
centuries and ten centuries respectively. The Mann team’s reconstruction looks much
like a hockey stick.
To common-sense realists the proxy and instrumental climate data represent a
pre-existing material  reality.  They regard  as  self-evident  the  works of  thousands of
scientists,  that  is,  their  observations,  measurements,  calculations  and  theories  that
ultimately enable scientists like Mann to test the theory of AGW – as if one stuck a
thermometer into the planet or a measuring yard into a climate archive, sat back and
observed the temperature rise and fall or the tree grow and wither. “[I]n principle, all
you need to do is take all your thermometer readings and work out an average,” wrote
Andrew Montford (2010: 41), a blogger and sceptical commentator of the hockey stick
controversy.  Obviously,  as  both  scientists  and sceptics  acknowledge,  reconstructing
past  climate  change  involves  many  more  steps  than  this  caricature  suggests.  In
innumerable steps the material  world is  turned into representations thereof until  the
Mann  team  can  speak  of  a  graph  representing  Northern  hemispheric  temperature
patterns over the past six (respectively ten) centuries.14
14 The Mann team was not the first to attempt a Northern hemispheric reconstruction. In 1979 doctoral
student Brian Groveman and supervisor Helmut Landsberg from Maryland University presented the
first quantitative multi-proxy reconstruction of Northern hemisphere annual mean temperatures, with
all but 3 of the 20 proxy series used being instrumental temperature series (Groveman & Landberg,
1979). Their study simulating temperature departures from 1579-1880 is discussed in the specialised
scientific literature and provoked fairly little criticism. Global palaeoclimatology was in its youth.
The occasional palaeoclimatological  reader was published (Lamb, 1990),  but  palaeoclimatologists
were  still  relatively  few,  and  climate  science  of  relatively  marginal  societal  interest  and  rarely
newsworthy. Then in 1993, Raymond Bradley and Phil Jones published their much-cited multi-proxy
study on Northern hemispheric summer conditions since 1400 using 23 proxy series including tree
rings  and  ice  cores  (Bradley  &  Jones,  1993).  New  data  and  more  sophisticated  methodologies
allowed scientists  to  ask  and  answer  new questions,  to  go  further  back  in  time  and  to  increase
temporal resolution. Increasingly, climate came to be understood as dynamic and unstable.
69
Scientific practice in the case of dendroclimatology
Because the Mann team believe that trees provide the most robust proxy data,
they chose to use tree rings as their main source of proxy data (Ryghaug &  Skjølsvold,
2010).  If tree rings hold measurable climatic information, trees are climate archives.
Dendroclimatologists  thus  core  trees,  extract  tree ring cross-sections  and take them
back to their laboratories where they measure climate proxy variables. They measure a
tree’s ring width, wood density, radiocarbon content, and other variables that indicate
climate parameters, such as temperature and precipitation. Higher temperature typically
results  in  wider  rings  and  denser  wood,  but  at  some  point  parameters  other  than
temperature may become the principle drivers of growth. For instance, drought may
impede tree growth, and the dendroclimatologist’s aim is to establish the quantitative
relationship  between  these  measurable  attributes  of  the  tree  core  and  the  climatic
conditions that determine them.
Before scientists set out to core trees they must have an idea of what trees to
look  for;  they  do  not  blindly  sample  any  tree  they  come  across.  Their  choice  is
informed by often tacitly held knowledge of the field site, information gathered from
colleagues, and the textbooks they have studied in their offices and laboratories from
where they have virtual  access to  the pre-existing observations,  i.e.,  in  one way or
another their choice is based on theory.  They then pick those climate archives they
know will harbour climatic information; if tree growth shall be limited by the parameter
temperature, they select specimens that grow in high altitudes and high latitudes, where
the  growing season is  short  and growth depends on the  climate  parameter  summer
temperature. In dendrochronological theory a tree grows wider rings in warm summers
than in cold, and in wet conditions than in dry. But they have to be careful because trees
sometimes pose unpredictable problems which are not yet acknowledged by that theory,
or generally difficult to account for.
In a comparatively unruly field laboratory (Kohler, 2002), several confounding
factors must be taken into account. Tree growth, ring width and wood density may
depend on other environmental variables such as the tree’s physical shape, interspecies
competition for sun and nutrients,  the site’s topography, insect  infestation and CO2
fertilisation.  The  list  continues  and  may  include  to  the  scientist  hitherto  unknown
factors. Having noted an anomalous tree ring measure, a dendroclimatologist at CRU
warned his colleague: “There are some problems still. I note that [the year] 1032 is not
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cold  in  [the  Russian  site  of]  Yamal.  Seems  odd.  Is  it  cold  in  *all*  of  the  three
chronologies at issue? Or did a reindeer crap next to one of the trees?” (EAE 2009, 10
January 2006). Apparently the scientists do not know why the growth pattern of one
tree  is  at  odds  with  the  others.  The  dendroclimatologist  humorously  dispels  the
anxieties involved in trying to control for all potentially compromising influences: As
hitherto unacknowledged factors, even reindeer may have to be taken into account, but
for practical reasons they are not.
When  the  dendroclimatologist  has  picked,  packed  and  shipped  home  their
sample cores, the calculation can begin. Because trees do not always grow at the same
speed, but usually grow slower with age, any suitable tree’s expected growth curve is
calculated and normalised by reference to a set of other samples from trees of the same
species. Many more calculations follow in the laboratory where the tree cross sections
have been shipped to.  Data  from different  trees is  averaged to  smooth outliers  and
create a proxy chronology representing a certain local site. In order to arrive at the long
chronologies used in climate reconstructions, cores from different trees, alive and dead,
must then be standardised. Missing data is interpolated from existing chronologies or
simply continued, that is, extrapolated by persistence of the final available value until
recordings  are  again  available.  The  result  is  a  chronology describing  the  indicated
climate variable. All these steps are documented, the location is noted and samples of
trees are archived in order to trace the chronology back to each single tree (cf. Latour,
1999: chapter 2)
When the Mann team set  out  to  reconstruct  hemispheric  climate  change the
climatic proxy variables they used had already been compiled in 415 columns and a
row for each year. For Mann the trees, corals, sediments, etc., exist as homogenised
data on spreadsheets. Their materiality – the particularity and locality of the field site
from which the values in each cell were derived – have long been left behind and the
calculations that were performed on them can be safely ignored. They are stored away
but could, in theory at least, be retrieved whenever the final result that is the hockey
stick  curve  is  challenged.  In  their  publication  the  scientists  (generally)  mention
potential uncertainties within the data, but for their task at hand they do not delve into
comparably esoteric controversies  about a single outlier in one of their chronologies.
For  them the  discussions  over  “reindeer  crap”  have  been  closed  off.  Now  all  the
scientists are interested in is relative universality and a global climate history.
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Scientific practice in the case of instrumental climate records
Proxy variables  are  calibrated against  instrumental  temperature records from
weather and climate stations on land and on sea (ships and buoys). In order to calibrate
their proxy series, the Mann team made use of 20th century instrumental temperature
series compiled by Phil Jones and Keith Briffa from CRU at UEA (Jones & Briffa,
1992). Collecting data from Bradley et al (1985) and Jones et al (1986) among others,
Jones  and  Briffa  formed  the  hitherto  most  comprehensive  compilation  of  monthly
instrumental  temperature  data.  They  merged  countless  single  instrumental
measurements into regional and global climate data sets. And though these instrumental
temperature  records  are  deemed  the  most  reliable  –  they  are  more  accurate  than
equivalent proxy data because the relationship between mercury used in thermometers
and temperature is both better understood and, by the magic of standardisation, has less
variation from one instrument record to the next  than the relationship between ring
width and temperature, – their construction is not as straightforward as it is presented in
the publications either.
Various  instruments  and  techniques  exist  to  measure  the  climate  parameter
temperature,  to  calculate  temporal  averages,  and  to  interpolate  data  from  point
measures over regional and global scales. Most commonly, the recorded daily minimum
and maximum temperatures are averaged to a daily mean before monthly and annual
temperatures are calculated by averaging those daily means.  In order  to  arrive at  a
spatially consistent regional and global temperature, land and sea surface temperature
averages are combined using statistical techniques. These quite heterogeneous data sets
can be combined in at least two ways: by using constant weights which are roughly
proportional to the areas of land and sea in each hemisphere, or by a combination of
grid point land and grid point marine data into a 5°x5° grid box data set. The value in a
grid box is the calculated average of sometimes both land and marine observations,
often  measured  by entirely  different  instruments.  Scientists  can then  correlate  each
regional grid value against global values to test for spatial representativeness of global
temperature. The resulting global series is available in the form of grid point data of
temperature  anomalies;  for  example,  for  each  month  since  1902,  Jones  and  Briffa
(1992) calculate the anomaly against the reference period 1950-1979.
The construction of such data sets makes instrumental records no less open to
challenge than proxy records. Many steps have been taken to transform temporally and
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spatially unique observations into monthly and yearly regional and global data sets. The
particularity  and  locality  of  unique  measurements  dissolves  in  representative  signs
allocated to grid boxes which ring-fence the globe. In this way point measurements
have been made commensurable with the output of climate models and can be tested
against these models, and vice versa. Model output can thus be used to help identify
anomalous  data  in  the  temperature  records,  and  to  smooth  them  out.  Thus  what
scientists  may  call  direct  or  real  instrumental  temperature  observations  are  actually
moulded data. They are not truly real data, in the sense idealised by the discourse of
‘sound science’ we considered in Chapter 3. Rather, as Paul Edwards (2009: xv) notes,
they are so-called models of data: 
Philosophers of science use the phrase “models of data”; practising scientists might say
“data analysis.” Data analysis models are used to process historical weather and climate
records. Observing systems have changed so much and so often that you can only combine
long-term records by modeling the effects of different instrument behaviors, data collection
practices,  weather  station  site  changes,  and  hundreds  of  other  factors.  You  also  need
models to adjust for the tremendous unevenness of observations in space and time. In this
process, which I call making data global, coherent global data images are created from
highly heterogeneous, time-varying observations. 
As  with  the  preparation  of  proxy  data  sets,  in  scientific  publications  of
instrumental  temperature  series  the  many  steps  from  the  material  world  to
representations  thereof  are  closed  off  and  hardly  mentioned. Eventually  also  the
relationship between mercury and temperature is based on physical laws that require
explanation (Chang, 2007). That relationship is described as a constant which is derived
from empirical measurements, which, once again, contain some element of theory. And
as in proxy data sets, the instrumental products too factor out many sources of bias
which scientists have had to account for in their data analysis. Potential errors, as Jones
and  Briffa  (1992)  acknowledge,  include  changes  in  station  locations,  observing
schedules  and  practices,  in  thermometer  exposure,  in  the  environments  (especially
urbanisation around many stations) and in spatial coverage. These biases affect single
stations  and  the  calculation  of  regional  averages.  In  particular,  the  comparison  of
recordings from different stations must take many more variables into account, such as
differences in station elevation – in scientific theory temperature decreases with altitude
according to a so-called lapse rate – and differences in the calculation of monthly mean
temperatures. 
Sea  surface  and  sea  air  temperature  measurements  are  also  problematic;
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potential  errors in measurement are smoothed out with sophisticated techniques. For
example,  the  so-called  bucket  measurements  are  adjusted  to  accord  with  so-called
intake  measurements.  Gaps  in  data  and  potential  errors  from  changes  in  location,
observers and techniques pose yet more problems. Such ‘noise’ or measurement errors
are typically smoothed out in the aggregation of temporal averages onto a grid scale.
Indeed, this is one of the attractions of using gridded data: scientists hope that errors are
randomly distributed and will average themselves out through aggregation, leaving a
clean  climate  signal.  As  such  they  are  often  deemed  more  reliable  than  the  direct
observations of an expanding and contracting mercury column.
Jones  and  Briffa  (1992)  conclude  to  be  fairly  confident  that  the  world  has
warmed by about 0.5°C since the late 19th century. The Mann team certainly regarded
their temperature product as most reliable and apt for their purposes (1998: 779):
Monthly instrumental land air and sea surface temperature grid-point data [...] from the
period 1902–95 are used to calibrate the proxy data set. Although there are notable spatial
gaps,  this  network  covers  signiﬁcant  enough  portions  of  the  globe  to  form  reliable
estimates of Northern Hemisphere mean temperature.
Jones and Briffa’s data and metadata are archived at CRU and their methodologies are
briefly described in the scientific publication and on the institution’s website. If other
scientists want to replicate the original studies, or perform further calculations, they
have to track down the data, which, alongside the temperature series produced by the
NOAA/NCDC and the NASA/GISS, have become what science scholar Michel Callon
(1986)  would  call  an  ‘obligatory  passage  point’ for  authoritative  claims  of  global
temperature rise in the 20th century.15
The calibration exercise in MBH98/99
In  the  Mann  team’s  calibration  exercise  climate  proxies  were  weighted
according to their  so-called temperature sensitivity  and calibrated against  Jones and
Briffa’s  instrumental  temperature  time  series.  But  because  the  Mann  team’s  proxy
series are cut off in the year 1980, they only use a gridded 1902–1980 instrumental
temperature  product.  Calibration  simply  means  that  a  mathematical  relationship
15 The concept of an obligatory passage point is likened to the narrow end of a funnel that forces actors
and challengers  to  take  this  route.  These  can take  the form of important  datasets,  algorithms or
computer models,  but also of institutions whose reports have become essential when it comes to
talking  authoritatively  about  the  reality  of  a  phenomenon.  Any claim against  the  reality  of  said
phenomenon must pass through these scientists’ knowledge domains.
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between proxy variables (for instance tree ring width and instrumental temperature) is
established via regression analysis. In a multi-proxy reconstruction this is complicated
by the great number of heterogeneous proxies. For this reason the Mann team chose to
use the so-called climate field reconstruction (CFR) method after dendrochronologist
Hal Fritts (Fritts et al 1971). 
Out  of  a  randomly  chosen  proxy  index,  CFR chooses  temperature-sensitive
proxies over non-sensitive proxies. The scientists use this well-established method to
justify the selection of relevant proxies. To this end 415 proxy chronologies have been
summarised into 112 dominant ‘indicators’ or ‘proxy series’, some of which are again
summaries of larger networks of proxies. The summary is performed using so-called
principle  component  analysis  (PCA).  PCA  provides  a  natural  smoothing  of  the
temperature fields in terms of a small number of dominant patterns of variability or
‘empirical eigenvectors’ (Mann et al 1998: 781), i.e., PCA finds the key pattern in the
data’s  variance.16 The  Mann  team  thus  isolated  the  dominant  patterns  of  the
instrumental surface temperature and proxy data. For example, Jones & Briffa’s 20th
century instrumental data were reduced to 16 dominant patterns or ‘climate fields’. The
Mann team then calibrated  the individual  climate  proxy indicators against  the  time
histories of these distinct patterns during their mutual interval of overlap (Mann et al
1998: 780).
At least  three fundamental  assumptions are implicit  in the team’s calibration
exercise.  First,  because  in  the  calibration  exercise  some  regions  are  not  directly
represented but indirectly through so-called teleconnections with regions that are, the
Mann team assumes that these teleconnections hold. Second, the Mann team assumes
that indicators used in the calibration exercise are linearly related to one or more of the
so-called  instrumental  training  patterns.  In  the  relatively  unlikely  event  of  a  proxy
indicator representing a local climate phenomenon which is uncorrelated with larger-
scale  climate  variations  (or  representing  a  highly  non-linear  response  to  climate
variations) this assumption will not hold. Third, the patterns of variability captured by
the  multi-proxy  network  must  have  analogies  in  the  patterns  they  resolve  in  the
instrumental data. This last assumption is called the stationarity requirement. According
to the stationarity requirement the statistical relationship between the proxies and the
16 The Mann team explained: “Each of these eigenvectors is associated with a characteristic spatial
pattern or ‘empirical orthogonal function’(EOF), and its characteristic evolution in time or principal
component (PC). The first PC filters data that explain most of the variance, for example 60%. The
second explains less, the third only a fraction, and so forth” (Mann et al 1998: 781).
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climate  variable  must  be  the  same  throughout  the  calibration,  validation  and
reconstruction periods.
Though these assumptions “involve a certain leap of faith to trust that trees that
are not responding to their own local temperature can nevertheless detect a signal in a
wider temperature index,” as Montford noted (2010, 47), they must hold for the final
reconstruction  to  be  deemed  ‘robust’.  Whether  the  algorithm  of  the  calibrated
relationship during 1902-1980 is indeed correct is checked in the next step. The Mann
team argued that “[t]he statistical cross-validation exercises we describe later provide
the best evidence that these key underlying assumptions hold” (1998: 781).
The verification and reconstruction steps
The Mann team study continued with a verification exercise to establish “the
skill  of the temperature reconstruction” (Mann  et al 1998: 781). Here the statistical
validity  of  the  algorithm  as  applied  in  the  calibration  period  was  tested  in  the
verification period of 1854-1901 against previously withheld instrumental data sets.
Once the  calibration  period tells  the  scientists  how temperature  translates  into  ring
width, the verification period serves to check whether this relationship is statistically
valid, i.e., the researchers want to know if any calculated relationship arises purely by
chance.  Various statistical  techniques or methodologies exist  to verify the algorithm
(e.g.,  Reduction  of  Error  (RE),  squared  correlation  (R2),  Coefficient  of  Efficiency
(CE)).  The primary diagnostic  of the Mann team’s reconstructive skill  is  the R2 in
which the algorithm calculates the square of each value resulting in a sum of squares –
the smaller the sum, the more effective is the algorithm.
If the algorithm is deemed effective in the verification period, the Mann team
can use it for the comparatively straightforward reconstruction exercise, which is done
in a few steps. Using the respective available proxy series, the Mann team reconstructed
temperatures for the periods from 1850-1980, 1800-1980, 1750-1980 back to 1400-
1980 (Mann  et al 1998; Mann  et al  1999 includes the period from 1000-1980). The
periods were “spliced” together and the instrumental record from 1980-1998 was added
to form a coherent and up-to-date graph. A computer code written by Michael Mann
then  executed  the  reconstruction,  which,  speaking  to  Congress, he  likened  to  the
building of a house (HCEC, 2006: 726):
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And you wanted to build a house and the data would be the materials you need to build the
house, the nails, the wood, et cetera. The algorithm would be the architectural plan. Now
what would the code be? Well, imagine that instead of builders you had a computer to
make your house for you. Well, the code would be implementing the architectural plan by
telling the computer to pick up the hammer, pick up the nail, hammer it in. And so the code
is simply implementing the algorithm but the real scientific process is embodied within the
algorithm.
Results
In 1998 the Mann team summarised their findings in Nature (Mann et al 1998:
779):
Spatially resolved global reconstructions of annual surface temperature patterns over the
past  six  centuries  are  based on the  multivariate  calibration of  widely  distributed high-
resolution  proxy  climate  indicators.  Time-dependent  correlations  of  the  reconstructions
with  time-series  records  representing  changes  in  greenhouse-gas  concentrations,  solar
irradiance, and volcanic aerosols suggest that each of these factors has contributed to the
climate variability of the past 400 years, with greenhouse gases emerging as the dominant
force during the twentieth century. Northern Hemisphere mean annual temperatures for
three of the past eight years are warmer than any other year since (at least) AD 1400.
And in the extended version of the hockey stick graph, published a year later in GRL,
the Mann team came to the following conclusion (Mann et al 1999: 759):
Building on recent studies, we attempt hemispheric temperature reconstructions with proxy
data networks for the past millennium. We focus not just on the reconstructions, but the
uncertainties  therein,  and  important  caveats.  Though  expanded  uncertainties  prevent
decisive  conclusions for  the  period to AD 1400 our results suggest  that  the latter  20th
century is anomalous in the context of at least  the last millennium. The 1990s was the
warmest decade, and 1998 the warmest year, at moderately high levels of confidence. The
20th century counters a millennial-scale cooling trend which is consistent with long-term
astronomical forcing.
4.3 The popularisation of the hockey stick
In 1998 “Northern Hemispheric Temperature Patterns and the Climate Forcing
over the Past Six Centuries” was presented to the readership of Nature. The graph came
with  a  description  of  data  and  was  accompanied  by  equations,  tables,  figures  and
supplementary  methodological  information.  The  language  was  sober  and  the  many
numbers  and  equations  made  it  a  rather  inaccessible  scientific  literature  for  the
layperson. A year later the Mann team published a follow-up study in  GRL in which
they  extended  the  graph  to  cover  a  millennium.  Despite  appearing  in  prestigious
scientific journals, comparably few people within the scientific community showed an
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interest in the articles, and even fewer out in the public sphere.17
In 2001 the IPCC TAR reprinted the graph with a short description in both the
scientific section and the report’s SPM. The publicity was a great success for Mann, his
colleagues,  and the palaeoclimate community in general.  Many palaeoclimatologists
felt they had lost ground to climate modellers, whose work was well covered in the first
and second IPCC assessment reports in 1990 and 1996, and were keen to make a better
case for their work in the TAR.18 In an email the contributing author to the IPCC 2001
report  Jonathan  Overpeck  commented  to  Phil  Jones:  “The  IPCC next  time  around
should be much stronger than last on the paleo side of things (although still not as good
as it can get!)” (EAE, 2009: 1 October 1998). In an email to colleagues Michael Mann,
then lead-author to the IPCC palaecolimate chapter, tried to gather support (EAE, 2009:
6 October 1998):
There  is  indeed,  as  many  of  us  are  aware,  at  least  one  key  player  in  the  modeling
community that has made overly dismissive statements about the value of proxy data of
late, because of what might be argued as his/her own naive assessment/analysis of these
data. This presents the danger of just the sort of backlash that Keith [Briffa] warns of, and
makes all the more pressing the need for more of a community−wide strategizing on our
part.
But  the  idea  of  highlighting  the  hockey  stick  in  the  TAR’s  SPM  was  not
unanimously shared.  Neither was there agreement among palaeoclimatologists about
the  truth-value  of  the  graph  (cf.  Ryghaug  & Skølsvold,  2010).  In  an  email  Chris
Folland,  then  coordinating  lead-author,  wrote  to  contributing  palaeoclimatologists
(EAE, 2009: 22 September 1999):
A proxy  diagram  of  temperature  change  is  a  clear  favourite  for  the  Policy  Makers
summary. But the current diagram with the tree ring only data somewhat contradicts the
multiproxy curve and dilutes the message rather significantly.  We want the truth.  Mike
[Mann] thinks it lies nearer his result (which seems in accord with what we know about
worldwide mountain glaciers and, less clearly, suspect about solar variations).
Keith Briffa, a contributing author to the respective chapter, replied (EAE, 2009: 22
September 1999):
17 In the scientific literature Mann et al 1999 was cited 42 times in 2000, 42 times 2001, but twice as
often in the two years after its publication in the IPCC TAR in 2001 report (ISI web of knowledge,
Accessed on 17 March 2014).
18 Mike Hulme (personal communication) suggests geopolitical imperatives as one reason for the under-
representation of palaeoclimatological  research in the IPCC’s first and second assessment reports.
While Russian researchers used to be strong in palaeoclimatology in the immediate proximity of the
Cold War the IPCC did not include much Russian science. Drawing on an Indian case study, in a first
analysis on the geography of the IPCC, Kandiklar and Sagar (1999) note an over-representation of
Western scientists as IPCC authors (cf. Hulme & Mahony, 2010).
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Let me say that I don’t mind what you put in the policy makers summary if there is a
general consensus (sic.). However some general discussion would be valuable […] I know
Mike  thinks  his  series  is  the  ’best’ and  he  might  be  right  −  but  he  may also  be  too
dismissive of other data and possibly over confident in his (or should I say his use of
other’s). After all, the early (pre−instrumental) data are much less reliable as indicators of
global temperature than is apparent in modern calibrations that include them and when we
don’t know the precise role of particular proxies in the earlier portions of reconstruction it
remains  problematic  to  assign  genuine  confidence  limits  at  multidecadal  and  longer
timescales […] There is still a potential problem with non−linear responses in the very
recent period of some biological proxies (or perhaps a fertilisation through high CO2 or
nitrate input). I know there is pressure to present a nice tidy story as regards ’apparent
unprecedented warming in a thousand years or more in the proxy data’ but in reality the
situation is not quite so simple. We don’t have a lot of proxies that come right up to date
and those that do (at least a significant number of tree proxies) some unexpected changes
in response that do not match the recent warming. I do not think it wise that this issue be
ignored.
Despite these noises of private disagreement, the chapter was published as a consensus
report. “From the outside, one should be seen to be in agreement,” observe Ryghaug
and  Skjølsvold  (2010).  And  eventually  the  publication  in  the  SPM  served  the
community well – or so it seemed at the time. With the rise of climate science to global
importance,  palaeoclimatological  research  gained  popularity  and  arguably  also
funding.19
The  Mann  team’s  work  was  subsequently  cited  in  public  lectures  and
presentations, in the popular science literature, even in TV. By the time it was featured
in  Al  Gore’s  Oscar-winning  documentary  An Inconvenient  Truth (Gore,  2006),  the
Mann team’s science had been stripped down to the bare stick; the grainy and roughly
hewn  graph  had  become  a  smooth  hockey  stick  lacking  the  detailed  qualifying
information  provided  in  the  original.  For  that,  the  reader  was  pointed  towards  the
original papers.
In  the  wider  context  of  climate  change  politics  the  hockey  stick  served  as
critical and convincing observational test of the theory of AGW. Importantly, it could
be  deployed  as  an  empirically  grounded  argument  against  sceptics  who  criticised
climate science for its heavy reliance on computer models and modelled data. If climate
models  were  not  taken  seriously  by  climate  sceptics,  the  Mann  team’s  climate
reconstruction would surely tip the balance of evidence in favour of AGW; during the
years  of  the  Republican  Administration  under  George  W.  Bush (2000-2008),  when
climate sceptics occupied important government offices, such an empirical test would
prove all  the  more invaluable.  In  that  way the  hockey stick graph became ever  so
19 Between 1990 and 1999, 247 scientific titles included “palaeoclimat*”, and in the following decade
(2000-2009) 570 titles did (ISI web of knowledge; accessed on 12 October 2013)
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tightly linked to the politics of climate change, at least in the US. 
Its celebration has made the hockey stick probably the most popular but also the
most contested icon of climate science – it became what Latour (2010) calls a “factish
god” that would soon attract iconoclasts. Indeed, two years after the IPCC prominently
exhibited the graph, the retired Canadian mining consultant Steven McIntyre took a
closer look at MBH98 and spotted inconsistencies. Michael Mann initially fended off
McIntyre’s  criticism,  but  as  more  sceptics  and scientists  joined the  debate he  soon
found himself in the midst of The Climate Wars, as Mann (2012a) would later describe
the episode. Both on blogs and in the scientific literature, Mann and McIntyre rejected
each other’s  arguments,  revealing ever more details  about  the graph’s  construction.
McIntyre’s  meticulous  dissection  of  the  graph,  his  extensive  critique,  and  Michael
Mann’s defence thus provide unique insights into the practices of palaeoclimatology.
This chapter proceeds with a description and analysis of McIntyre’s deconstruction of
the hockey stick graph.
4.4 Deconstructing hockey stick science
In 2002 Steven McIntyre took an interest in the graph after he had seen it in
materials distributed by the Canadian government, probably in promotion of climate
policies. He first  delved into MBH98, but the team’s unwieldy explanation of their
many  steps  made it  difficult  for  the  self-styled  climate  auditor  to  understand what
exactly the scientists had done. While the space-saving word limit for scientific articles
in Nature generally does not allow for an exhaustive description, editors at Nature also
presume that only insiders who read and judge the papers have the tacit knowledge to
appreciate  what  goes  unsaid.  Thus  outsider  McIntyre  had  to  contact  corresponding
author  Michael  Mann;  he  wanted to  reproduce  every  single  step  performed by the
scientists  so  as  to  trace  the  graph  to  its  material  reality,  that  is,  past  atmospheric
conditions as recorded by instruments and captured in climate archives. But while the
article in Nature depicted the graph as a fairly straightforward representation of reality
arrived at by way of the scientific method, McIntyre was bewildered by its complicated
construction.  For McIntyre and fellow critics, that construction of the graph opened
plenty of vantage points. If only one step in the building of Mann’s “house” failed to
live up to the scientific method, according to the philosophy of ‘sound science’, the
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hockey stick study would be proven wrong. To help him navigate these novel scientific
waters, McIntyre sided with professor of economics Ross McKitrick who knew how to
publish in scientific journals.
Collecting the materials
McIntyre wrote several emails to Michael Mann in which he politely asked for
the data used in the hockey stick experiment. Mann responded late, arguably because he
was not able to readily provide data. This only spurred McIntyre, since as soon as he
saw the  first  figures  he  noted  calculations  on  some of  the  data  that  had  not  been
reported in Nature. Puzzled but intrigued, he began to examine each of the 415 proxy
chronologies, many of which had become obligatory passage points for understanding
millennial  climate change. Andrew Montford (2010: 73) recalled in his  take on the
controversy: “The fact that the data had never been compiled into a single record also
strongly suggested that nobody had ever asked to see the figures before.” Evidently, it
took an outsider to replicate the hockey stick graph. But first McIntyre needed to know
which proxy series had been used in which time step of which PCA calculations.
When McIntyre continued to request data, chief researchers from CRU decided
to close ranks and, though somewhat reluctantly, to support Mann. One of the scientists
wrote to his colleagues at CRU (EAE, 2009: 12 November 2003):
[Y]ou will have seen Stephen McIntyre’s request to us. We need to talk about it, though my
initial feeling is that we should turn it down (with carefully worded/explained reason) as
another  interim  stage  and  prefer  to  make  our  input  at  the  peer-review  stage.  In  the
meantime, here is an email (copied below) to Mike Mann from McIntyre, requesting data
and programs (and making other criticisms). I do wish Mike had not rushed around sending
out preliminary and incorrect early responses − the waters are really muddied now.  He
would have done better to have taken things slowly and worked out a final response before
publicising this stuff. Excel files, other files being created early or now deleted is really
confusing things! Anyway, because McIntyre has now asked Mann directly for his data and
programs, his request  that *we* send McIntyre’s request  to Mann has been dropped (I
would have said “no” anyway).
What climate sceptics would call the ‘hockey team’ made it ever more difficult for
McIntyre to fully understand the experiment.
McIntyre  grew  impatient  and  tried  alternative  avenues  to  gain  access  to
technical  information.  An  allegedly  easy  way  was  formal  material  complaints  to
Nature.  Because information was still  lacking by 2006, McIntyre drafted a letter of
complaint to its editors as well as to the president of the NAS, Ralph Cicerone. In his
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letter McIntyre reiterated the climate sceptics’ demand for ‘sound science’: “Given the
influence of MBH98,  meticulous verification should be possible and this  cannot  be
accomplished with the [hitherto] requested disclosure” (HCEC, 2006: 794). He would
accept the truth of the graph if, and only if, it could be replicated and verified. Both
Nature and  Cicerone  rejected  his  requests,  either  because  they  went  substantially
beyond what they would normally expect authors to provide, or because they had no
authority over all those entities.
An increasingly irritated McIntyre decided to force the release of all relevant
material by law. Using the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA), which is intended to
provide a mechanism whereby information held by public authorities can be accessed
by the public, he and a UK citizen named David Holland addressed the scientists’ host
institutions.20 Though the FoIA is rarely used to gain access to scientific information,
they decided to press for all  data,  Mann’s computer  code, as well  as the scientists’
internal communications. “Without Mann’s input it  was almost impossible to get an
exact replication of the Hockey Stick,” revealed Andrew Montford (2010) echoing the
climate  auditor.  Again  McIntyre  was  denied  the  disclosure  of  the  computer  code,
however  this  time  with  a  nod  to  intellectual  property  rights  (IPRs).  And  David
Holland’s request was denied by the Met Office and the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
with the argument that correspondence related to IPCC assessments was confidential.21
McIntyre’s replication exercise became an increasingly frustrating pursuit. He
had exhausted all options and felt as if the climate scientists had put obstructions in all
of  his  necessary  points  of  passage.  And  whenever  he  highlighted  new  points  of
contention,  he  said,  “the  nomads  appear  to  have  de-camped”  (McIntyre,  2006).
“Whenever anyone criticizes one of their papers, they’ve moved on. Never a place to
20 In 2007 McIntyre filed FoIA complaints directed at Mann’s host institution, the University of Virginia
(UVA) in the US, and the UK’s UEA as host institution of CRU scientists. Holland filed complaints to
the British Met Office. Under section 12b of the Environmental Information Regulation (EIR), these
public authorities must disclose information unless the public interest in maintaining the exemption
outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information in all the circumstances of the case  (cf.
Abbot & Marohasy, 2010).
21 The Met Office replied that the requested information was produced in scientists’ private capacity and
on behalf of the IPCC, which was exempt from all countries’ FOIAs. They argued that “[t]he release
of information considered to be confidential could deter other scientists from participating in the
IPCC or other similar scientific processes. Scientists would be likely to be inhibited from the free and
frank advice or the free frank exchange of views for purposes of deliberation. It is essential to protect
a  free  space  in  which  scientists  can  think  through  the  implications  of  various  options  under
consideration […] As a great deal of the IPCC process is undertaken during meetings and unrecorded
telephone conversations, the requested information may not present a full picture, may not be of the
IPCC and if taken out of context could do more to mislead the general public unnecessarily and on an
unwarranted basis” (Met Office, cited in Abbot & Marohasy, 2010: 9).
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lay one’s head even for one night,” he fretted. Any time McIntyre criticised one of their
statements, or hypotheses, he would find it protected by further auxiliary explanations
and hypotheses. In the end “[t]here was nothing for it except to use trial and error to try
to  discover  the  exact  combination  of  methodological  steps  that  Mann  had  used,”
Montford summarised (2010: 86).
Opaque calculations and methodological choices
McIntyre published his initial findings in the journal Energy & Environment in
2003 (McIntyre & McKitrick, 2003). Among the 415 chronologies used by the Mann
team  he  found  dozens  of  items  that  proved  difficult  to  replicate.  Series  had  been
truncated, inter- or extrapolated without any notice and justification. At times values
had been added to allow for the inclusion of temperature-sensitive series: the so-called
Gaspe (peninsula) tree series had been extrapolated to allow for its inclusion in the
1400-1980 proxy roster which includes the stick’s flat shaft. According to McIntyre &
McKitrick (2003), this data manipulation served to flatten the graph in the 15th century.
Again other series had been bizarrely mislocated: a proxy indicator measured in North
Eastern America had been assigned to a grid cell over France. “The rain in Maine falls
mainly in the Seine,” McIntyre (2005a) commented bitingly. Other series had been used
twice, were inaccurately cited, erroneously said to have been included, and so forth. At
one  point  it  was  even  unclear  whether  the  Mann  team  had  summarised  the  415
chronologies into the reported 112 or 159 series.  “[W]ith Mann’s description of his
methods being so vague, it was still a hard task to work out exactly what he’d done”
(Montford, 2010: 78).
Though “[i]n most cases these simply present obstacles to replication [...] in at
least one instance there is a serious issue of whether the series was edited with a view to
affecting the final result,” McIntyre & McKitrick (2006) remarked in a letter to the
NAS. McIntyre detected this problematic proxy series while examining those that had
been weighted highly in the calibration step. Apparently the Mann team had included a
hockey stick-shaped tree chronology whose reliability to capture 20th century climate
even  its  creator  Donald  Graybill  doubted  (in  Graybill  & Idso,  1993).  As McIntyre
contended in a Congressional hearing (HCEC, 2006: 792),
[o]ne of  Mann’s  most important  methodologies  was his introduction of  bristlecone and
foxtail pine growth chronologies into proxy reconstructions. As early as the 1980s, these
trees were known to have experienced an anomalous pulse in growth in the 20th century,
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which specialists had concluded was unrelated to temperature, and speculated that it was
due to CO2 fertilization.22
Like the Gaspe series, the Bristlecone pine series had been included based on anything
but “clear analytic a priori criteria,” noticed McIntyre (2005a). The Mann team had
violated the scientific method as described in the philosophy of ‘sound science’.
McIntyre’s  replication  exercise  revealed  more  contestable  methodological
choices. In 2005 he published his critique on the Mann team’s so-called ‘short-centred’
PCA. Because the Mann team had not adjusted the data to a mean of zero as in ‘normal
centring’, the team’s PCA unduly prioritised any series with great variance. In other
words, the team’s method gave series with great 20th century divergence from the long-
term mean disproportionally high weight. McIntyre and McKitrick (2005ab) found that,
contrary to what was claimed by the scientists, the allocation of weight was not justified
by  theory:  if  and  only  if  data  were  normally  centred,  would  the  algorithm  point
automatically to the most important series. In his own experiments, McIntyre showed
that the wrong choice could produce so-called ‘artificial hockey sticks’ (AHS) even out
of  randomly  generated  time  series  (McIntyre  &  McKitrick,  2005a).  And  though
German climate scientists Hans von Storch and Eduardo Zorita (2005) concluded that
Mann’s method alone would not necessarily influence the final result, McIntyre and
McKitrick  (2005c)  insisted  that  it  had  done  so  precisely  because  it  prioritised
questionable proxy series as the foundation blocks of Mann’s house of cards.
Because  the  widespread  acceptance  of  the  hockey  stick  was  related  to  the
authors’ claims of unprecedented statistical  skill,  McIntyre next  took issue with the
verification  statistics  of  the  team’s  proxy-temperature  correlation  (McIntyre  &
McKitrick, 2003; 2005ab). Apparently Mann had withheld certain validation statistics
so as to make it impossible for anyone to gauge the true reliability of the reconstruction
(cf. Montford, 2010). And in the important 1400-1980 time step of the reconstruction,
McIntyre’s R2 verification statistic values were extremely low, rendering insignificant
the correlation established in the team’s calibration exercise. McIntyre thus concluded
that the reconstruction was anything but robust; it did not show the “skill” the team had
claimed it did, but proved a “catastrophic failure” in the verification test (McIntyre &
McKitrick, 2006). To be sure, opinions on the appropriate use of verification statistics
22 Later he retracted: “For the record, I’m not sold on claims that bristlecone growth pulses are due to
CO2 fertilization as argued by Graybill and Idso” (McIntyre, 2009).
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still differ among and between sceptics, mainstream statisticians, and the palaeoclimate
community, and subsequent examinations of both parties’ claims recommended the use
of several statistical validation metrics in order to account for the trade-offs between
single metrics (e.g. between precision and accuracy) (NRC, 2006; Wegman et al 2006).
The  better  McIntyre  understood  what  the  Mann  team  had  done  in  their
convoluted study, the more he became convinced that the hockey stick was an untrue
(re)construction.  He endorsed a  study by climate  scientists  Gerd Bürger  and Ulrich
Cubasch  (2005)  who  repeated  the  possibility  of  a  different  climate  history.  The
reconstruction was “highly sensitive to the variation of [...] criteria [...], resulting in an
entire spectrum of possible climate histories,” Bürger and Cubasch wrote. They found
that,  depending  on  six  binary  methodological  choices,  there  were  at  least  64
“reasonable”  shapes  the  reconstruction  could take.  And since  “[n]o  a  priori,  purely
theoretical  argument  allows  us  to  select  one  out  of  the  64  as  being  the  ‘true’
reconstruction” (Bürger & Cubasch, 2005), the Mann team’s graph could be dismissed
– though not out of logical necessity – as the scientists’ preferred choice among 64.
“Music  to  our  ears”  was  McIntyre’s  description  of  what  he  saw as  a  “devastating
critique of MBH98-type reconstructions” (McIntyre, 2006).
Climate  sceptics  in  Congress  celebrated  the  breaking  of  the  hockey  stick
(Inhofe,  2006).  The  hockey stick  graph  had  been  refuted  and  AGW was  falsified,
triumphantly concluded fellow sceptics on various blogs. 
Scientists  interpreted  the  results  differently.  Asked  in  Congress  whether  he
deemed Mann’s statistical analysis incorrect, Gerald North, who led a well-respected
investigation (NRC, 2006) into the scientific controversy, answered: “Well, we found
that it was not – there were many choices to make. They probably didn’t make the best
choice when they did the analysis the way they did” (HCEC, 2006: 101). But McIntyre
had certainly triggered a “healthy and broad discussion of the issue,” concluded Hans
von Storch (2007). And since then climate scientists have found ways to exclude at
least some variants proposed by Bürger and Cubasch on purely theoretical grounds.23
23 For example, the variant based on inverse calibration is not justified because it requires the proxy to
be  error-free.  The  alternative,  classic  calibration  is  more  correct  because  the  error  term  in  the
measured temperature is very likely smaller. Another example is the detrending issue: theoretically, a
regression analysis must be conducted on stationary data. If the time series of proxy and temperature
display a trend, the estimation of the regression coefficients can be considerably biased. In those
cases a so-called co-integration model should be used. A third example is related to the variance re-
scaling, which is an ad-hoc procedure that has no theoretical grounding at all. It is still applied and,
quite  remarkably,  turns  out  to  be  the  best  method of  those  tested  in  pseudo-proxy  experiments.
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Disputed trees
Steven McIntyre’s  meticulous  critique  of  the  team’s  methodological  choices
revealed  the  many  contestable  ad-hoc  steps  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  Northern
hemispheric  climate.  Evidently,  different  methodologies  could  or  should  have  been
used, data could or should have been manipulated differently. And though he initially
welcomed  Bürger’s  studies,  McIntyre  has  since  become  increasingly  doubtful  of
whether  a  methodologically  ‘sound’ and  satisfying  solution  could  be  found.  While
Mann’s PhD student Scott Rutherford and other colleagues gathered in defence of the
team’s choices (Rutherford et al 2005; Wahl & Ammann, 2007), McIntyre had already
moved on: “The real problem,” he announced in a Congressional hearing, “is that the
[PCA] method  as  applied  to  low quality  data  caused a  minor  pattern,  in  this  case
bristlecones, to be exaggerated as a dominant pattern in worldwide climate” (HCEC,
2006: 681). Revealing his ambition, McIntyre argued that “[e]very construction using
bristlecones will have to be reconsidered.”
McIntyre’s  main  focus  shifted  from  the  scientists’ opaque  calculations  and
methodological choices to the proxy data and notably the bristlecone pines: Did those
trees really record changes in temperature? Michael Mann and many of his colleagues
certainly thought so. In rare agreement with the sceptics over the superfluity of endless
methodological  debates,  Mann  insisted  that  the  hockey  stick  pattern  was  a
straightforward representation of Northern hemispheric temperature variability (HCEC,
2006: 178, emphasis added):
My critics also fail to recognize that even if their criticisms are accepted, it has no bearing
on the outcome. Dr. Wegman’s report argues that the hockey stick pattern derives from the
statistical  conventions  used  in  our  1998  and  1999  studies.  However,  using  alternative
statistical conventions yields the same hockey stick pattern.  The hockey stick pattern is
intrinsic to the data. That was the conclusion of the National Academy. Page 116 of the
National Academy report [NRC, 2006] says the statistical convention my colleagues and I
used  “does  not  appear  to  unduly  influence  reconstructions  of  hemispheric  mean
temperature;  reconstructions  performed without  using  principal  component analysis  are
qualitatively similar to the original curves presented by Mann et al.”
In fact, the professional statistician Edward Wegman, who Republican representatives
asked to evaluate the Mann team’s statistics, argued along similar lines: “[I]f you use a
nice set of proxies that all have the same signal in them then it really doesn’t matter a
Sometimes scientists choose theoretically incorrect methods, so called ad-hoc methods, which turn
out to perform better than more sophisticated and theoretically more convoluted methods. Here the
idealised  boundary  between analytic  and  synthetic  sentences  is  porous  if  not  completely  blurred
(Eduardo Zorita, personal communication).
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whole lot what [statistical] methodology you use” (HCEC, 2006: 735). “The shape of
the graph will depend on the underlying data,” he agreed with Mann.
Mann,  Bradley  and  Hughes  understood  data  from  bristlecone  pines  to  be
temperature proxies, and based on that theoretical understanding, the team included
them in their study. McIntyre on the other hand was convinced that bristlecone pines
were not reliable “antennae of world climate” (McIntyre,  2009). They would record
drought rather than temperature, he and fellow critic Anthony Watts argued; they were
rain gauges rather than thermometers. What is more, if the bristlecone pines’ late 20th
century growth was indeed controlled by CO2 fertilisation, as has been suggested by
Donald  Graybill,  the  stationary  requirement,  as  one  of  the  Mann  team’s  three
fundamental assumptions, would fail. This problem of divergence between proxy and
instrumental  temperature data after the 1960s puts into question the trees’ ability to
reconstruct the temperature in previous centuries.
McIntyre’s critique had been anticipated by dendroclimatologists at CRU. Early
on  they  recognised  that  scientific  uncertainties  would  pose  a  problem  for  the
communication of their results. In 1998 Keith Briffa warned in an email to colleagues
(EAE, 2009: 6 October 1998):
[W]e should be very wary of seeming to damn certain proxies and overhype others when
we all know that there are real strengths and weaknesses [associated] with them all. The
truth is that all of this group are well aware of this and of the associated fact that even
within each of these sub−disciplines e.g. Dendro, coral etc. there is a large range of values,
or concern with the external usage of our data. However, my own and Phil’s concerns are
motivated, like yourself, by the outside world’s inability to appreciate these points and the
danger that we will all be seen as uncritical or [naive] about the real value of proxy data.
Two years  later,  in  another  email,  Briffa  expressed  “[suspicions]  as  to  whether  the
negative trend in Mike’s hockey stick prior to the 20th century is not at least partly the
result  of a trend in the […] high elevation western US trees he uses” (EAE, 2009: 1
October 2000). Yet arguably because of the signiﬁcant political pressure to express the
voice of climate science as uniﬁed voice, such criticism was muted in the 2001 IPCC
report. For Andrew Montford “[Mann’s] failure to observe the divergence, or worse, if
he had failed to report it at all, must seriously undermine the credibility of the Hockey
Stick papers” (2010: 65).
Unaware  of  the  scientists’ doubts,  McIntyre  decided to  find  out  for  himself
whether bristlecone pines acted as rain gauges, CO2 filters or thermometers. In late
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2007 he ascended to the trees’ habitat in the high Rocky Mountains to replicate and
update Graybill’s chronology. 
To  McIntyre’s  dismay,  Graybill’s  ‘Mannian  data  management’,  as  sceptics
would call it, impeded his exercise. He struggled to track down Graybill’s trees, many
of which  were  not  even archived,  but  eventually  managed  to  identify  some of  the
tagged trees, retrieved his own cores, and with the help of dendroclimatologists from
Arizona  University  compiled  his  own  chronology.  In  a  talk  to  the  American
Geophysical  Union  (AGU)  McIntyre  preliminarily  concluded  that  tree  growth  was
moisture-limited – despite climate change, their ring width declined in the globally hot
1990s and 2000s (McIntyre & Holzmann, 2007). And to make his expedition appear
more credible than Graybill’s, McIntyre provided extensive metadata in form of various
maps, GPS data, pictures and rather extensive expedition reports so as to ensure readers
of his determination.24
Meanwhile,  other  researchers  had  updated  several  existing  bristlecone
chronologies and drew the sceptics’ attention to how tree physiognomy, soil sensitivity,
precipitation, temperature and other variables all influence bristlecone pine growth on
different  time  scales.  Many  hitherto  little  acknowledged  factors  all  of  a  sudden
demanded to be taken into account.  And while Ababneh (2008) served McIntyre to
argue against the inclusion of bristlecone pines in climate reconstruction,  in 2009 a
team of Arizona dendroclimatologists (Salzer  et al 2009) described bristlecone pines
from a  site  120  miles  south  and  80  metres  subjacent  to  McIntyre’s,  and  therefore
theoretically  less  temperature-dependent,  as  quite  robust  thermometers.  By showing
that bristlecone pines at this site are temperature sensitive, the study by Matthew Salzer
and colleagues has served the Mann team in its defence of the hockey stick.
Ultimately,  neither  Donald  Graybill  nor  Steven McIntyre  can  know without
doubt whose experiment is correct and whose data reflect true temperature variability.
24  Reads an excerpt of McIntyre’s expedition report (2007):
When we left this site, after a little while, we encountered the following situation in the road. It’s
actually  worse  than  it  looks.  The boulder  would rip  the underbelly  of  the  truck  we were  in,
stranding us on the mountain and the sides of the road on either side were pretty steeply pitched.
Pete is a skillful 4-wheel driver in addition to other skills (computers, wood working) and figured
out how to slalom the 4-wheeler down the gully, riding the wheels just to the side of the boulder
with the truck at what seemed to be about 35 (Pete amends: 35-45) degree angle to the horizontal,
while the rest of us held branches back at the side with all our limited might. We got off the
mountain with a deep $500 scratch to the truck and thanked our stars that that was all. You’d want
a different and less highway-comfortable vehicle for this section of the road, that’s for sure. But at
least  there was no precipice at  the  side  and the pictures  of  a  similar  situation  in  Pete’s  later
adventures look much more hair-raising.
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Aggravated by the unstable conditions in the high Rocky Mountains, the practical skills
of dendroclimatological experimentation and the theoretical commitments, described as
the  experimenter’s  regress we have discussed in  Chapter  3,  hamper the  succeeding
scientist’s replication exercise. First, the trees and the environment have changed since
the early 1990s; some trees may since have debarked, introducing a ‘strip-bark bias’.
Second, McIntyre does not know for sure which of the cored trees Graybill actually
used. Neither does he know why he decided to exclude samples from analysis. Some
trees may have been cored at least twice and at different heights for reasons that elude
the replicating experimenter – a taller scientist may decide to drill at a different position
than  their  shorter  colleague.  Irrespective  of  that,  an  exact replication,  as  has  been
frequently demanded by sceptics, is impossible since a tree can never be cored twice at
the same location. 
Many of these choices made in experimentation are tacitly held and agreed upon
by experienced scientists; they can hardly be articulated (Polanyi, 1958; Collins, 1985;
2010). Michael Mann so justified the interpolating of proxy data sets with a nod to his
colleague’s tacit knowledge (HCEC, 2006: 799):
Given Dr. Hughes’ long-standing collaboration in field and laboratory with the authors [...],
his  detailed  knowledge  of  their  working  methods,  and  his  own  direct  experience  of
working  with  the  same  species,  with  these  colleagues,  and  in  the  same  region  he
recommended that we fill this major spatial gap by digitizing these data, and also made
recommendations on which should be used […] Our procedure was in fact as objective and
rigorous as possible.
And Steven McIntyre too inferred from experience (cited in Montford 2010: 76):
At the time that [Mann’s Gaspe] series was making its big excursion, I happened to be
working for the Canadian company which owned the Gaspe. It’s certainly hard to think of
a reason why trees in Gaspe were making a 3 [standard deviation] excursion in the 1970s.
Since  neither  McIntyre  nor  Mann  had  access  to  respective  information,  successful
replication would have required close collaboration between the two. But the sceptics’
demand for an independent replication and the hostility between Mann and McIntyre
ruled that out. Thus the scientists and the sceptics once again argued with the scientific
method:  Salzer  et  al  (2009)  held  that  Graybill  had  used  inappropriate  methods  of
standardisation, and McIntyre criticised Salzer  et al (2009) for using modelled high-
altitude temperature in the proxy-temperature correlation exercise (McIntyre, 2009). In
line with the credentialed climatologists and physicists we encountered in Chapter 3, he
argued that modelled data would not qualify as real data. 
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The logical empiricist principles of ‘sound science’ have so provided plenty of
vantage points for critics, and the more complex the reconstruction, the more potential
problems can be located. “There are so many different sources of data and so many
ways of interpreting them, that there is much space for disagreements and no single set
of logical criteria that allows for easy closure of the controversy,” conclude Ryghaug
and Skølsvold (2010). According to Andrew Montford (2010: 77),
[t]he trouble started while McIntyre was trying to replicate one of the PC analyses […]
There may of  course have  been a rational  explanation for  this  (why some series  were
worthy a PC compilation in their own right and others were not), but Mann’s paper was
silent on the subject […] Again Mann gave no rationale in the paper for what appeared to
be an entirely illogical approach to the question of data compilation.
Disputed instrumental climate data
Climate sceptics have since followed McIntyre’s strategy and examined also
weather  and climate stations.  The compiled instrumental  temperature records  attract
critics, not only because the Mann team used them in the calibration and verification
exercises, but because they are often referred to as independent lines of evidence for
AGW. The rationale for deconstructing these records is the same: like proxy series,
instrumental temperature products factor out many sources of bias that scientists should
have accounted for.  Fred Singer (2011: 16) so asserted that
[i]t is well known that the quality of the surface temperature data is dubious […] A further
warming bias comes from the selection of stations, with the ‘best’ stations usually located
at airports. While airports may generally be warming, that’s not global warming. None of
the investigations of the Climategate principals has delved into this question. At the present
time, the Berkeley-Earth Project  is  investigating this difficult  but  important  matter.  We
should wait to see what they report.
Fellow sceptic and meteorologist Anthony Watts too believes that the changes in the
environment and in particular urbanisation around many stations have gravely biased
the climate records. Arguing with scientific studies such as “Unresolved issues with the
assessment of multidecadal  global  land surface temperature trends” (Pielke Sr.  et al
2007), these sceptics speak of an artificial warming trend, or artificial global warming
caused by urban heat islands (UHIs).25 And because most of the stations in the US
Historical  Climatology  Network  (USHCN)  are  ranked  poorly  according  to  WMO
standards (Fall et al 2011), they eagerly await the re-analysis of instrumental records by
a team of highly credentialed physicists from California’s Berkeley University.
25 http://www.surfacestations.org (Last accessed on 17 March 2014)
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4.5 Discussion
In  the  previous  chapter  I  argued  with  Harry  Collins’  observation  of  the
experimenter’s  regress that  the  successful  replication  of  scientific  experiments
inevitably  rests  on  however  small  a  degree  of  convention,  requiring  taste  and
judgement. I set up this chapter as a test of the principle of independent replication,
which is also a key element in the philosophy of ‘sound science’. To this end I first
explained in  some detail  the  science  of  climate  reconstruction,  including the  many
heterogeneous  materials  as  ‘agents’ in  scientific  practice  (cf.  Latour,  1999).  If  the
scientists put together the materials according to robust and well tested methods, their
findings  will  approximate  the  truth  about  past  climate  change.  In  the  scientific
literature, the  Mann  team  presented  their  assemblage  as a  fairly  straightforward
representation of an unprecedented temperature rise since 1,000 years, and in Congress
Mann likened the scientific  process to  the building of a house,  suggesting that  any
scientist-architect could with the same tools replicate his construction.
Upon close examination of the team’s science, Steve McIntyre found Mann’s
celebrated graph to be the result of little robust and badly described validation statistics
applied to questionable raw data. And because the scientists could not agree on a single
best  method  of  analysis,  each  of  them  having  trade-offs,  he  attended  to  the
heterogeneous materials of which there were hundreds and as many opportunities to
challenge  the  Mann  team.  Mann’s  secretive  behaviour  and  unprofessional  data
management  only  spurred  the  climate  auditor.  For  advocates  of  ‘sound  science’ to
accept the hockey stick as empirical test of the theory of AGW, the selection of each
and every of the 415 raw proxy series should be based on clear a priori criteria. And
because  McIntyre  would  not  agree  with  some  in  principle  analytic  a  posteriori
statements,  he had to give proof of the team’s unsound science.  He began with the
replication of Graybill’s chronology so as to show that bristlecone pines were other than
what  the  Mann team assumed  –  they  would  be  a  proxy  measure  for  rain,  not  for
temperature.
Several factors hampered McIntyre’s replication of seemingly straightforward
observations.  First,  the  two camps  are  bound to  different  theoretical  commitments.
While the Mann team likes to think of important proxies as thermometers, McIntyre
likes to view them as rain gauges, i.e., neither observation is an analytic a priori, and if
we follow William Quine (1951), there is much latitude of choice as to what statements
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to  re-evaluate  in  the  light  of  any  single  contrary  experience.  Second,  the  unstable
conditions  of  the  field  site  together  with  an  insufficient  description  of  the  original
experiment complicated its replication – with weathered materials, poor maps and even
poorer communication between them, no architects can ever replicate the constructions
of their predecessors: The two camps were generally unwilling to collaborate and share
their tacitly held knowledge and assumptions.  It is thus little surprising that Mann’s
close colleagues claim to have successfully replicated the hockey stick graph, noted
Edward Wegman (HCEC, 2006: 733):
[T]hese  supposed  independent  replications  of  the  original  Mann  work  are  done  by
Rutherford  et  al.,  which  includes  the  top  seven  people  in  the  social  network  that  we
identified  [...] Every one of them is in there, and they are frequent co-authors with Dr.
Mann.
Although  these  findings  generally  support  Collins’  observation,  the
experimenters’ regress  is  not  inevitable,  but  its  possibility  is  exploited  in  scientific
controversies  with  much  capital  invested  by  both  sides,  i.e.,  because  of  their
overarching political disagreement, in the hockey-stick controversy either side decided
to exploit that possibility.
4.6 Conclusion
In rehearsing this oft-told story (cf. Montford, 2010; Pearce, 2010; Mosher &
Fuller, 2010; Mann 2012a) I attempted not to take a side in the scientific controversy;
my interactional expertise does not allow me to contribute in discussions on the most
appropriate  validation  metrics.  Rather,  my  aim  was  to  show  empirically  how  the
principles ‘sound science’ come into conflict with science as practice. 
By invoking those principles climate sceptics can always question the practices
of climate science.  Thus, if applied symmetrically, the principles of ‘sound science’
would  pull  the  rug  from  under  their  own  feet:  However  credible  McIntyre’s
experiments  are,  they  too  can  be  challenged  with  the  ideas  of  logical  empiricism;
McIntyre too has to take certain facts on trust.  In a collaborative,  multidisciplinary
science, the practitioners rely heavily on others to have done their job properly, and it
would be highly impracticable to check all those raw data and account for all those
potential  problems  which  have  been  re-opened  in  the  controversy  on  climate
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reconstruction. 
But while open scientific questions are typically expressed as uncertainties, in
the popularisation of the hockey stick graph they were ignored. For the purpose of
legitimating climate policy, the politicians wanted certainty where there was arguably
not enough. They used to hockey stick to issue warnings of a climate catastrophe and
prescribed a remedy in form of governmental regulation. Thus, in response to what they
perceived as the much-loathed elite’s  smug and pseudo-scientific claims, the sceptics
demanded  definite  proof,  which  the  replication  exercise  did  not  bring:  “With  the
replication of the hockey stick in tatters, reasonable people might have expected some
sort of pause in the political momentum,” hoped Andrew Montford (2008).
If scientific closure on climate reconstruction is necessary for the political
process to continue, and yet cannot be reached because it will always be challenged
with the principles of ‘sound science’, decision-makers must look for other than
the putative foundational authority of facts. Politicians and all kinds of observers of
the hockey stick debate ask who can speak authoritatively on the history of climate and
the likely causes of temperature change. To find out who is qualified to do so and
whose expertise is relevant, and whose it not, sociologists of science have described
(and prescribed) mechanisms by which science is  (and should be) demarcated from
non-science.  The  next  chapter  describes  how  in  the  hockey  stick  controversy  the
irresolvable question over the scientific  method has been turned into that hopefully
resolvable one of expertise.
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Chapter Five
Scientific norms and expert authority
I think a problem like climate change is where our kind of analysis of expertise plays its
part. If there’s a consensus among experts, and you think you can trust these people, and
they’re working with integrity and trying to argue that  opposition are wrong using the
normal ways of arguing in science – rather than political suppression – then you should
base policies on the consensus even if you can’t be sure that consensus is the truth.
Harry Collins (2011)
5.1 Introduction
A key  argument  for  the  reduction  of  GHG  emissions  has  been  the  expert
consensus  on  AGW based  on  scientific  evidence.  But,  as  we  saw in  the  previous
chapter, even the proclaimed consensus on climate reconstruction is prone to criticism.
Climate sceptics deny any such claims with a nod to the scientific method ascribed to
‘sound science’. “‘Consensus’ is a political notion, not a scientific notion,” avered John
Christy in  his  most recent  testimony to Republican-sponsored hearings into climate
science  (HSCCT,  2011:  173).  Thus,  for  the  purpose  of  science  informing  political
decisions,  the insistence on ‘sound science’ is  problematic;  the principles of logical
empiricism can be used to deny any consensus, making it difficult for facts to speak
truth to or against power.
Although scientific  consensus  is  a  difficult  and in  principle  political  notion,
Western societies generally believe in its possibility and accept scientists as epistemic
authorities (cf. Castell  et al 2014). But with the ascendence of the knowledge society
(cf. Frank & Meyer, 2007), science having become an ‘ordinary’ profession (cf. Shapin,
2008), it is less clear who the authorities that is the true experts are. Through the lens of
Congressional hearings  on  climate  science,  this  chapter  examines  how  the  various
parties  in  the  hockey  stick  controversy  recognise  climate  experts,  certify  climate
research as scientific, and thereby demarcate expertise from lay knowledge.
Epitomised in  Congressional hearings is the modern order in which science is
separated from politics, and disinterested experts from sly politicians so as to inform
the latter of the most rationale course of action. Over the last two decades Democrats
and Republicans have convened dozens of Congressional hearings to which they have
94
invited  a  range  of  climate  experts  as  epistemic  authorities  (see  Keller,  2009).  And
because politicians want to use expert knowledge to legitimate policy action, which
meets  its  greatest  opposition  in  Congress,  the  supposedly  legitimating  science  is
meticulously  scrutinised.  Congressional  hearings  are  sometimes  hailed  as  the  most
effective way to keep expertise pure and political decisions rational.
Before we delve into hearings on climate reconstruction,  in  the next  section
(5.2)  I  review  the  SSK  literature  on  the  problem  of  demarcation.  Background
information on US Congressional hearings in section (5.3) sets up the empirical part in
which the first section (5.4) describes my protagonists’ principles of demarcation, and
the second (5.5) describes how they discuss and dispute their practical implementation.
In  the  discussion  section  (5.6)  the  findings  of  the  empirical  part  are  put  into
conversation with the literature presented in the review.
5.2 Demarcating science from non-science, and the theory of expertise
Science in ‘Wave One’  SSK: A self-regulating institution
‘Wave One’ sociologists of science typically view science as a self-regulating
institution populated by scientists as a class of formally qualified people (Mannheim,
1954; Merton, 1968). Scientists are generally believed to speak the truth by virtue of
their formal, meritocratic qualifications such as university degrees, which are obtained
after long training under the auspices of experienced scientists. “Truth claims, whatever
their source, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria,” believes Robert
K. Merton (1968: 598). These impersonal markers of expertise have also become a
convenient shorthand for policy-makers to recognise epistemic authority. For example,
expert witnesses in US Congress typically but not necessarily hold PhDs (see table 2.1
on page  41). And for  political  scientists  who study the  role  of  science  in  decision
making impersonal criteria too serve as convenient markers of expertise. Ann-Campell
Keller (2009, 18) so identifies a scientist as an individual who has a PhD in the natural
sciences  and  is  employed  as  a  PhD  scientist  by  either  an  academic  institution,  a
corporation, or by a (non-)governmental organisation:
Though there are other routes to having a professional role in the sciences, the empirical
evidence  [...] shows that having obtained an advanced degree in the natural sciences and
having  gained  professional  employment  on  the  basis  of  that  degree  characterizes  the
majority of actors who appear in policy setting under the label of “scientist.”
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Peer  review  is  the  self-regulating  mechanism  by  which  the  fraternity  of
scientists distinguishes among fellow experts. In peer review the scientists  lay open
their  research  to  the  scrutiny  of  their  colleagues  and  competitors.  These  peers
anonymously assess each other’s scientific propositions and either reject or recommend
them for  publication  in  scientific  journals.  Based  on the  reviewers’ judgement,  the
editors  of  these  journals,  themselves  established scientists,  then decide  whether  the
research deserves publication. The denied scientist typically revisits their research, re-
submits, or approaches a different scientific journal. The higher the journal is ranked
the  more  interest  is  triggered  from its  respective  publications;  by  convention  peer-
reviewed journals are indexed and ranked by the Institute for Scientific Information
(ISI).  Any proposition that survives this process is deemed scientific,  until  it  too is
rejected by subsequent scrutiny via reiterative rounds of review. Eventually only true
knowledge survives this process, which has been likened to the free market’s invisible
hand.26 And although this process is not fool-proof, it is generally accepted as the gold
standard by which the institution of science proves its independence.
Because the peer-reviewed literature has become too vast for politicians to keep
track with the latest findings, they typically entrust scientific societies such as the NAS,
“where  the  nation  turns  for  independent,  expert  advice,”  to  review  the  scientific
literature  on  an  identified  issue  of  public  interest.27 For  example,  in  2006  the  US
Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) asked the NAS’ National Research Council
(NRC) to assess the scientific literature describing the climate of the past 2000 years
(NRC, 2006). The NRC (2007) defines assessment as “a process by which independent
experts review and synthesize available scientific and technical knowledge [...] that is
needed by policy-makers to help make decisions.”  
According  to  ‘Wave  One’ science  scholar  Robert  Merton  (1968:  605)  the
scientists’ qualifications,  credentials,  publications and awards  signal  professionalism
and moral  integrity  which  “are  in  varying  degrees  internalized  by the  scientist”  as
scientific ethos, which is an “emotionally toned complex of values and norms which
26 In The Republic of Science Michel Polanyi (1962: 56) makes use of the idea of the free market: “In 
the case of science, adjustment takes place by taking note of the published results of other scientists; 
while in the case of the market, mutual adjustment is mediated by a system of prices broadcasting 
current exchange relations, which make supply meet demand. But the system of prices ruling the 
market not only transmits information in the light of which  economic agents can mutually adjust 
their actions; it also provides them with an incentive to exercise economy in terms of money.”
27 http://www.nas.edu (Accessed on 14 March 2013). In the UK, the Royal Society performs a similar
function. These societies are staffed by highly credentialed experts who have for years and decades
produced outstanding and often Nobel Prize winning research in their respective disciplines. 
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held  to  be  binding  on  the  man  [sic.]  of  science.”  Merton  identified  four  norms:
Communalism, Universalism, Disinterestedness, and Organised Scepticism (CUDOS).
The norm of communalism holds that knowledge is equally and freely accessible to all
members  of  the  scientific  community  and so  becomes  “part  of  the  public  domain,
shared by all and owned by none” (1968: 588). Universalism means that every scientist
regardless  of  race,  religion,  sex,  but  also  social  place  or  political  ideology,  can
contribute  to  science,  i.e.,  the  laws  of  science  are  the  same  everywhere  and  are
independent  of  the  scientists  involved.  To  this  end,  a  scientist  has  to  remain
disinterested  in  their  experiments’  results.  “The  translation  of  the  norm  of
disinterestedness into practice,” writes Merton (p. 613), “is effectively supported by the
ultimate accountability of scientists to their compeers.” Related to these three norms is
organised  scepticism,  which  can  be  understood  as  the  scrutiny  of  peer  review
internalised by the scientist as their moral obligation.
Science in ‘Wave Two’ SSK: Human, all too human
Though  formal  credentials  and  scientific  norms  are  understood  as  a  typical
pathway to establishing credibility and epistemic authority, in practice this is not always
the case. Exceptions to the rule suggest that scientific expertise is not restricted to a
formal class of scientists. For instance, there is no rule that a witness has to produce a
PhD in order to testify as an expert in Congress. And many people do possess expert
knowledge but have no formal qualification (cf. Wynne, 1989, 1996; Epstin, 1996) –
called ‘lay experts’ their institutional status is debated (Collins & Evans, 2002; Wynne,
2003).
In  that  vein  the  new  sociologists  of  science  have  argued  that  institutional
credentials and scientific norms do not sufficiently explain the perpetual maintenance
of a boundary between scientists and non-scientists (cf. Barnes & Dolby, 1970). As part
of  a  wider  social  reality  scientists  have always had to  work hard through repeated
demonstrations of integrity, rhetoric and exposure to be judged as independent, reliable
and trusted public witnesses (cf. Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Shapin, 1994, 2010). It has
never  been  enough  to  show  one’s  credentials,  to  talk  about  the  scientiﬁc  method,
experiments, observations and theories – for a scientist to convince a critical audience
of a statement’s truth it is necessary to draw on ‘extra-scientiﬁc’ factors. 
In demarcating science from politics,  scientists play with public sentiments by
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contrasting empirical or pure science favourably to theoretical or applied science, and
in Chapter 3 we saw how ‘sound science’ qua empirical science was demarcated from
computer  experiments  qua  theoretical  science.  Adversaries  are  then  portrayed  as
religious, political, populist and subjective. And to be immune from blame scientists
construct  a  boundary  between  the  production  of  science  on  one  side  and  its
consumption by business, politicians, the military etc. on the other side (cf. Gieryn,
1983; 1999). The ‘linear model’ of science and society describes the knowledge transfer
from production to consumption.
According to the new sociologists Mertonian norms, too, have served more as
an ideal than an accurate description of the reality of science today. Schmaus (1983)
argues that there have never been special norms operating in science; scientists would
simply follow general and ever-changing moral codes. Ben-David (1991) shows that
norms  are  suspended  in  controversies,  and  Metlay  (2006)  argues  that  the  norm of
communalism  has  been  replaced  by  the  ‘norm’ of  IPRs.  There  is  also  empirical
evidence of a violation of organised scepticism: Some reviewers were found to be less
critical  of  ideas  they  generally  agreed  with;  they  scrutinised  research  of  well-
established  scientists  from  prestigious  institutions  less  thoroughly  than  that  of
comparably unknown scientists from less prestigious institutions (Jasanoff, 1990: 68-
76). And in principle any group of scientists, such as expert panels that review the state
of knowledge, violate the ideal of scepticism. Depending on the size and practicality,
different groups of scientists approach the idea of consensus quite differently, and to a
reasonable degree they suspend with scepticism. That  ‘micro-politics of consenting’
reveals that a strict distinction between science and politics is problematic and prone to
criticism (cf. Fuller, 1988: chapter 8).
The  friction  between  science  and  politics  manifests  itself  in  an  observable
tension between the idealised, objective expert and the political citizen, who live in one
and  the  same body.  As  citizens,  scientists  are  also  granted  a  political  opinion  and
therefore  allowed to  break  the  ideal  of  disinterestedness.  But  because  they possess
highly valued knowledge, they must  strike this  balance responsibly,  argues political
scientist Roger Pielke, Jr. (2007): Those who make policy statements and clothe them
with  the  authority  of  science  are  branded  as  “stealth  issue  advocates.”  Those  who
refrain  from  stating  their  preference  are  celebrated  as  “honest  brokers  of  policy
options,” who help clarify existing and identify new policy options.  Because it again
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serves as a normative yardstick, for Pielke, Jr.,  (2007: 115) honest brokering “more
likely will  be the result of institutional commitments to expanding or clarifying the
scope of choice available to decision makers.”
Science after ‘Wave Two’ SSK: The problem of extension
 “‘If it is no longer clear that scientists and technologists have special access to
the truth, why should their advice be specially valued?’ This, we think, is the pressing
intellectual problem of the age,” argue Collins and Evans in an essay on the so-called
problem  of  extension  (2002:  236). If  neither  a  reliance  on  the  method  nor  on
institutional  markers  of  expertise  and  the  associated  scientific  ethos  suffice  to
demarcate  those  who  know  from  those  who  don’t,  decision-makers  who  rely  on
scientific  authority  will  struggle in  the  choice of  the  right  experts,  believe  the  two
science students. Not least the political controversies over GMOs, the use of pesticides
in agriculture, and global warming would prove that the question of how one should
draw the line between expertise and non-expertise is as pertinent as ever. As a solution
Collins  and  Evans  (2002:  238)  propose  to  “draw  a  boundary  around  the  body  of
‘technically-qualiﬁed-by-experience’ contributors to technical decision-making” so as
to  exclude  those  who  cannot  contribute  to  debates  about,  for  example,  the  Kyoto
Protocol.28 “We resurrect the old distinction between the political sphere and the sphere
of expertise, but in our model the boundary is found in a new place,” they posit (2002:
270).
 For Collins and Evans that boundary is no longer found between the class of
professional  accredited experts  and the rest:  in  part  because discrimination between
experts and non-experts based on formal meritocratic qualifications has sometimes led
to bad decisions (e.g.,  Wynne, 1996),  one should “take  the advice of scientists  and
technologists in virtue of the things they do as scientists and technologists, rather than
as  individuals  or  as members  of  certain institutions” (Collins  & Evans,  2002:  236,
emphasis  in  original).  Only  those  members  of  the  public  who  can  produce
“experienced-based expertise” should be counted into Collins’ core-set of experts. For
28 Collins and Evans (2002: 236) cite the Kyoto Protocol as an example of technical decision-making:
“By  ‘technical  decision-making’ we  mean  decision-making  at  those  points  where  science  and
technology intersect  with  the  political  domain because  the  issues  are  of  visible  relevance  to  the
public: should you eat British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-ﬁred power stations, want a quarry in
your village, accept the safety of anti-misting kerosene as an airplane fuel, vote for politicians who
believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto agreement, and so forth.”
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the sociologists the core-set is made up of those “deeply involved in experimentation or
theorization which  is  directly  relevant  to  a  scientiﬁc controversy or  debate” (2002:
242). The core-scientists’ special position would “[arise] from their long experience and
integration into the specialist  social  group of which such expertise is  the collective
property” (p. 260).
Despite  this  more  restricted principle  for  identifying whose  expertise  should
count, in any given case, there is still the question of demarcating what and who should
count  as  the  core  group.  Demarcation,  the  scholars  suggest,  becomes  a  task  for
sociologists  of science to  contribute  to.  The science student  should closely observe
scientific debates and use the acquired interactional expertise to help in the erection of
new boundaries. For example, depending on the context and public interest, Collins and
Evans’ boundary requires a sociological definition of types of science. Other than in the
“public domain sciences and technologies,” in the “esoteric sciences” (2002: 242) only
the core-set can legitimately contribute to the formation of the consensus. And yet what
counts  as  esoteric  science  awaits  a  positive  answer;  at  times  previously  esoteric
sciences  have  been  propelled  into  the  public  limelight  rather  unexpectedly  (e.g.,
Wakefield et al 1998). 
Finally, as regards the public acceptance of controversial scientific knowledge
claims, which ‘Wave Two’ scholars have taken particular interest in, Collins and Evans
presume that the ‘chattering classes’ will somehow come to know who to believe in.
Following a strong universalising rationale, they assert that people would understand
whether  experts’ claims  are  trustworthy  and  compatible  with  the  “forms-of-life  of
Western science.” The public would make their decision by asking: “Does the author of
a claim seem to have integrity? Is the author of a claim known to have made unreliable
claims in the past?” (Collins & Evans, 2002: 258). 
With  these  concepts,  describing  a  theory  of  expertise,  a  better  and   more
authoritative consensus on climate change could be found, believes Collins (2011).
The contingency of expertise
In controversies over technical decision-making the central question is typically
what is going to count as relevant knowledge, rather than who possesses the right sorts
of knowledge, or how it is certified as scientific, argues Sheila Jasanoff (2003). For
100
Jasanoff, Collins and Evans’ theory, including its prescription of core-sets and types of
sciences and expertise, is  desirable only to those who believe that decisions can be
rendered  entirely  rational.  She  views expertise  as  the  outcome of  negotiations  and
controversies, and so directs our attention away from the production of science and
expertise to the processes of public warranting by which the public can hold experts to
account. Through what can also be called public-review we formally decide as a society
who to believe on important ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004a).
Public warranting succeeds scientific peer review and already includes audits
and site visits, regulatory peer review, judicial review and legislative oversight such as
Congressional hearings in which politicians evaluate contesting knowledge claims by
publicly (cross)-examining scientists. The public warranting mechanisms Jasanoff has
directed our attention to are neither universal nor objective – they differ within and
between nation-states, and their various mechanisms reflect specific expectations that
are grounded in historically shaped practices about how to arrive at  truth (Jasanoff,
2005).  Other  than  those  sociologists  of  science  who have  argued  for  the  universal
importance of trust in the making of truth (e.g., Shapin, 1994), Jasanoff shows that in
the US more than in any comparable Western liberal democracy public accountability
of expertise is based on the assumption of distrust. This assumption shapes what comes
to count as true public knowledge. 
While  Jasanoff  has  focused,  in  particular,  on  the  role  of  the  courts  in  US
America’s civic epistemology, my focus here is on Congressional hearings as a forum
for public warranting that plays a crucial  role in testing the constitution of relevant
expertise.  The next  section introduces  Congressional  hearings as  a  venue on which
climate expertise is tested and adjudicated. 
5.3 Background and setting
The hearings
When Steven McIntyre took interest in the graph in 2003, the IPCC (2001b)
along with the US EPA (2003) had already declared the hockey stick a policy-relevant
fact. Their reports suggested that climate change was a global issue with potentially
dire  consequences.  In  response Senators John McCain  (R-AZ) and Joe Liebermann
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(ID-CT) introduced the Climate Stewardship Act in the Senate. Representatives Wayne
Gilchrest (D-MD) and John Olver (D-MA) then introduced the Act to the House in
2004. The formal policy process was finally under way, and in order to set a binding
target  for  the  reduction  of  GHG emissions  Senate  and  Congress  only  had  to  pass
legislation. But both chambers of the 107th (2001-2003) and 108th Congress (2003-
2005) had a Republican majority, which made the passage of legislation to regulate
GHGs an uphill struggle.
Because  climate-concerned  politicians  endorsed  the  scientific  consensus  as
presented by the IPCC and EPA, some climate sceptics in both chambers of the 107th
and 108th Congress called for  Congressional hearings on climate science. Using the
power of the majority, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) convened the first of
several hearings on climate reconstruction held by the Committee on Environment and
Public Works. Hearings on July 29, 2003, entitled “Climate History and the Science
Underlying  Fate,  Transport,  and  Health  Effects  of  Mercury  Emissions,”  featured
Michael  Mann  and  the  astrophysicist  Willie  Soon,  representing  either  side  of  the
scientific debate (SCEPW, 2003).
In October 2003 the first Climate Stewardship Act failed in the Senate but was
re-introduced to both houses in February 2005 when it failed once more. Half a year
later on September 28, 2005, Inhofe convened a second hearing entitled “The Role of
Science in Environmental Policy Making” before the same Committee (SCEPW, 2005).
The hearing addressed climate reconstructions as well as the impact of climate change
on hurricane frequency, since only one month earlier Hurricane Katrina had devastated
New Orleans,  killing at  least  1,833 people.  Notable expert  witnesses to the hearing
included science fiction writer Michael Crichton and the hurricane scientist William
Gray, who spoke on the debated impact of climate change on hurricane frequency and
intensity.
In July 2006 fellow House Republicans Joe Barton (R-CA) and Ed Whitfield
(R-KY) followed Inhofe’s example and called for a  hearing dedicated solely to the
hockey stick (HCEC, 2006). “Questions Surrounding the ‘Hockey Stick’ temperature
Studies:  Implications  for  Climate  Change  Assessment”  was  held  before  the
Subcommittee  of  Oversight  and  Investigation  of  the  Committee  of  Energy  and
Commerce on July 19 and 27, 2006. 
Joe  Barton  explained the  rationale  for  Republican-sponsored  hearings  on
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climate science (HECE, 2006: 111):
Well, let me [...] say why we are doing this hearing, [...] I don’t disagree fundamentally
with some of what my friends on the minority side have stated. There is no question that
the temperature is warmer today than it was in 1850. I think there still is a question about
the cause of that […] Where I disagree with  some of my friends on the minority side is
that before we make massive public policy changes that affect every American citizen in
this country, we need to have with  the highest degree of certainty that the facts really are
the facts […] If the United States has ratified Kyoto and if the United States Congress
working with the Administration had begun to implement Kyoto, it requires a reduction in
CO2, I believe about 30 to 40 percent, and that means you are not going to have coal-fired
power plant combustion in many parts of this country. It means that you are going to have
to reduce the automobile emissions of the vehicles that are made in Michigan. And before
we go down that trail, I think it is imperative that we do the oversight and do the science --I
am not opposed to talking to the climatologists but I agree [...] that we really get everything
on the table. If that shows that the human correlation is beyond dispute, then I believe we
do have an obligation to take what steps we can to remedy that but I don’t believe that
science yet shows that.
In the run-up to that hearing Barton and Whitfield ordered the statistician and
fellow sceptic Edward Wegman to review McIntyre’s critique on the hockey stick. They
then invited both Wegman and McIntyre to counter the testimony subpoenaed from
Michael  Mann.  Irritated  by  what  he  considered  a  misguided  and  illegitimate
investigation, the Chair of the House Science Committee Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY)
called  upon  the  NAS to  authoritatively  assess  the  hockey  stick  controversy  (NRC,
2006). The report’s chair, Gerald North, the NAS president Ralph Cicerone as well as
German climate scientist Hans von Storch were among the expert  witnesses in July
2006. They were joined by climate scientists Tom Karl, who appeared for the absent
Michael  Mann during  the  first  session,  Thomas  Crowley,  and Jay  Gulledge as  the
Democrats’ witnesses, and John Christy as expert for the Republican side.
After ‘Climategate’ and years of Republican majority, in November 2010, the
Committee on Science and Technology convened, under Democrat rule this time, the
hearing grandly entitled “A Rational Discussion of Climate Change: The Science, the
Evidence, the Response” before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment (HCSS,
2010). This and a second hearing entitled “Undeniable Data: The Latest Research on
Global Temperature and Climate Science” (SCEPW, 2011) convened by the Democrats
Edward Markey (MA) and Henry Waxman (CA) should set the scientific record straight
and reinforce the difficult legislative process.
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The procedure
A hearing starts with a formal procedure in which the politicians explain its
rationale – scientific expertise is sought to help inform policy-makers – and the reason
for their choice of expert witnesses. “Very often our subjects come from areas in which
we have very little personal involvement or expertise, so we have to depend on expert
witnesses,”  explained  Senator  Lisa  Murkowski  (R-AK)  (SCEPW,  2005:  13).  Yet
because they are selected independently by Republicans and Democrats, there is an
incentive for either party to choose witnesses whose expertise is thought to align with
their respective policy positions. Scientists whose knowledge claims do not align with
the respective position are usually cross-examined by members of Congress as hostile
witnesses. And though officially denied, it is fairly easy to tell who sympathises with
whom, and politicians of both sides badly disguise their hostility towards particular
witnesses as a dialogue between Senator Inhofe and Michael Mann illustrates (SCEPW,
2003: 16):
INHOFE: All  right.  Let’s see.  Dr.  Mann,  since you have characterized your colleagues
there in several different ways as nonsense, illegitimate, and inexperienced, let me ask you
if you would use the same characterization of another person that I quoted on the floor
yesterday […].
MANN: I do not think I have questioned scientific integrity. I have questioned scientific
expertise  in  the  case  of  Drs.  Willie  Soon and David Legates  with regard  to  issues  of
paleoclimate […] If I could clarify one—— .
INHOFE: OK. Well,  you can’t  because there isn’t  time. I  am going to  stay within my
timeframe and I want to  get  to questions so others  will  have plenty of  opportunity to
respond to questions I am sure.
In  order  to  forestall  mutual  accusations  of  biased  selection  the  sworn-in
witnesses then introduce themselves with a written statement stressing their impersonal
credentials. After having sworn an oath, they give a sober account typically stating their
academic  rank  (e.g.,  their  title  in  their  respective  discipline),  position,  institutional
affiliation (e.g., Professor of Earth System Science, Director of the Climate Research
Centre,  Member  of  the  Academy  of  Science,  etc.),  and  past  and  current  research
interests. Often expert witnesses cite the number of peer-reviewed publications to mark
their scientific experience. Pledges of independence and disinterestedness follow once
the  debate  has  kicked  off  and  politicians  examine  each  other’s  experts.  Often  the
‘hostile’ experts are first explained the rationale for their invitation. Congressman Jay
Inslee (D-WA) lectured Ed Wegman (HCEC, 2006: 100):
I want you to make sure you understand the reality of the situation. I am giving you all the
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sincerity that I can give to you. But the reason you are here is not why you think you are
here, okay. The reason you are here is to try to win a debate with some industries in this
country who are afraid to look forward to a new energy future for this Nation, and the
reason you are here is  to  try  to  create doubt  about  whether  this  country should move
forward  with  a  new  technological  clean  energy  future  or  whether  we  should  remain
addicted  to  fossil  fuels.  That  is  the  reason  you  are  here.  Now,  that  is  not  the  reason
individually why you came but that is the reason you are here. Thank you very much.
The  hostile  climate  of  Congressional hearings  puts  these  scientists  in  an
uncomfortable  position.  Whilst  they  make  sure  to  appear  as  objective  as  possible,
policy-makers try to elicit subjective statements by asking policy-relevant questions.
They want more than just  scientific advice;  they demand of scientists to offer their
impersonal  authority  as  a  resource  in  the  political  battle.  But  expert  witnesses  are
particularly careful not to ‘talk politics’. They do not want to give the impression of
favouring a policy position as this would undermine the rationale for their invitation
and threaten the image of disinterestedness and neutrality they are supposed to uphold.
Thus, observes Keller (2009: 176),
[i]n many scientists who participate in legislative decision making, this tension produces a
visible  effort  to  negotiate  the  boundary  between  science  and  policy.  Through  such
negotiations,  scientists  attempt  to  retain  their  status  as  neutral  experts  and  to  provide
relevant information to policy makers. But the ability to fulfil one of these roles almost
precludes the ability to satisfy the other. In spite of this, scientists are repeatedly called
upon to play both roles when they participate in Congressional hearings.
And in spite of this tension, scientists too have an incentive to attend these hearings:
Whilst  an invitation to  the most  authoritative  political  venue in the US is  certainly
flattering,  some  may  also  see  it  as  a  chance  to  actively  shape  political  decisions.
Scientists  who enter  the policy making process “are purposive  and will  adapt their
behaviour to the setting in order to maximize their goals,” argues Keller (2009: 14).  
By discussing the political implications of their research, and by demarcating
themselves from each other, the parties’ respective expert witnesses actively engage in
boundary work.  In  the  next  section I  let  the scientists  and their  political  protégées
describe  the  principles  of  demarcation  to  clarify  whether  and  how  different  sides
actually disagree about them (cf. Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
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5.4 Principles of demarcation
Scientific credentials
The authority of scientific credentials is repeatedly invoked by PhD scientists,
Nobel laureates and academic societies signing petitions for and against action to curb
the risks of climate change. In the 2006 hearings Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA)
presented a joint statement issued by 11 national science academies calling on world
leaders to acknowledge that the threat of climate change is clear and increasing (see
also UCS, 1997). On the other side of the climate divide, at a presentation to climate
sceptics  at  the  Heartland  Institute,  atmospheric  physicist  Richard  Lindzen  (2010)
played down a letter signed by 250 scientists to the journal  Science arguing “...most
signers had no background whatever in climate sciences.” For Michael Mann a climate
expert  is  “an  individual  with  specific  training  in  oceanographic,  atmospheric,  and
coupled ocean-atmosphere processes relevant to understanding climate variability and
the  behavior  of  the climate system” (SCEPW, 2003: 178).  They have obtained this
training through “either an advanced degree in those areas of study, or through years of
research  in  those areas associated  with  numerous publications in  the peer-reviewed
climate literature,” Mann added.
Both  sides  support  meritocracy  in  science.  Thus,  Republican  Senator  James
Inhofe deemed it necessary to defend the invitation of science fiction author Michael
Crichton as an expert witness (SCEPW 2005, 32-33):
In a way, I kind of regret that Michael Crichton was an author. Because if he had not been
an author, he would still be here today because of his scientific credentials, having degrees
from  Harvard  College  and  Harvard  Medical  School,  visiting  lecturer  of  Physical
Anthropology  at  Cambridge  University,  post-doctoral  fellow  at  the  Salk  Institute  for
Biological Studies. We would have him here anyway.
Inhofe  also  emphasised  institutional  affiliation  in  his  endorsement  of  a  study  by
credentialed climate sceptics Sallie Baliunas and Willie Soon (2003, otherwise referred
to as BS03) (SCEPW 2003: 2):
The 1000-year climate study that  the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics has
compiled is a powerful new work of science. It has received much attention, and rightfully
so  […]  In  many  important  ways,  the  Harvard-Smithsonian  Center’s  work  shifts  the
paradigm away from the previous hockey stick study. The powerful new findings of this
most comprehensive study shiver [the timbers of the] adrift Chicken Little crowd.
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The  brand  name  and  associated  public  authority  of  Harvard  as  a  scientific
institution was also recognized by climate scientists, who worried about its potential to
lend  credence  to  the  sceptics.  In  an  email  to  his  colleagues,  climate  scientist  Tom
Wigley from the National Center of Atmospheric Research (NCAR) wrote (EAE, 2009:
23 July 2003):
What is worrying is the way this [BS03] paper has been hyped by various groups. The
publicity has meant that the work has entered the consciousness of people in Congress, and
is given prominence in some publications emanating from that sector. The work appears to
have the imprimateur of Harvard, which gives it added credibility […] It would (also) be
useful to have Harvard disassociate themselves from the work […] As scientists […] we
need  to  concentrate  on  exposing  the  scientific  flaws.  We  also  need  to  do  this  in  as
authoritative a way as possible. I do not think it is enough to speak as individuals or even
as a group of recognized experts.  Even as a group, we will not  be seen as having the
’power’ of the Harvard stamp of approval.
In trying to organise fellow scientists to get Harvard University to denounce the study,
Wigley  was  taking  the  organised scepticism  of  peer  review  to  new  levels.  Such
behaviour would eventually support the sceptics’ claim of a politicisation of climate
science. 
Because expert witness Steven McIntyre is a retired mining consultant without
formal  qualifications  such  as  a  PhD,  Ed  Whitfield  (R-KY)  deemed  it  important  to
highlight his visit at Oxford University dating back several decades, so as to bask in the
reflected glory of that ancient university as a centre of scientific learning. And yet, to
hedge  their  bets,  Whitfield  and  Barton  also  asked  the  professional  statistician  Ed
Wegman to review McIntyre’s ‘lay expertise’ and offer the stamp of approval  from
someone with more conventionally recognised scientific credentials. Clifford Stearns
(R-FL) explained Wegman’s appointment (HCEC, 2006: 736):
Dr.  Wegman  is  an  appointed  member  of  the  National  Academy  of  Science  Board  of
Mathematical  Statistics  and  Their  Application.  He is  chair  of  the  NAS Committee  on
Applied and Theoretical Statistics, highly credentialed in math and statistics, wouldn’t you
say? Shouldn’t we take his judgement on statistical matters seriously, and don’t they carry
significant weight? Wouldn’t you say his judgement about statistical matters is important
and that he has credibility upon those credentials?
The rationale for having a professional and highly credentialed statistician assess and
approve  of  McIntyre’s  critique  was  to  authorise  his  ‘lay’  claims  in  front  of  a
disbelieving audience of Democrat representatives. 
To sum up, these examples of boundary work confirm that protagonists across
the divide appreciate and agree on scientific credentials as in formal qualifications and
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institutional affiliations as meritocratic, non-personal markers of expertise.
Scientific norms
Scientists do not want to give the impression of having a stake in the outcome of
their research: “[I]t would be problematic if our views on policy somehow influenced
the way we went about doing our science,” Mann (2014) forestalled in the NYT. The
norm of disinterestedness, which Mann alludes to, is particularly valued among experts
operating at the legislative and implementation stages of decision-making. Yet because
each side in Congress chooses witnesses who are likely to be sympathetic to respective
policy positions, the politicians will try to push for statements they want to hear. Faced
with  the  risk  of  losing  credibility,  the  witnesses  usually  deny  their  interrogator  a
satisfactory answer. Asked by Henry Waxman (D-CA) whether he deemed it important
to  take  cost-effective  steps  to  reduce  emissions,  the  NRC  chair  and  atmospheric
scientist Gerald North evaded: “Well, now you are stepping a little bit beyond my role
here. I will talk about the science but what we ought to do is somebody else’s business”
(HCEC, 2006: 65).
Those  who  express  their  opinions  quickly  find  themselves  at  the  centre  of
attention. In 1988, climate scientist James Hansen’s emphatic Congressional testimony
that “[i]t’s time to stop waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that
the  greenhouse  effect  is  here”  (New  York  Times,  1988)  became  famous  precisely
because he overstepped the conventional boundary between expertise and politics. His
candour gave him the contentious reputation of (stealth?) issue advocacy: “Dr. Hansen
has pushed far beyond the boundaries of the conventional role of scientists, particularly
government  scientists,  in  the  environmental  policy  debate,”  summarised  the  NYT
journalist and close observer of the climate controversy, Andy Revkin (2009). Given
the  Democrats’ reliance  on  climate  expert  judgement,  and the  Republican  sceptics’
attempts to deconstruct any proclaimed consensus, it is easy to see why some climate
scientists are tempted to jeopardise their status as epistemic authorities.
In view of the multi-million dollar campaign to cast doubt over climate change,
contrarians  too  are  advised  to  deny  any  profit  or  interest.  Anticipating  a  loss  of
credibility, John Christy pre-empted any accusations: “No one is holding a gun to my
head and no one is paying me money either above or under the table to arrive at the
conclusions  I  (and others)  have  come to”  (HCSST,  2011:  68).  Neither  did  Edward
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Wegman receive any compensation, “not even a taxi fare,” he insisted (HCEC, 2006:
36).  Joe  Barton  vouched  for  the  disinterestedness  and  independence  of  his  chosen
expert: “I would especially like to thank Dr. Edward Wegman who, on his own time
and his own expense, assembled a pro bono committee of statisticians to provide us
with independent and expert guidance concerning the hockey stick studies” (HCEC,
2006: 9). Wegman reaffirmed the point, telling Barton, “I didn’t even know what you
looked like until--.” And when Wegman confirmed Barton’s rhetorical question to have
voted for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential elections, he publicly dissociated himself
from the Republican Congressman who ordered his expertise.29
To  forestal  the  accusation  of  interest  experts  stress  the  motif  of  curiosity.
Evading Janice Schakowsky’s (D-IL) rhetorical question about his lack of credentials,
Steven McIntyre replied (HCEC, 2006: 739):
SCHAKOWSKY: Actually I wanted to ask you--I hope you don’t think this sounds rude
but when I looked at the witness list I see, you know, everyone has got kind of a credential
and  then  it  just  says  your  name,  so  I  wanted  to  ask  you  about  your  credentials,  Mr.
McIntyre, [...] what I found was: ‘for the last 16 years I have been an officer and director of
several small public mineral exploration companies, previous to that I worked for a large
international mining company, and that mainly it is your experience in mineral exploration
industry that you tout in your resume and your background’ [...].
MCINTYRE: Well, in this case this has nothing to do with any work that I have ever done.
I  just  became interested  in  it  as  a  citizen when I  read  the  studies,  and I  thought  that
politicians were facing difficult policy decisions so I thought that it would be interesting to
examine one particular paper which was being cited by the Canadian government. It wasn’t
clear to me how people knew that 1998 was the warmest year in the millennium, and I was
just interested in how—.
Here McIntyre appeals to scientific ideas of curiosity-driven research (cf. Daston &
Park,  2001),  seeking knowledge for its  own sake without  an eye  to  profit  or other
instrumental  purpose.  His  noble  virtues  are  hailed  by  the  WSJ’s Antonio  Regalado
(2005):  “After  spending  two  years  and  about  $5,000  of  his  own  money  trying  to
double-check the influential graphic, Stephen McIntyre says he has found significant
oversights and errors.” 
The  Congresswoman  Schakowsky,  however,  was  not  satisfied  and  so  she
pressed further:
SCHAKOWSKY: So are you qualified to make a judgement on whether or not the Earth is
warming at an unprecedented rate?
MCINTYRE: For the things that  I  have  published on,  my statistical  and mathematical
29 Though at  odds with Wegman’s  choice,  hurricane  scientist  and expert  witness  William Gray too
discloses his preference: “I must say I have been a lifelong Democrat until Al Gore ran for president”
(SCEPW, 2005: 24). It serves the same purpose.
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skills are adequate for what I  have published on. The findings that we have had about
principal components have been—.
Now McIntyre adopts the role of a modest witness, who is qualified to speak on a
limited range of technical topics – mathematics and statistics. His skills enable him to
publish in those core areas, but in so doing he is merely an intermediary speaking on
behalf of his data, his ‘findings’. The Congresswoman, however, turned to the wider
conclusions that have been drawn as a result of those findings and queried whether
McIntyre had the standing to draw them:
SCHAKOWSKY:  But  are  you  qualified  to  comment  on  whether  or  not  the  Earth  is
warming at an unprecedented rate?
MCINTYRE: Well, you asked whether the people knew or didn’t know. I am just saying I
didn’t know.
It  is  typical  for Congressional  hearings to  see expert  witnesses evade wider,
potentially policy-relevant conclusions of their research. For the sake of objectivity and
in the spirit of ‘sound science’ politicians and expert witnesses generally deny scientists
an opinion. There is politics on one side and science on the other. The latter is guided
by the Mertonian ideals of universalism and disinterestedness, which all silently buy
into. It is “[t]he scientific method’s impersonal rigor [that] has produced enormously
powerful results for 400 years […].  A truth in science is verifiable whether you are
black or white, male or female, old or young,” intoned Michael Crichton during his
Senate  testimony  (SCEPW,  2005:  52).  Human  fallibility  is  only  reluctantly
acknowledged: “Now, we are all human beings, we make a lot  of mistakes. We are
biased. We do this, we do that,” Ed Whitfield ‘confessed’ (HCEC, 2006: 256). Not least
because of this inevitable human factor scientists rely on organised scepticism and the
associated practice of peer review.
Peer review and expert assessments
The scientific norm of organised scepticism guides the practice of peer review.
As Michael  Mann piously  explained to  Congress,  “[s]cience  progresses  through an
open, self-correcting process whereby scientists place their ideas in the marketplace,
typically by publishing articles in peer review journals” (HCEC, 2006: 767). In the
introduction to that 2006 hearing we learn that Mann has (co-)authored more than 70
peer-reviewed  articles,  more  than  30  other  peer-reviewed  contributions  and  book
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chapters on climatology and palaeoclimatology. Mann’s colleagues too have substantial
certified work experience in the field of palaeoclimatology and though they often co-
author papers, the overriding imperative of organised scepticism in the marketplace of
ideas  limits  cooperation  and  should  ensure  that  truth  emerges  in  the  end.  Mann
explained: “My profession is highly competitive. We often disagree publicly. Scientists
disagree publicly and in our articles, with each other on certain matters, and yet we can
co-author on other areas where we agree [...]” (HCEC, 2006: 732). Gerald North made
much the same point: “This is  a pretty  competitive business, and I will  tell  you, if
somebody can find a way to knock down someone else’s theory, that is their road to
recognition and fame. We all do that. That is part of the game and we really enjoy that
part of the game” (HCEC, 2006: 64).
The  contrarians  too  subscribe  to  peer  review.  “Especially  when  massive
amounts of public monies and human lives are at stake, academic work should have a
more intense level of scrutiny and review,” concluded Wegman (HCEC, 2006: 38-39).
majority-side member Michael Burgess (R-TX) concurred (HCEC, 2006: 23):
As the U.S. Congress and even the international policymaking bodies look to the scientific
community to provide information and analysis, it is especially important to make certain
that the processes are in place to ensure that we are using sound and unbiased science that
has undergone rigorous peer review process.
Because he cannot produce formal qualifications, Steven McIntyre more than anyone
else relies on credentialed peers to certify his ‘lay expertise’. Prior to the publications in
the renowned  GRL (McIntyre & McKitrick 2005ab), he presented his findings on his
blog climateaudit.org. Because blogs are not subjected to formal review, they are “not
an appropriate  way to conduct science,”  concluded Wegman in agreement  with the
scientists (HCEC, 2006: 49). In an email Michael Mann reacted to an early critique of
the hockey stick published on a sceptical blog (EAE, 2009: 3 August 1999): 
This thing wouldn’t have a chance at passing peer-review (at least, not on this planet), so
he posts it on the web – the downside of absolute freedom of dissemination I suppose. The
material in question is the scientific equivalent of trash, plain and simple […] I think the
best  approach is to, as Jonathan Overpeck has so effectivley been doing, try whenever
possible to educate the lay public about the essential distinction between peer-reviewed
science and un-peer-reviewed [...] well, whatever you want to call it.
In the multidisciplinary sciences it is particularly difficult to stay on top of the
peer-reviewed debate,  and decision-makers rely on groups of experts to review and
assess state-of-the-art knowledge. At least two such expert panels, the IPCC and the
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NAS’ NRC, are regularly ordered to synthesise the peer-reviewed literature on climate
science.  While  the  IPCC  wants  to  be  recognized  as  the  most  authoritative
intergovernmental  scientific  voice  on  climate  change  issues,  the  NAS  has  firmly
established its reputation as the authority on scientific matters in the US. “[O]ftentimes
when  we  have  scientific  disputes  we  [politicians]  ask  the  National  Academy  of
Sciences to review the matter”, explained Henry Waxman (D-CA) (HCEC, 2006: 20).
Emailing  privately  to  other  climate  scientists,  Tom  Wigley  agreed  “...[t]he
Administration and Congress still seem to respect the NAS (even above IPCC) as a
final authority” (EAE, 2009: 23 July 2003).
In the run-up to the 2006  Congressional hearing, Sherwood Boehlert asked a
NRC  committee  on  Surface  Temperature  Reconstructions  (STR)  to  authoritatively
review  surface  temperature  reconstructions  for  the  last  2,000  years  (NRC,  2006).
Having reviewed the existing literature, the 12 eminent scientists and statisticians, none
of  whom had collaborated with the  Mann team, find it  plausible  that  the  Northern
hemisphere was warmer during the last few decades of the 20th century than during any
comparable  period  over  the  preceding  millennium  (NRC,  2006:  115).  This  was
endorsement of a sort,  but much weaker than that given in the 2001 IPCC chapter,
which repeated the Mann team’s conclusions one-to-one. First, the STR committee’s
invocation  of  ‘plausibility’ here  marks  a  shift  from  inductive  to  abductive  logical
reasoning,  by  which  scientists  infer  from  evidence  the  best  explanation.  Second,
because the uncertainties inherent in temperature reconstructions for individual years
and  decades  are  larger  than  those  for  longer  time  periods,  the  STR  placed  less
confidence in  the  claims made by MBH99 that  the 1990s were likely the  warmest
decade, and 1998 the warmest year in a millennium.
The NRC report’s  findings  were accepted by scientists  and expert  witnesses
across the divide, for reasons an NRC panellist explained:
There were enough conclusions that all sides were able to claim victory without being
entirely dishonest. Many of the critics’ points were found to be cogent. The report did not
vindicate the specific studies and approaches used by Mann and colleagues.  But it  did
confirm that the planet warmed during the last century and that this warming and the prior
cool period is consistent with all the other evidence about anthropogenic climate change.
(anonymous, 2013).30   
30 The report is not endorsed by all scientists. Roger Pielke, Sr., writes on his blog (2006): “The Report
is a disappointment in not adequately addressing the accuracy of the global surface temperature trend
data. Since its accuracy is at the foundation of the entire Report, the absence of such an evaluation
very substantially weakens the value of the Report in climate science”.
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Politicians and think tanks too endorsed the NRC’s findings, but they interpreted its
conclusions  in  different  ways  that  reflected  their  policy  preferences.  For  Senator
Inhofe: “[t]oday’s NAS report reaffirms what I have been saying all along, that Mann’s
‘hockey-stick’ is broken” (Inhofe, 2006). Likewise for the CEI (2006), “[h]aving ‘high
confidence the planet is warmest in 400 years’ is a little like saying everyone who eats
carrots eventually will die. We all know that. What would one expect after emerging
from  the  little  ice  age?”  The  Heartland  Institute  (2006)  titled  its  press  release
“Congressional Hearings break Hockey Stick.” By contrast, in a statement, Sherwood
Boehlert (R-NY) (2006) expressed satisfaction with the STR results, saying “...[t]here
is  nothing  in  this  report  that  should  raise  any  doubts  about  the  broad  scientific
consensus on global climate change – which doesn’t rest primarily on these temperature
issues,  in  any  event  –  or  any  doubts  about  whether  any  paper  on  the  temperature
records was legitimate scientific work.”
In  summary,  the  principals  in  the  controversy  and across  the  climate  divide
agree on scientific norms (CUDOS) which they hold binding upon the expert. In the
next  section  I  examine  how they employ them against  each  other’s  arguments  for
epistemic authority.
5.5 Demarcation in practice
The scientists’ normative markers of expertise
From the convinced point of view the motives behind climate scepticism are
attributed to right-wing ideology and resistance to government regulations by the fossil
fuel industry (cf. Hoffman, 2011). The sceptics’ expert front group has a financial stake
in denying climate change, argue analysts, scientists  and politicians alike (cf.  Gore,
2006;  Hoggan & Littlemore,  2009;  Oreskes  & Conway,  2010;  Brulle,  2013).  “One
Colorado  electric  cooperative  has  openly  admitted  that  it  has  paid  $100,000  to  a
university  academic  who prides himself  on being a  global  warming sceptic,”  noted
Democrat Janice Schakowsky (D-IL) during the hockey stick hearing (HCEC, 2006:
629). Thus, to exclude their expert critics and notably Steven McIntyre, the ‘hockey
team’ argued with the sceptics’ courting of their ‘kindred spirits’. Eager to illuminate
the  context  in  which  McIntyre  as  well  as  BS03  gained  popularity  and  support,
mainstream climate scientists,  sympathetic  journalists  (cf.  The Guardian,  2011) and
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bloggers (desmogblog.com) search the record for any potentially compromising links,
whether financial or political.
And  so  do  their  opponents,  who are  equally  suspicious  of  the  motives  of
mainstream climate scientists (e.g.,  climatedepot.com). In his testimony, John Christy
complained about former colleagues ‘having a dog in the fight’ over the hockey stick,
thereby setting himself up as a neutral observer standing above the fray and thus able to
speak impartially about the accuracy of the temperature record  (HCEC, 2006: 664).
And from a more avowedly political perspective Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) accused
the  ‘hockey team’ of  clinging  to  disproven ideas  of  AGW as  if  it  were  a  religion
(SCEPW, 2005: 43):
I think in the case of global warming, it really has become a religion to a lot of people. A
lot of people have so many years of their lives wrapped up in it that they don’t want to all
of a sudden realize that most of the science since 1999 has refuted it. How could I have
been wrong; and did I waste 10 or 15, 20 years of my life? I kind of think this is some of
the things that are going on.
The boundaries he is drawing here between faith and facts, religion and science are age-
old and stretch back to the very dawn of the scientific revolution. And indeed, it is not
altogether preposterous to advance such a suspicion. “As you know,” wrote Phil Jones
in an email to John Christy, “I’m not political.  If anything, I would like to see the
climate  change  happen,  so  the  science  could  be  proved  right,  regardless  of  the
consequences. This isn’t being political, it is being selfish” (EAE, 2009: 5 July 2005).
To  maintain  their  epistemic  authority  when  called  to  appear  in  Congress,
scientists have to be careful to avoid making any such statements that might be seen to
cross the conventional boundary between science and politics. Only occasionally have
climate scientists in Congress been lured into some kind of advocacy. When asked by
Clifford Stearns (R-FL) whether there is a scientific consensus that global warming is
real  and bad,  Edward Wegman evaded:  “I  believe  there  is  a  consensus  that  global
warming is real. My friends in Finland think it is a great thing” (HCEC, 2006: 97).
Stearns had to press harder to get the answer he wanted. “It is probably less urgent than
some would have it  be,” Wegman finally conceded. Such a statement is  enough for
Stearns  to  understand  Wegman’s  policy  view,  and  for  Wegman  to  claim  a  neutral
position.  Of  course,  it  is  very  difficult  to  derive  any  concrete  advice,  which  is
supposedly what the scientists are called in for, from such a statement.
 Very few scientists in Congress willingly jeopardise their expert position. In
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arguing against large scale GHG emission reductions, John Christy was careful first to
dissociate his political opinion from his scientific position as remote sensing expert and
Alabama  state  meteorologist.  Instead  he  based  his  policy  recommendations  on  his
personal experience overseas as a missionary (HCEC, 2006: 187): 
I  believe  my experience in Africa is  important  in  this whole discussion of  energy  and
climate. In the 1970s I taught science and math as a missionary teacher, and I saw the
energy system there. The energy source was wood chopped from the forest. The energy
transmission system was the backs of women and girls hauling wood an average of three
miles each day. The energy use system was burning the wood in an open fire indoors for
heat and light. The consequence of that energy system was deforestation and habitat loss
while for people it was poor respiratory and eye health. The U.N. estimates 1.6 million
women and children die each year from the effects of this indoor smoke. Energy demand
will grow, as it  should, to allow these people to experience the advances in health and
quality of life that we enjoy. They are far more vulnerable to the impacts of poverty, water
pollution, and political strife than whatever the climate does. I simply close with a plea,
please remember the needs and aspirations of the poorest among us when energy policy is
made. Thank you very much.
Although  he  dissociated  himself  from  his  climate  expertise,  his  argument  against
energy policy whose overarching goal is the stabilisation of climate change derives its
authority also because of his position as recognised climate expert.  But because his
argument has also been forwarded by the creationist climate deniers of the Interfaith
Stewardship Alliance, Congressman Bart Stupak (D-MI) quickly dismissed Christy’s
emphatic humanitarian pledge instead of considering its political relevancy, i.e. it  is
interpreted  according  to  party-political  positions.  In  the  hostile  climate  of
Congressional hearings, Christy’s attempt at honest brokering of policy options is not
rewarded.
Explicitly political arguments such as Christy’s are much more frequently found
on the many informal venues offered by the news media and on the internet. Michael
Mann’s call to action, in which he blames climate sceptics in Congress for the political
impasse, is printed in the NYT (2014):
In fact, there is broad agreement among climate scientists not only that climate change is
real [...], but that we must respond to the dangers of a warming planet […] This is where
scientists come in. In my view, it is no longer acceptable for scientists to remain on the
sidelines  [...]  there  is  nothing  inappropriate  at  all  about  drawing  on  our  scientific
knowledge to speak out about the very real implications of our research […] In fact, it
would be an abrogation of our responsibility to society if we remained quiet in the face of
such a grave threat […] We scientists are citizens, too, and, in climate change, we see a
clear and present danger.
Other  than at  the legislative stage  of decision-making where  his  right  to speak out
honestly is curtailed by the expectations placed on experts, at the agenda-setting stage
115
on the internet and in newspapers (cf. Keller, 2009) scientists like Mann can speak as
citizens who happen to be epistemic authorities. There is less incentive to live up to the
norm of disinterestedness – Mann dismisses it as rather dangerous. And he does not
seem  to  care  about  the  conclusions  the  ‘chattering  classes’ may  draw  about  his
scientific integrity either. He is preaching to the already converted, as it were. 
While they are deemed to hold binding upon experts at  the legislative stage
more  so than upon those who speak at  the  agenda setting stage,  in  the practice of
demarcation, normative markers of expertise are generally adhered to. Both sides try to
insulate their opinions from their expertise, political from epistemic authority, for the
former must inform the latter – only occasionally do scientists speak out causing a stir.
In  Congress  there  are  more  likely  to  question  each  others’ epistemic  markers  of
expertise:  according  to  many  mainstream  climate  scientists  and  their  protégées
(Oreskes & Conway,  2010),  the sceptics’ experts  cannot  produce epistemic markers
(formal qualifications or experience) appropriate to the debates about climate science;
they lack certified knowledge in relevant disciplines; nor do they have a publication
record in the appropriate scientific literature. They should not be heard in the political
debate, whether in Congress, on the internet or in the print media.
The scientists’ epistemic markers of expertise
An advanced university degree is a widely accepted marker of expertise, but not
all  formally  credentialed  witnesses  are  necessarily  qualified  to  speak  as  experts.
Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) so dismissed the witnesses called by
her Republican opponents (HCSST, 2011: 9):
I look at this panel today and I must ask, well, where are they? Where are the masses of
legitimate expert witnesses that will corroborate to the assertion that climate change is an
unproven theory or worse yet a hoax? I don’t see them today. Instead the witnesses before
the  Science,  Space,  and  Technology  today  include  a  business  school  professor  of
marketing, an economist, and an energy industry lawyer.
And because Michael Crichton’s university credentials were certainly not accepted by
the Minority side, Crichton in turn questioned the boundary drawn by  Congressional
Democrats to exclude his view on global warming (SCEPW, 2005: 55):
I am not a climate scientist and I consider my observations useful precisely because I am
an outsider looking at this field. I do consider myself a well-educated American citizen,
and I share with my countrymen a healthy skepticism toward experts of all sorts. If war is
too important to be left to the generals, science is too important to be left to the scientists.
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Crichton’s argument  is  at  odds with the demarcation principles propounded also by
Republicans. His testimony as an expert witness cannot be justified by his invitees’ own
standards, even though some of them seem to be unsure of where to draw the boundary:
“[I]n a democracy anybody with an opinion is entitled to express that opinion and some
are more qualified than others obviously because of their credentials, but I don’t think
we have a standard of witnesses that says unless you have a Ph.D. you cannot testify
before--,” explained Joe Barton (HCEC, 2006: 739). 
Formal qualifications are not a prerequisite for witnesses to testify in Congress
as such a standard would have excluded the majority side’s arguably most important
witness Steven McIntyre. Michael Mann noted in his testimony: “Neither McIntyre nor
McKitrick  is  a  trained  climate  scientist  […]  Mr.  McIntyre  is  a  mining  industry
executive with no formal training in any discipline related to climatic research and Mr.
McKitrick is an economist […] hardly credentials  that lend force to their  academic
arguments”  (HCEC,  2006:  274).  Forced  to  acknowledge  his  lack  of  formal
qualification,  which  was readily  exploited  by  Janice  Schakowsky (D-IL),  McIntyre
insisted,  albeit  hesitantly, that in his  restricted area of scientific publication, he was
nevertheless  still  qualified  to  speak:  “For  the  things  that  I  have  published on,  my
statistical  and  mathematical  skills  are  adequate  for  what  I  have  published  on  ––”
(HCEC, 2006: 739).
If  we  follow  Collins  and  Evans  (2002),  McIntyre’s  practical  skills  and
experience should lend his arguments authority. But many climate scientists thought
otherwise,  as  McIntyre  himself  was  all  too  aware:  “I  mean,  quite  frankly  I  could
understand why there would be some reluctance to  take the claims seriously at  the
beginning” (HCEC, 2006: 178). Because McIntyre lacked the “numerous publications
in  the  peer-reviewed  climate  literature,”  Michael  Mann  would  demand  of  climate
experts,  the ‘hockey team’ could dismiss  McIntyre’s  critique  as  non-scientific.  And
arguably because they did not recognise McIntyre’s epistemic  markers of expertise,
they did not see themselves as ethically obliged to share their  data under Merton’s
communalist principle of science.
Other contrarians were harder to disqualify, since they possessed both advanced
degrees in cognate sciences and had produced numerous publications in the scientific
literature. Here the boundary was drawn quite explicitly along disciplinary lines. Forced
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to  acknowledge  Wegman’s  expertise  in  statistics,  Mann  employed  the  discipline
boundary to delegitimise the claims of his critic. Wegman’s ignorance of basic radiation
physics  and  his  apparent  lack  of  engagement  with  the  climate  science  community
would “underscore the hazards of an amateur seeking to draw conclusions in a field in
which he has no expertise,” warned Mann (HCEC, 2006: 766) in line with Oreskes and
Conway. “And you shouldn’t be ashamed of [not knowing the laws of thermodynamics]
because you are a statistician, not a physicist,” Jay Inslee (D-WA) sneered in Wegman’s
direction (HCEC, 2006: 75). In turn, Wegman used the discipline boundary to criticise
the notable absence of professional statisticians in the Mann team, before he drew some
sweeping conclusions about climate science in general: “What is insular thought I think
is that it doesn’t really involve people from the areas that I call the enabling sciences
such as mathematics, computer science, and so on” (HCEC, 2006: 89).31
The discipline boundary also assisted Oreskes and Conway (2010) in dismissing
climate sceptic,  physicist  and founding director  of  the  NASA Goddard Institute  for
Space Studies (GISS) Robert Jastrow. With the same argument Mann snubbed Inhofe’s
witness, the astrophysicist Willie Soon: “I would not, for example, consider scientists
with advanced degrees in Astronomy,  Astrophysics,  or Physics who have published
primarily in those areas, as ‘‘climate scientists’’– nor do I believe would most of my
colleagues in the climate research community” (SCEPW, 2003: 178). The meteorologist
William  Gray  in  turn  denied  astrophysicist  James  Hansen  any  relevant  expertise
(SCEPW, 2005: 34-35):
James Hanson is a very bright, outstanding scientist, I have no doubt about that. He got his
Ph.D., I believe, on the runaway greenhouse effect of Venus. I don’t know what he knows
about the atmosphere. He is not trained as a meteorologist, and I don’t know why the press
goes to him so much. I don’t know why he could come down here in the hot summer of
1988, before a Congressional committee, and make these claims. They are ridiculous.
Oreskes and Conway on the other hand insist on Hansen’s expertise precisely because
he is a trained physicist and director (1981-2013) of the GISS. 
Such inconsistent argumentation suggests that the drawing of boundaries along
traditional  epistemic lines,  and disciplinary markers  in  particular,  is  an exceedingly
31 Wegman sketched professional statisticians credentials:  “Although there may be exceptions to the
guidelines I am proposing here, in my view, a mainstream statistician will have graduated with a
doctorate in statistics, will be actively doing research in statistical methodology or actively applying
statistical methodology to a related discipline area, and will professionally identify with the statistics
profession”  (HCEC,  2006:  833).  Also  for  Wegman  (statistical)  expertise  is  marked  by  official
certification.
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ineffective strategy of demarcation. They may offer some guidance to decision-makers
but are no safe place to stay in the multidisciplinary climate sciences where physicists
turn  climatologists,  who  collaborate  with  dendrochronologists  or  meteorologists,
whose vast amounts of data require statistical expertise, and so forth.
Peer review
Because peer review is viewed as an authoritative, impersonal mechanism to
separate science from non-science, the convinced scientists invoke the apparent lack of
sceptical  papers in the scientific  literature  to deny them epistemic authority.  Naomi
Oreskes (2004) even argued that not a single paper in the scientific literature seriously
questioned the consensus. Unsurprisingly, her much cited analysis has since become a
preferred argument in the political debate (e.g., Gore, 2006).
But  peer  review  in  (climate)  science  is  not  as  straightforward  as  that  gold
standard implies (cf. Edwards & Schneider 2001). According to Edward Wegman, peer
review at Nature failed in the case of MBH98 because no professional statisticians had
scrutinised the team’s research. More precisely, Wegman denied the reconstructive skill
Mann cited in the hockey stick verification exercise. Mann justified the use of the term
‘skill’ with reference to the American Meteorological Society’s (AMS) glossary, but to
Wegman  “...it  doesn’t  matter  that  the  American  Meteorological  Society  says  what
statistical skill is. Statisticians do not recognize that term” (HCEC, 2006: 734). If the
scientists  had  engaged  with  statisticians,  the  true  uncertainties  associated  with  a
reconstruction’s verification statistics would have been revealed, Wegman assured the
Republican majority. 
Yet  because  only  “lip  service  was  paid  to  the  idea  of  formal  peer  review,”
Wegman’s analysis would fail by his own standards, countered Mann (2012: 161). Also
Bart  Stupak  (D-MI)  noted  that  “Dr.  Wegman’s  work  is  not  yet  published or  peer-
reviewed so  it’s  very  difficult  for  us  to  evaluate  his  work”  (HCEC,  2006:  6).  Jay
Gulledge too came to Mann’s defence (HCEC, 2006: 698):
Fortunately, a different group, one well qualified both statistically and climatologically to
tackle this question of merit, had already performed the task several months before the
Wegman  Report  was  released.  The  study  by  Wahl  & Ammann  [2007]  [...]  was  peer-
reviewed and accepted for publication in the journal Climatic Change, early last spring,
and has been publicly available in accepted form since last March.
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But the sceptics do not accept examination or review by scientists who frequently co-
author  papers  with  Mann.  Even  if  Wahl  and  Ammann  had  engaged  statisticians,
scientists who interact regularly would engender a common attitude or acquire shared
biases, argued Wegman: “[T]here is some element of thinking that if they are frequent
co-authors  they  are  thinking  the  same  way”  (HCEC,  2006:  733).  Anticipating  the
revelations that would come out with the publication of the ‘Climategate’ emails from
UEA, Wegman went on to speculate: “I think there is evidence [...] that there is a tight-
knit group of people who are interacting with each other and who frankly don’t seem to
like to be criticized.” Hans von Storch tentatively confirmed: “I myself can say that
they were always the same type of reviews we got, the same style and I am sure that it
was the same person and I am sure it was the person we have spoken about here quite a
bit” (HCEC, 2006: 214). Apparently, reviewer Michael Mann did not like von Storch’s
research and gave bad reviews to delay or avert  its publication. “I’m not sure [von
Storch]  isn’t  somewhat  of  a  skeptic  himself,“  Mann  once  wrote  in  an  email  to
colleagues (EAE, 2009: 11 March 2003).
Wegman’s  hypothesis  of  badly  organised  scepticism  would  eventually  be
corroborated by ‘Climategate’. The emails showed chief scientists in their attempt to
keep sceptical science out of both the scientific literature and the IPCC. In the position
of a journal reviewer, Phil Jones wrote to Mann (EAE, 2009: 31 March 2004):
Recently rejected two papers (one for JGR and for GRL) from people saying CRU has it
wrong over Siberia. Went to town in both reviews, hopefully successfully. If either appears
I will be very surprised, but you never know with GRL.
In the position of coordinating lead-author to the IPCC, Jones addressed Mann in yet
another email (EAE, 2009: 8 July 2004):
The other paper by MM [McIntyre & McKitrick, 2003] is just garbage − as you knew. De
Freitas again. Pielke [Sr.] is also losing all credibility [...]. I can’t see either of these papers
being in the next IPCC report. Kevin [Trenberth] and I will keep them out somehow − even
if we have to redefine what the peer-review literature is!
For Jones and Mann the mere possibility of politically motivated scepticism
required active intervention in the peer review process to keep it out. More so than
about  McIntyre  &  McKitrick’s  2003  paper  in  Energy  &  Environment,  they  were
concered over the publication of the “Harvard-Smithsonian Centre’s work” (Soon &
Baliunas, 2003) in the journal  Climate Research. Since “some sceptics had identified
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Climate Research as a journal where some editors were not as rigorous in the review
process as is otherwise common,” according to editor-in-chief Hans von Storch (cited
in  Powell,  2011:  102),  several  scientists  appealed  for  a  boycott  against  publishing,
reviewing for, or even citing articles from Climate Research. In an email Tom Wigley
shared his reservations (EAE, 19 August 2003): 
I have been closely involved in the [Climate Research] fiasco. I have had papers that I
refereed (and soundly rejected), under De Freitas’s editorship, appear later in the journal –
without me seeing any response from the authors.  As I  have said before to  others,  his
strategy is  first  to  use  mainly referees  that  are in  the  anti-greenhouse  community,  and
second, if a paper is rejected, to ignore that review and seek another more ‘sympathetic’
reviewer.  In  the  second case  he  can then  (with enough reviews)  claim that  the  honest
review was an outlier.
In his  take  on the hockey stick  controversy Mann (2012:  121)  remembers  that  the
Climate Research editor “Chris DeFreitas’ advocacy against policies that restrict carbon
emissions and his frequent attacks against the IPCC made him a highly unusual editor
for an academic journal.” Mann dismissed McIntyre and McKitrick’s publication in
Energy & Environment (2003) justifying himself (HCEC, 2006: 274-275):
Energy & Environment is not a peer reviewed journal; it is […] primarily devoted to policy
rather than science that  appears to engage in,  at  most,  haphazard review of its  articles
Adding  to  the  problem,  the  editor  of  Energy  &  Environment […]  has  candidly
acknowledged that  the publication has a clear editorial bias  […] in her  rush to get  the
McIntyre  and  McKitrick  piece  into  print  for  political  reasons  Energy  &  Environment
dispensed with what scientists consider peer review.
Quite  evidently,  the  dispute  between  sceptics  and mainstream scientists  had
chipped away at the golden image of peer review. In what Collins and Evans (2002)
would call the public domain science of climate reconstruction one could not be sure if
one’s research was treated with due diligence.
The micro-politics of expert panels
If  peer  review is  no  safe  place  to  stay  either,  expert  assessments  are.  They
provide a pragmatic synthesis of the often incommensurable scientific views held by
the various experts, and for the majority of climate scientists the IPCC presents the
most  comprehensive  assessment  of  climate  science.  The  Democrats’ expert  witness
Tom  Crowley  confirmed  (HCEC,  2006:  138):  “It  involves  hundreds  of  scientists,
reviews of thousands of papers, and received on the order of 10,000 comments for each
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of the earlier drafts […] So my feeling is that it is a very, very thoroughly reviewed and
vetted manuscript and I think just about the best thing we have.” Likewise, even as he
conceded  “that  process  isn’t  exactly  perfect,”  NRC panellist  Gerald  North  “cannot
imagine  a  better,  more  efficient  way  to  pull  several  thousand  scientists  together”
(HCEC, 2006: 109). But the more ambitious the assessment is, that is the greater the
number of disciplines covered and researchers involved, the more difficult it is for such
an assessment to do justice to the wealth of scientific opinions.
To  its  critics  the  2001  IPCC  consensus  on  millennial  climate  change  was
nothing more than the opinion of a few scientists who acted as gatekeepers. In his
capacity  as  lead-author  of  the  chapter  “Observed  Climate  Variability  and  Change”
Mann also happened to review his own study.  “[S]ome of the authors of the IPCC
assessment dealing with global temperature history were not independent or impartial.
They also happened to be the authors of the  hockey stick studies themselves,”  Joe
Barton (R-TX) encapsulated the critics’ main charge (HCEC, 2006: 9). As we have
seen, Mann’s scientific collaborator and IPCC co-ordinating lead-author Phil Jones also
tried to keep critical papers out of the IPCC (EAE, 2009: 8 July 2004). His actions were
facilitated by the institution’s hierarchical architecture, the IAC (2010) concluded in its
review of ‘Climategate’.  Being at  the top of the hierarchy, lead-authors could exert
disproportional influence on its content.
The NAS’ STR report (NRC, 2006) on the other hand was almost equivocally
endorsed.  The  fact  that  all  sides  were  able  to  claim victory  without  being entirely
dishonest is attributable to both the small number of experts involved – “it may be, […]
that the NRC approach cannot be used for such a complex and large field, which the
IPCC is covering,” noted Hans von Storch (HCEC, 2006: 220), – and the committee’s
democratic approach to consensus. A panellist described the committee’s politics:
Consensus is hard to define as I see it. I think a majority vote on a committee would carry
the day if it were very contentious […] But there has been […] a great effort to move
things in such a way as to persuade the dissidents to be more agreeable to the outcome. For
example,  majority  members  will  often  bend  the  wording  of  a  sentence  to  be  more
satisfactory to minority members. Often this works. As usual there are a wide variety of
viewpoints on this panel (anonymous, 2013).
A majority vote among 153 scientists as in the IPCC chapter on “Observed Climate
Variability  and  Change”  would  inevitably  repel  some  of  its  participants,  leaving  a
disgruntled minority. John Christy,  IPCC lead-author and one of the 153, has since
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turned his back on the IPCC, and once again resorted to the ideal of ‘sound science’:
“Since consensus is a political notion, not a scientific notion, a goal of consensus in any
form is at its heart a political goal” (HCSST, 2011: 59). If we take seriously Christy’s
boundary, the NAS’ STR report is not scientific either – and yet Christy served as a
panellist to that report.
The  notion  of  expert  consensus  has  provoked and will  continue  to  provoke
discussion. In the run-up to the IPCC AR4 published in 2007, climate scientist Eduardo
Zorita noted and discussed the problem a scientific consensus entails. Emailing various
colleagues Zorita mused (EAE, 2009: 17 August 2006):
Consensus. This paragraph may be problematic. Again what is the consensus? If we look at
the recent NAS report, which again not every one would agree with, the ’consensus’ is
reduced to the past 400 years in comparison to IPCC, leaving ample space for speculation
before this period. Does the NAS report belong to the consensus? [P]erhaps partially, but I
am not sure to what extent.
“Let’s have a better consensus than we do now,” demanded Congressman Joe Barton
(SCCST, 2007: 240). He would have to wait 6 years until a consortium of 78 scientists
took up the sceptics’ criticism on the hockey stick and reconstructed millennial climate
change  almost  from  scratch.  The  so-called  Past  Global  Changes  (PAGES)  2k
Consortium was a new project which relied on experts who had few if any ties to the
‘hockey team’.
5.6 Discussion
 In the previous two sections I have presented norms and principles which the
protagonists in the hockey stick controversy hold binding upon the scientist. Because
the  scientific  method alone is  not  enough to discriminate  between a true and false
climate reconstruction, certain markers of expertise should help politicians to exclude
the  objections  by  those  ‘lay  experts’ who have  nothing to  add  but  a  more  or  less
educated guess,  such as Michael  Crichton’s.  But  when the ‘hockey team’ and their
protégées ignored Steven McIntyre, claiming that he was not a scientist, they invited
counter-accusations along similar lines. His exclusion not only meant that politicians
were  withheld  the  best  possible  advice  in  their  assessment  of  climate  policy,  his
replication exercise also revealed that certain scientists found it difficult to perform the
sorts  of  organised  scepticism  generally  associated  with  their  profession.  Sceptics
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courted McIntyre precisely because he was not part of that norm-breaking group. 32 With
the concepts offered by the ‘Wave One’ and ‘Wave Two’ SSK, in this section I analyse
the debates between the ‘hockey team’ and its critics, between Mann and McIntyre.
What part would Collins & Evans’ theory of expertise have played in the dispute over
climate reconstruction?
 Worried that sceptics would overemphasise mistakes and sloppy, ‘Mannian’
data management for political reasons, the scientists were eager to illuminate the wider
political context of climate denial. McIntyre’s contribution to the sceptical blogosphere,
and his  background  as  a  mining  consultant  potentially  funded  by  the  fossil  fuel
industry,  conveniently  served  Mann  to  ignore  his  requests  for  data;  if  we  follow
Merton,  McIntyre’s  putative  political  motivation  was  enough  to  deny  him
disinterestedness. The hacked emails then proved that the ‘hockey team’ had not only
been  inattentive  to  McIntyre’s  claims,  but  themselves  had  an  interest  in  certain
scientific results – they were motivated by other than the noble pursuit of truth.  They
closed ranks, judged any theoretically valid critique based on the cultural authority of
its  claimants,  and  excluded  sceptical  experts  from the  putative  consensus  so  as  to
further  their agenda.  They  too  violated  certain  Mertonian  norms  (cf.  Grundmann,
2013). 
Throughout  the  controversy,  both  sides  qua  ‘Wave  One’ sociologists  or
Mertonians engaged in that kind of circular critique – in any aspect  of the climate
debate political  bias is  found in what  should be strictly  scientific.  Thus,  and if  we
follow the ‘Wave Two’ scholars, such bias is more of a rule than the exception (cf. Ben-
David,  1991).  Because  scientific  work  and  expert  assessments  always  contain  an
element of ‘political bias’ – the NAS’ NRC panel on STR too agreed on the wording of
their report, – the inevitable micro-politics of science, as described in seminal ‘Wave
Two’ volumes (cf. Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; Latour, 1987), will continue to serve as an
argument  for  critics  of  the  proclaimed  consensus  on  climate  change.  During  these
debates  conventional  boundaries  between  science  and  non-science  are  called  into
question  and  the  analysts’ task  would  be  to  follow that  boundary  and  to  describe
whether,  where,  and how it  (re-)appears,  and who is  served as  a  result.  “Expertise
[does] emerge, but with respect to the allocation of power it [is] neither neutral nor
32 With  McIntyre  climate  sceptics  have  employed  the  popular  image  of  the  lone,  disinterested
empiricist, epitomised in Galileo, Newton and Einstein, who by virtue of being a sceptic disproves
the pseudo-scientific other. Only the individual observer, who does not need to consent with anyone
else, can follow the scientific method. 
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innocent,” summarises Jasanoff (2003: 397). 
According  to  Collins  and  Evans,  on  the  other  hand,  the  analyst  should  not
merely describe but assist in the making of new boundaries.  If we follow Collins and
Evans, McIntyre should always have been treated on a par with the scientists – arguably
he was deeply involved in experimentation or theorization, and thus should have been
included into the core-set as experience-based expert. But we can draw this conclusion
only with the benefit of hindsight as in 2003, when he first published his critique on
blogs as well as in the non-indexed journal Energy & Environment, McIntyre was not a
recognised member of the core-set. He had experience in statistics, but did not yet have
any  publications  in  the  scientific  literature  as  a  marker  of  his  experience-based
expertise.  And,  ultimately,  it  is  the  job  of  the  established  experts  in  the  field  to
recognise and acknowledge appropriate experience. McIntyre knew that and therefore
sided with McKitrick – he knew that he had to publish in recognised,  high-ranking
peer-reviewed  journals  and  his  publications  in  GRL in  2005  eventually  mark  his
metamorphosis from lay to experienced-based expert. By the time of the hockey stick
hearing  in  2006  his  exclusion  was  no  longer  tenable,  yet  in  light  of  the  sceptical
backlash  against  climate  science  –  sceptics  have  indeed  overemphasised  and  de-
contextualised  tiny mistakes for political reasons (e.g., EAE, 2009: 20 April 2007) –
Mann still  disregards  McIntyre’s  arguments.  But  since  the  boundary  has  shifted  in
McIntyre’s favour, he cannot dismiss them any longer as non-scientific.
Collins and Evans of course recognise the difficulty of drawing boundaries in
such highly contentious public controversies. In order to account for this context, they
want to discriminate between esoteric and public domain sciences: if palaeoclimatology
was  a  public  domain  science,  the  scientists  should  have  been  open  to  McIntyre’s
critique.  But  as  McIntyre  once  acknowledged,  “...[w]hen paleoclimate  research  had
little  implication outside academic seminar rooms, the lack of any adequate control
procedures  probably  didn’t  matter  much”  (2005b).  It  was  the  hockey  stick’s
popularisation, the public hearings, and eventually ‘Climategate’, which have turned
palaeoclimatology  into  a  public  domain  science.  Thus,  once  again,  the  boundary
between esoteric and public domain sciences is anything but clear from the outset of the
controversy. It can be drawn more easily in retrospect. 
Next Collins and Evans presume that the ‘chattering classes’ will find ways to
discriminate who to agree with. “Their consensual view emerges from the making of
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social judgements about who ought to be agreed with, not scientiﬁc judgements about
what ought to be believed,” the sociologists assert (2002: 259), and ask whether the
author of a claim has integrity or is known to have made unreliable claims in the past.
In climate science, these questions have become increasingly difficult to answer. There
is hardly one scientist who has not made a statement which could be used to question
their  impartiality  – on  the  internet  upset  climate  bloggers  mine for  any potentially
compromising statements – and there is always at  least  one journalist that creates a
scandal. It is strange, to say the least,  that the rationalists Collins and Evans put so
much hope in the ‘chattering classes’.
Speaking with Jasanoff (2003), the processes through which (climate) expertise
emerges are difficult to anticipate. The making of authoritative scientific knowledge
depends as much on the participants, some of who entered the debate via the internet by
chance, as on the wider political context, and it is influenced by the venues onto which
the  controversy  is  carried. It  is  difficult,  and  maybe  not  even  desirable,  for  the
sociologist to try to foresee the many events that have lifted bristlecone pines onto the
legislative stage of decision-making. And while US Congress has certainly helped to
constitute  palaeoclimatology  as  a  public  domain  science,  after  the  hearings  the
controversy has retracted to more esoteric scientific venues where the core-set, which
now  includes McIntyre,  solidifies  (Mann  et  al 2008;  McIntyre  & McKitrick,  2009;
Mann et al 2009). This supports Jasanoff’s observation that it is never totally clear from
the outset who the experts are. Soon many more may demand access; soon many more
may claim to possess to the scientific controversy indispensable knowledge.
5.7 Conclusion
Because both sides in the climate debate agree on the epistemic and normative
markers of expertise intended to keep science pure, which is requirement of the linear
model of science and society, they accuse each other of not complying with them. This
has allowed both sceptics to deny the proclaimed scientific consensus on AGW and
scientists to dismiss the sceptics’ science backing their claims against the consensus. In
this  chapter  I  have  shown  that  Collins  and  Evans’ proposed  solution  to  the
problem of legitimation in form of a theory of expertise is of little help. It has
merely  shifted  our  attention  from  the  disputed  facts  to  the  equally  disputed
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persona of the scientist and the norms they should adhere to.
Once it was revealed that high-profile climate scientists had violated the very
principles they themselves invoked so as to justify the exclusion of their critics, publics
in the US (and arguably also in the UK) lost some of their trust in the scientists, the
IPCC and the dire scenarios of climate change, which are now often considered the
opinions of some environmentalist lobby group rather than scientific predictions. Faced
with this disbelief in climate change, the hockey stick controversy and ‘Climategate’
has triggered a debate about how timely such traditional boundaries and its markers of
expertise are, especially if they give rise to accusations of a conspiracy.
Because boundaries cannot be easily prescribed or may prove inadequate in the
next controversy, why not do away with them now and forever? Not least in light of the
damning emails, such a seemingly logical solution to the problem of demarcation has
been proposed by both some scientists, science students, and sceptics. For the latter, the
politicisation  of  climate  science  demands  an  open  and  transparent  re-evaluation  of
climate reconstruction by experts who are not part of the consensus. “[C]limate science
needs  adult  supervision,  [and]  Congress  needs  at  least  one  second  opinion,”
encapsulated John Christy (Congress, 2011: 46). And while the authoritative reviews of
‘Climategate’ univocally demand openness and transparency in the production of expert
assessments (IAC, 2010; Muir, 2010), some climate scientists, too, see advantages in a
public  ethos  of  science,  if  only  to  bolster  their  authority  in  front  of  a  mistrusting
audience.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  show how these  demands  are  implemented  in  the
science of climate reconstruction and to what effect.
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Chapter Six
Public accountability and scientific expertise after ‘Climategate’ 
And what about the issue itself? Are we really experiencing Anthropogenic Carbon-based
Global Warming? If the public loses faith in that claim, then the situation of science in our
society will be altered for the worse. There is very unlikely to be a crucial experience that
either confirms or refutes the claim; the post-normal situation is just too complex. The
consensus is likely to depend on how much trust can still be put in science. The whole vast
edifice of policy commitments for Carbon reduction, with their many policy prescriptions
and quite totalitarian moral exhortations, will be at risk of public rejection. What sort of




In  the  Congressional hearings  on  climate  science  the  Republicans  have
repeatedly confronted their political opponents with charges about the unprofessional
conduct  of  ʻtheirʼ  scientists.  With  the  ‘Climategate’  email  disclosures  casting
unfavourable light on the private  interchanges among climate scientists,  many have
called for  changes  in  the  production of  scientific  climate  knowledge and its  expert
assessments.  While  sceptics  insisted  that  an  independent  re-analysis  of  climate
reconstruction would reach a different answer than the Mann teamʼs hockey stick, and
yield a different picture to the one presented in the IPCC assessment reports, others
hoped that more transparent methods of analysis open for wider external scrutiny such
as McIntyre’s would win public trust, re-authorise the science of climate reconstruction,
and carry the day.
To this end, the Republican sceptics, credentialed contrarians, and conservative
think tanks proposed an independent re-analysis of climate science of which several
demands were made: “An independent effort to reconstruct the global temperature [...]
demands a dedicated project with proper resources,” reasoned the prominent sceptic
Fred  Singer  (Watts,  2011a).  It  should  be  “overseen  by  a  non-activist  team  which
includes  those  with  experience  in  the  scientific  method,  such  as  physicists  […],”
insisted John Christy (HCSST, 2011: 46). “Everybody [should] take their shot at it,” or
at least “anyone who has the scientific ability and the mathematical ability to study it,”
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suggested Joe Barton (HCEC, 2006: 250).
Following  in  the  tradition  of  the  intelligence  community,  conservative  think
tanks  called  for  the  creation  of  a  so-called  Red  Team  to  reconsider  climate
reconstruction (cf. The Marshall Institute, 2010). In the defence and intelligence world
Red  Teams  are  regularly  convened  to  provide  an  independent,  critical  review  of
intelligence agency issues, systems and programs. Staffed by experts from outside the
immediate  agency or  team whose conclusions are  being assessed,  the Red Team is
charged with performing a competitive critique of a specific topic. Epistemically, the
model merges two distinct models of truth seeking. From the sciences, there are strong
echoes  of  peer  review  and  the  idea  that  the  organised  scepticism  of  the  wider
community of experts  provides the best  check against bias and error.  But  from the
Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law, there is also the idea that truth is best served
through adversarialism and the clash of competing viewpoints before a judge and jury.
This of course was the logic organising the aggressive cross-examination of climate
scientists before Congress, where John Christy made the case (HCSST, 2011: 167):
The  IPCC continues  to  be  led  by  an  establishment  of  scientists  and  bureaucrats  who
believe humans are having a catastrophic impact on the climate system and who desire
strong greenhouse gas controls. It is important to remember that the IPCC provides one
view of climate change and that there are other views equally backed-up by evidence but
which have been marginalized or eliminated from the IPCC venue. As such, at least one
other venue independent from the IPCC, such as a ‘‘Red Team,’’ is necessary.
In  view  of  the  negative  social  relations  ʻtheirʼ  scientistsʼ  behaviour  has
provoked, the Democrats and the wider climate science establishment cannot dismiss
the scepticsʼ demand for a re-assessment. But since they want science to speak with a
single authoritative voice, the proverbial one-handed scientist, they shunned a second
and potentially adversarial report. Instead they urged climate scientists to modernise the
processes by which science is produced, appealing to their ethical obligation to openly
share  their  data  and  show their  working  (IAC,  2010;  Muir,  2010).  “Openness  and
transparency enables critical  examination by a broad range of scientists and citizens
[…] and frank discussions with skeptics are needed,” the climate scientist Judith Curry
maintained in a Democrat-sponsored hearing on climate science (HCSS, 2010: 212).
Two new projects took into consideration the various points of critique, and this
chapter describes the new and improved climate reconstruction. First, the independent
PAGES 2k Consortium published a comprehensive climate reconstruction of the past
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2,000 years (PAGES 2k Consortium, 2013). Second, a group of esteemed physicists
from  Berkeley  University  presented  its  independent  re-analysis  of  instrumental
temperature records (Rhode et  al 2013).  Also,  in 2014 the IPCC published its AR5
(IPCC, 2013a). Unlike the PAGES 2k Consortium and the so-called Berkeley Earth
Surface Temperature (BEST) project, which both conduct original research, the AR5 is
an expert review of the existing peer-reviewed scientific literature.
Before  I  describe  the  updated  IPCC  assessment  and  the  two  independent
projects, in the next section I review the theory of PNS by the philosophers of science
Jerry Ravetz and Silvio Funtowicz: because it seeks to address the demand for an open,
more inclusive science, PNS serves as this chapterʼs conceptual framework (Funtowicz
& Ravetz 1990ab, 1993; Ravetz, 2004; 2006; also Gibbons, 1999; Gibbons et al 1994).
Like  Collins  and  Evans,  Ravetz  and  Funtowicz  are  sceptical  of  the  traditional
boundaries  drawn between scientists  and non-scientists.  But  other  than Collins  and
Evans, who find epistemic reasons to exclude ʻlay expertsʼ, the latter propose a radical
solution to the problem of extension. The “post-normal situation” of “uncertain facts,
high stakes, disputed values, and urgent decisions” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) would
ask not for new boundaries but for the dismantling of any existing ones. Among the
measures to (re-)authorise political decisions which depend on the electorateʼs trust in
science is the extension of the scientific peer review community.
6.2 ‘Climategate’ in PNS
In Chapters  3  and 4 we noticed that  the  practical  turn in  the  philosophy of
science opened up the so-called problem of closure. How do scientists come to agree on
a scientific truth if the scientific method alone does not account for it? If social factors
account for the closing of a scientific proposition as true, that is agreed upon rather than
achieved through incontrovertible evidence and logical reasoning, questions about the
scientific  method can  at  least  for  analytical  purposes  be  ignored.  The  method  still
serves as a guiding principle, but studies in the new SSK have shown that scientists
habitually strayed from it.
Confronted with the resulting problem of extension, Collins and Evans (2002)
proposed a theory of expertise which would exclude ‘lay experts’. But because their
exclusion has led to ‘Climategate’ and a loss of trust in climate science, that boundary
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is  no  longer  justified,  argues  Jerry  Ravetz  (2010)  on  a  climate  blog  run  by  the
meteorologist-sceptic Anthony Watts. And because in the post-normal situation science
has  been  increasingly  opened  up  to  outsider  participatation,  Ravetz  supports  his
argument with the theory of PNS. Writing on ‘Climategate’ Ravetz and the geographer
Mike Hulme contend (Hulme & Ravetz, 2010):
Where  claims  of  scientific  knowledge  provide  the  basis  of  significant  public  policy,
demands for what has been called “extended peer  review” and “the democratisation of
science”  become  overwhelming  […]  Unsettling  as  this  may  be  for  scientists,  the
combination  of  “post-normal  science”  and  an  internet-driven  democratisation  of
knowledge demands a new professional and public ethos in science. And there is no better
place to start this revolution than with climate science. After all, it is claimed, there is no
more pressing global political challenge than this. But might this episode signify something
more  in  the  unfolding  story  of  climate  change  –  maybe  the  start  of  a  process  of  re-
structuring scientific knowledge?
 In practice PNS achieves its goals by extending scientific peer review. The so-
called extended peer community consists “not merely of scientists with some form or
other of institutional accreditation, but rather of all those experts and lay people with a
desire to participate in the resolution of the issue,” write Funtowicz and Strand (2007).
These extended peers would identify unexplained assumptions and tacit value choices
in science (why did the Mann team weight bristlecone pines higher than other proxy
series?), they would challenge each other’s views about what science is and how it
should be carried out, and they would debate what they hope to achieve, and how they
would  like  to  see  science  used  (cf.  Turnpenny,  2012;  Turnpenny  et  al  2011).  The
extended peers, sometimes called citizen scientists or citizen peers, then organise in
community-based  participatory  research  (Bidwell,  2009),  multi-actor  approaches  to
decision-making  (Frame  &  Brown,  2008;  Frame  &  O’Connor,  2011),  so-called
upstream engagement in science (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004) as well as on blogs where
they discuss scientific and political questions. In this way PNS would tap into local
knowledge and restore a sense of trust and ownership (cf. Lahsen, 2007). Writing on
Watts’ blog, Ravetz analyses the hockey stick controversy (2010): “From the record, it
appears that in this case, criticism and a sense of probity needed to be injected into the
system by the extended peer community from the (mainly) external blogosphere.”
Ravetz  hopes  that  if  the  institution  of  climate  science  allows  for  outsider
participation in knowledge production, the authoritarian climate policy prescriptions in
danger of rejection will give way to authoritative climate governance. With this hope he
131
is not alone (e.g., Von Storch, undated; Bray & von Storch, 2009, Krauss et al 2012).
Judith Curry explained in her Congressional testimony (HCSS, 2010: 179):
[C]limate scientists and the institutions that support them need to acknowledge and engage
with ever-growing groups of citizen scientists, auditors, and extended peer communities
that have become increasingly well organised by the blogosphere. The more sophisticated
of these groups are  challenging our conventional notions of expertise and are bringing
much needed scrutiny particularly into issues surrounding historical and paleoclimate data
records. These groups reflect a growing public interest in climate science and a growing
concern  about  possible  impacts  of  climate  change  and  climate  change  policies.  The
acrimony that has developed between some climate scientists and blogospheric skeptics
was amply evident in the sorry mess that is known as Climategate. Climategate illuminated
the fundamental need for improved and transparent historical and paleoclimate data sets
and improved information systems so that these data are easily accessed and interpreted.
But  analysts  who  make  the  case  for  an  ‘extended  peer  community’  are
themselves unsure of what PNS actually is. “It is not clear from the numerous papers
published by Funtowicz and Ravetz over two decades whether PNS is a phenomenon, a
prescription for a new kind of science, a heuristic, a theory, or something else again,”
criticise  Wesselink and Hoppe (2010: 5). Indeed, Funtowicz and Ravetzʼs model of
PNS is not simply normative; it claims to be descriptive as well; it assumes that there is
such a thing as normal science and that it  has been succeeded by PNS (Goeminne,
2011).  PNS  is  often  described  vis-a-vis  normal  science  and  instances  such  as
‘Climategate’, which, explains Brigitte Nerlich (2010: 436),
may have damaged public understanding of science and science-based public policy [...] by
making people believe that science is based on the pursuit of certainty, or universal truth,
or  on  the  achievement  of  an  absolute  consensus,  [which  perpetuates]  a  very  outdated
understanding of (normal) science.
Also Ravetz (2010) understands “the root cause of Climategate as a case of scientists
constrained to attempt to do normal science in a post-normal situation.”  Other than
“[t]he  approach used by normal  science to  manage complex social  and biophysical
systems as if they were simple scientific exercises [which] has brought us to our present
mixture  of  intellectual  triumph  and  socio-ecological  peril”  (Funtowicz  &  Ravetz,
2003:1), the new public  and professional ethos of PNS shall  lead to a better public
understanding of science and shall re-establish trust in climate scientists and decisions
informed by them. Thus, for the purpose of this chapter and the argument of the thesis
as  a  whole,  I  treat  PNS  as  a  theory  of  expertise  that  speaks  to  the  problem  of
authorising science qua science for technical decision-making. 
In the next section (6.3) I tell the story of climate reconstruction as presented in
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the IPCC reports since 1990. Because in the run-up to AR5 the IPCC’s non-transparent
review-process,  which  allowed  a  few  gatekeepers  to  highlight  their  science  at  the
expense of other research, had been heavily criticised, in the latest assessment report
the IPCC promised to re-assess the science including the new climate reconstructions in
an open and transparent way (IPCC, 2013c). This should re-establish the authority of
their reports in the contentious politics of climate change. 
Then, in sections 6.4 and 6.5 I describe both the production of the new science
(PAGES 2K Consortium and BEST) and the reactions its results have provoked across
the climate divide. In the aftermath of ‘Climategate’ this new research was conducted
without  the  contribution  of  the  established  IPCC cadre  and following the  scepticsʼ
demand  for  Red  teams.  They too  answered  calls  for  a  more  open  and  transparent
climate  science  as  heralded by PNS theorists.  And because  climate  sceptics  would
accept those independent and open re-analyses of climate reconstruction, their reaction
to the new science will prove most interesting. The findings are discussed in section 6.6
followed by the conclusion in 6.7.
6.3  The IPCC assessments of centennial to millennial climate change
Since 1990, in intervals of 5 to 6 years, the IPCC has assessed and synthesised
the peer-reviewed scientific literature. Its task is to prepare policy-relevant knowledge
for decision-makers, who typically read the reportsʼ SPM. With respect to the science
of climate reconstructions, “[t]he main policy-relevant question could be phrased as
follows,” explained the oceanographer and former IPCC lead-author Stefan Rahmstorf:
“Does the past climate history tell us how sensitive the climate system is to CO2?”
(EAE,  2009:  1  October  2004).  In  an  email  to  IPCC  contributing  authors  the
coordinating lead-author Jan Overpeck elaborated (EAE, 2009: 22 April 2009):
[T]he key for inclusion in an IPCC assessment, is to synthesize the published literature in a
way that informs policy makers (the top audience) on what is happening in the climate
system, and more important  even what will happen in [the] climate system. Taking the
terrific speleothem work for example, what are the key lessons that are NEW and important
to highlight to policy makers?
Assuming a pivotal role of science in the politics of climate change, Jan Overpeck notes
that even speleothems, which are cave dripstones whose variations in growth rate and
composition reﬂect environmental changes on the land surface above the cave, may
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provide or contribute to policy relevant knowledge.33
In its first report in 1990 the IPCC reproduced a schematic diagram in which the
late climatologist and founder of CRU Hubert Lamb noted a marked period of medieval
warmth during which the Vikings settled in Greenland (Lamb, 1965). But since most of
Lambʼs data came from a few regions in the Northern hemisphere and largely in the
form of anecdotal evidence, the certainty over the global extent of medieval warming
was low. “[I]t is still not clear whether all the fluctuations indicated were truly global,”
concluded the IPCC in 1990 (p.202). And after the IPCC dropped Lambʼs diagram for
the  hockey  stick  graph  in  its  TAR  in  2001,  the  scientists  wondered  how  Lambʼs
diagram could ever have been so uncritically accepted by the authors of FAR. Raymond
Bradley mused in an email to Mann and colleagues (EAE, 2009: 2 January  2007):
In any case, the graph has no objective basis whatsoever; it is purely a “visual guess” at
what happened, like something we might sketch on a napkin at a party for some overly
persistent inquisitor..... (so make sure you don’t leave such things on the table...). What
made the last millennium graph famous (notorious!) was that Chris Folland must have seen
it and reproduced it  in the 1995 IPCC chapter he was editing. I  don’t think he gave a
citation and it thus appeared to have the imprimatur of the IPCC.
Bradley  seems to be  well  aware  that  Lambʼs  hand drawing,  much like Overpeckʼs
speleothems, itself had little authority – it is its publication in the IPCC that would lend
knowledge authority in the politics of climate change.
After  this  ʻU-turnʼ  and  McIntyreʼs  critique  on  the  hockey  stick,  scientists
involved in  the preparation of  AR4 in 2007 were wary about  the sensitivity  of the
subject.  “We will  to  a  large  extent  be  judged on how we  tackle  the  hockey stick,
sensitivity, unprecedented 20th century warming [issues] in view of palaeo[records],”
wrote one coordinating lead-author of the chapter on palaeoclimate, Eystein Jansen, to
his colleague Jonathan Overpeck (EAE, 2009: 10 January 2005). Four months later his
addressee made up his mind. Overpeck wrote to Keith Briffa (EAE, 2009: 23 May
2005):
We’re hoping you guys can generate something compelling enough for the TS [Technical
Summary] and SPM − something that will replace the hockey-stick with something even
more compelling.
A month  on and the  two coordinating lead-authors  Overpeck  and Jansen reminded
Keith Briffa and fellow lead-authors that “figures MUST BE POLICY RELEVANT
33 To be sure, speleothems have played a comparably minor role in the reconstruction of centennial to
millennial climate change (McDermott, 2004).
134
AND COMPELLING” (EAE, 2009: 14 July 2005, capitals in original). “Thanks again
for helping us lead the next big push!,” they bowed. 
Overpeck and Jansen’s pressure on lead-authors to support their political agenda
put the latter in an uncomfortable position. “I have been accustomed to write about
scientific facts. Now I am confronted with a new problem how to serve the purpose of
another  style,”  wrote  an  unidentified  lead-author  to  Overpeck (EAE,  2009:  12  Jan
2005).  Also  the  IPCC veteran  Briffa  was  worried  about  the  imperative  of  policy-
relevancy; in a reply to Overpeck and Jansen he defended the lead-authors’ choice  of
figures (EAE, 2009: 3 February 2006):
[W]e  are  having  trouble  to  express  the  real  message  of  the  reconstructions  –  being
scientifically  sound  in  representing  uncertainty,  while  still  getting  the  crux  of  the
information across clearly. It is not right to ignore uncertainty, but expressing this merely in
an arbitrary  way (and as  a  total  range as before)  allows the uncertainty to  swamp the
magnitude of the changes through time. We have settled on this version (attached) of the
Figure which we [hope] you will agree gets the message over but with the rigor required
for such an important document.
In  all  of  these  conversations  the  scientists  are  shown to  struggle  with  the  task  of
bridging the gap between science and politics, which gives ample scope for choice,
judgement and interpretation. Aware of the subject’s sensitivity they are trying to find a
consensus they can all live with.
The result of the IPCC authorsʼ negotiations was a diagram presenting several
climate reconstructions (figure 6.1, p. 136). In figure 6.1, palaeoclimatologist  David
Frank and colleagues assembled Lambʼs graph from FAR, the hockey stick graph from
TAR and the graphs from AR4, summarising the change from a single “noodle” in 1990
to the hockey stick in 2001 and finally a “spaghetti plate” of graphs in 2007: “[F]urther
consideration of existing and the development of new reconstructions, methodological
disputes, and analysis  called for a  retreat from the 2001 position that reconstructed
temperatures were well understood. Numerous, smoothed reconstructions in the 2007
report testify to signiﬁcant remaining uncertainty” (Frank et al 2010).
In  2009  ‘Climategate’  revealed  how  those  IPCC  authors  have  exerted
disproportional influence on assessment and synthesis of climate science. Reviewing
the  affair,  several  committees urged the IPCC to reform this  process.  “Because the
individuals  involved  in  the  IPCC  assessment  process  carry  the  burden  and
responsibility of maintaining the public’s trust, it is important for all involved to act
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with transparency and integrity and to abide by appropriate codes of conduct,” warned
the IAC (2010: 58). Echoing PNS, according to the IAC and other inquiries (e.g. Muir,
2010),  the  IPCC  has  to  “respond  to  a  larger  and  more  demanding  group  of
stakeholders” (IAC, 2010: 59). As a consequence the IPCC (2013c) subscribed to an
“objective, open, and transparent review process.”
Figure 6.1: IPCC icons of temperatures over the past millennium. “Sequence of the pre-
industrial to industrial temperatures as expressed in the 1990 (upper), 2001 (middle), and
2007 (lower) IPCC reports. Dashed lines represent mean temperatures at 1900 in the upper
panel and for 1961–1990 in the middle and lower panels. The upper panel was graphically
recreated, whereas the middle and lower panels are based upon data obtained at the NCDC
webpage.  Curves  illustrate  the  evolution  of  the  ‘consensus  views’  for  large-scale
temperature change in the IPCC reports”, Source: Frank et al (2010).
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In September 2013 the IPCC finally published its  AR5 SPM (IPCC, 2013b)
followed by the full report in April 2014 (IPCC, 2013a). The chapter on palaeoclimate
contains a graph showing different climate histories of the past 2,000 years for both the
Northern and Southern hemispheres as well as its global aggregate (figure 6.2, p. 138).
As regards  the disputed Northern hemispheric  climate  history,  the  report  concluded
(IPCC, 2013a: 408-409):
Based  on  multiple  lines  of  evidence  using  different  statistical  methods  or  different
compilations  of  proxy  records  [...] published  reconstructions  and  their  uncertainty
estimates indicate, with high confidence, that the mean NH temperature of the last 30 or 50
years very likely exceeded any previous 30- or 50-year mean during the past 800 years [...]
reconstructions covering part or all of the first millennium suggest that some earlier 50-
year periods might have been as warm as the 1963–2012 mean instrumental temperature,
but the higher temperature of the last 30 years appears to be at least likely the warmest 30-
year period in all reconstructions. However, the confidence in this finding is lower prior to
1200,  because  the  evidence  is  less  reliable  and  there  are  fewer  independent  lines  of
evidence.
First,  and  arguably  as  a  response  to  the  sceptics’ calls  for  more  robust  statistical
analyses, the report stressed the use of different methods. Second, the use of 30- or 50-
year means instead of single decades or years – the 1990s and 1998 in MBH98/99  –
allowed for more confidence in the results. 1998 may still have been the warmest year
over a millennium, but the confidence in annually resolved data, in particular when they
come from qualitatively different sources, was much lower. Third, there is a chance that
there have been extended warm periods in the first millennium A.D. and not covered by
the hockey stick study.
Policy-makers were offered the same conclusion however in slightly amended
form (IPCC, 2013b):
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia [...]. In the Northern Hemisphere,
1983–2012  was  likely  the  warmest  30-year  period  of  the  last  1400  years  (medium
confidence)  [...].  Continental-scale surface  temperature reconstructions show, with high
confidence,  multi-decadal  periods  during  the  Medieval  Climate  Anomaly  (year  950 to
1250) that were in some regions as warm as in the late 20th century. These regional warm
periods did not occur as coherently across regions as the warming in the late 20th century
(high confidence) [...].
In the SPM, past periods as warm as the late 20th century were acknowledged as a
distinct possibility, but they did not occur on a global scale. And because GHGs affect
the climate globally, no matter where and how they are emitted (cf. Argawal & Narain,
1991), the SPM deemed that scale the scientifically and politically most interesting one.
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Figure  6.2: The  IPCC AR5 2,000  year  temperature  reconstruction.  “Reconstructed  (a)
Northern Hemisphere and (b) Southern Hemisphere,  and (c) global annual  temperatures
during the last 2000 years.” Source: IPCC 2013a.
Reactions to the IPCC AR5 re-assessment of climate reconstruction
The  IPCCʼs  assessment  of  climate  reconstruction  was  endorsed  across  the
climate  blogosphere.  On  a  well-known  climate  blog  Stefan  Rahmstorf  (2013b)
reported: “The last 30 years were probably the warmest since at least 1,400 years. This
is a result from improved proxy data. In the 3rd IPCC report this could only be said
about the last thousand years, in the 4th about the last 1,300 years.” Likewise, on his
Facebook account Michael Mann quoted extensively from the SPM, crowing that this
latest IPCC assessment “...is in fact a STRENGTHENING of the original Hockey Stick
(and  Third  Assessment  Report)  conclusion  that  recent  warmth  was  LIKELY
unprecedented for the PAST 1000 YEARS” (Mann, 2013c, capitals in original). For
these scientists the IPCC draws its authority from both the extensive review process
and the great number of expert participants from diverse disciplines. In Rahmstorfʼs
view the IPCC remains authoritative precisely  because of its consensual construction
which “tends  to  produce  very  cautious  and conservative  statements  [...] Despite  or
perhaps even because of this conservatism, IPCC reports are extremely valuable – as
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long as one is aware of it” (Ibid.). The “conservative” scientific consensus serves as
argument against the sceptics’ charge of IPCC alarmism. 
Climate sceptics interpreted the AR5 review of millennial climate change quite
differently.  Relying on a leaked document of the SPM, for Anthony Watts  (2013b)
“they’ve gone from saying warmest in the last 1300 years to the last 800 years,” thus
back to its position of 1990 when they published Lambʼs graph. For Douglas Keenan
(2013) “the correct conclusion is that there is no demonstrated observational evidence
for global warming.” Invoking ‘sound’ scientific principles, he justified his conclusion
with  “flaws  [in  statistical  analysis  which] imply  that  there  is  no  demonstrated
observational  evidence  that  global  temperatures  have  significantly  increased  (i.e.
increased more than would be expected from natural climatic variation alone).” “The
Medieval Warm Period, located by AR4 in the centuries spanning the end of the first
millennium, is  now apparently accepted as probably being warmer than the current
warming,” asserted the author of The Hockey Stick Illusion Andrew Montford (2013).
“There doesn’t appear to be a single skeptic (correct me if I’m wrong) in the author
list,” observed Anthony Watts (2013b).
6.4  The PAGES 2k Consortium’s 2,000 year climate reconstruction
Included  in  the  scientific  literature  which  the  IPCC  assessed  for  AR5  is  a
climate reconstruction produced by the PAGES 2k Consortium. In 2006 the consortium
of 78 scientists began to reconstruct continental-scale temperature variability during the
past two millennia (PAGES 2k Consortium, 2013, N.B.: the article is often cited as
Kaufmann et al  2013 or Ahmed et al  2013). They justified their effort with a lack of
regional-scale climate information beyond the instrumental period, “which is important
as we prepare for the full range of future climate changes due to both anthropogenic
and  natural  factors,”  the  scientists  noted  on  their  webpage.34 Lead-author  Darrel
Kaufmann (2013) rationalised the so-called regions-up approach they have adopted,
pointing both to the way in which it mobilises local expertise and to its potential for
including new data that would have been more difficult to assemble for a centralised
global reconstruction. One of the original architects of the PAGES 2k Consortium, the
Swiss climate scientist Heinz Wanner, reiterated: “A key aspect of the consortium effort
34 Knowledge of climate variability on regional scales can inform the adaptation of ecosystems and
societies to climate change (http://pages-igbp.org; Accessed on 5 November 2013)
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was to engage regional experts who are intimately familiar with the evidence for past
climate changes within their regions.”35 The inclusion of local expertise is also a key
aspect  of  PNS,  however  there  it  tends  to  carry  a  different  meaning  that  is  ‘lay
expertise’.
In  order  to  both  maintain  the  regional  effects  and  arrive  at  a  robust  global
reconstruction, the scientists adopted and applied various statistical methodologies and
mathematical procedures. By doing so they can assess the extent to which the main
conclusions  of  the  study stand up to  the  different  analytical  approaches.  Thus,  and
whether  consciously  or  not,  the  PAGES 2k Consortium responded to  the  sceptics’
criticism of  the  hockey stick.  In  a  Congressional  hearing  Senator  Inhofe  (SCEPW,
2005: 2)
look[ed] forward to determining whose data is most comprehensive, uses the most proxies,
maintains  the  regional  effects,  avoids  losing  specificity  through  averaging  statistics,
considers more studies,  and most accurately reflects the realities  of  the Little  Ice Age,
reflects the realities of the Medieval Warming Period, and more.
Moreover, the PAGES 2k Consortium was open to all interested participants and
they  made  available  all  data  and  methodology  on  their  webpage.  In  this  way,  the
PAGES  2k  Consortium  exercised  openness  and  transparency  with  the  aim  of
forestalling the negative social relations the Mann team’s secrecy had provoked. On
their webpage they answered to the frequently asked question about the peer review
process:
The manuscript was reviewed carefully by anonymous peer reviewers and it was revised
extensively  to  address  their  concerns.  Specifically,  the  first  round of  reviews  by  three
referees included 12 pages (6200 words)  of comments,  to which the authors’ point-by-
point replies spanned 6 pages (3500 words). A fourth referee was added for the second
round of reviews, which amounted to 6 pages (3500 words) of comments, with 3 pages of
author  replies  (1400 words)  […]  This  is  an  extensive  review by  any  standard,  not  to
mention the vetting of the manuscript among 78 co-authors during both the writing and
review/comment phase.36
The peer review was organised by the editors of the journal Nature Geoscience where
the  study  was  published as  Progress  Article  in  2013.  Nature Geoscience publishes
studies as Progress Articles when the discussion is focused on a developing field that
might not yet be mature enough to be considered a Review Article, which, however




The PAGES 2k Consortium offered three primary conclusions. First, the most
coherent feature in nearly all of the regional temperature reconstructions was a long-
term cooling trend, which ended late in the 19th century. Second, temperatures did not
fluctuate  uniformly  among  all  regions  at  multi-decadal  to  centennial  scales.  For
example, there were no globally synchronous multi-decadal warm or cold intervals that
define  a worldwide MPW or so-called little  ice age (LIA).  Third,  the 20th century
ranked as the warmest or nearly the warmest century in all regions except Antarctica.
During  the  last  30-year  period  in  the  reconstructions  (1971-2000),  the  average
reconstructed temperature among all of the regions was likely higher than any time in
nearly 1,400 years.  However,  some regions experienced 30-year  intervals that were
warmer than 1971-2000. In Europe, for example, the average temperature between 21
and 80 AD was warmer than during 1971-2000 (PAGES 2k Consortium, 2013). 
The Consortium did not attempt to attribute causes to these observed changes.
Nor did they claim to have achieved scientific closure: “The new PAGES 2k database
will  no  doubt  be  analyzed  using  alternative  approaches  that  will  reveal  additional
patterns and address further research questions.”37
Reactions to PAGES 2k Consortium
Climate scientists welcomed the Consortium’s reconstruction and disseminated
its findings primarily on social media platforms. On Facebook Michael Mann (2013b)
offered his summary: “PAGES 2k Consortium (70+ paleoclimate scientists) reports in
latest  Nature Geoscience:  “[global]  average  reconstructed  temperature  likely  higher
than any time in nearly 1400 yrs.” Rahmstorf (2013a) likened the study to a twin of the
original  MBH99 hockey  stick  reconstruction:  “The  global  average  age  of  the  new
reconstruction  looks  like  a  twin  of  the  original  “hockey  stick”,  the  first  such
reconstruction published fifteen years ago.” The environmental scientist Dana Nuticelli
(2013) explained that the hockey stick has won the rivalry with sceptics: “PAGES two
main results are a confirmation that current global surface temperatures are hotter than
at any time in the past 1,400 years (the general ʻhockey stickʼ shape), and that while the
MWP and LIA are clearly visible events in their reconstruction, they were not globally
synchronized events.” “It confirmed that recent global and continental-scale warming
was ʻvery unusualʼ in recent Earth history,” stated Jonathan Overpeck (SMH, 2013).
37 Ibid.
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In front of ʻtheirʼ audience, who they address via (social) news media, these
scientists described the studyʼs authority as a function of the great number of certified
experts who have intimate explicit and tacit knowledge of the unique regions and the
local sites of measurement. For example, wrote Dana Nuticelli (2013): 
This network consists of scientists from 9 regional working groups, each of which collects
and processes the best  paleoclimate [...]  data from their respective region. Itʼs a clever
approach because it allows the experts in their local proxy [area] to contribute to a much
larger global project. 
But since their interpretative focus is on global climate, Nuticelli, Rahmstorf, Mann and
Overpeck either omitted or mentioned in passing its third primary conclusion (some
regions experienced 30-year intervals that were warmer than 1971-2000).  Nor have
they mentioned uncertainties or explained the assumptions inherent in the calibration
exercise.
Climate  sceptics  on  the  other  hand  stressed  a  particular  finding  as  well  as
uncertainties  stemming  from  proxy  data.  “[C]laims  of  unprecedented  recent
temperatures are not supported by the regional reconstructions,” opened Anthony Watts
(2013a), noting that in Europe the average temperature between 21 and 80 AD was
warmer than during 1971-2000. Steven McIntyre, who despite his expertise on proxy
data  had  not  participated  in  the  project,  adopted  a  well-known  line  of  critique
(McIntyre, 2013). He found three studies which would
clearly demonstrate that the sediments are contaminated as climate proxies […] Kaufmann
and paleo peer reviewers ought to be aware that the recent portion of varve data [NB: a
varve is the annual layer of sediment that typically contains the climate proxy pollen] can
be contaminated by modern agriculture […] The contaminated series is readily identified
as an outlier through a simple inspection of the data. The evidence of contamination by
recent agriculture in the specialist articles is completely unequivocal. This sort of mistake
shouldn’t  be  that  hard  to  spot  even  for  real  climate  scientists  […]  It  is  unclear  why
Kaufman selected pollen accumulation rate out of all the available measurements.
McIntyre  seems to have  accepted  the  authority  of  PAGES 2k Consortium qua real
climate scientists and so agrees with his opponents on the markers of expertise.
Because the 70+ paleoclimatologists are all credentialed experts, sceptics once
again invoked the empiricist ideals of ʻsound scienceʼ: “So much of climate science
looks far different  when the raw data is  inspected,”  commented Watts  on McIntyre
(2013). On their respective blogs Watts and McIntyre then added satellite images and
photographs which show the contaminated site whose data should have been excluded
based on insufficient a priori criteria. “Pages2k need to have a policy on when and how
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an in/out  decision  (about  proxy data)  is  to  be  made.  And they have  in  their  rules
delegated that to the original authors, their journal and reviewers, whose job it is to
make that decision for publication,”  noted the sceptic Steven Mosher (in McIntyre,
2013),  echoing  the  institutional  constructivist  critique  on  the  Mann  team  we  have
examined  in  Chapter  5.  Arguably  because  of  its  inconvenient  conclusion,  Mosher
mused over the micro-politics at PAGES 2k Consortium and Nature Geoscience.
Despite  these  voices  of  disagreement  the  scepticsʼ critique  did  not  make
headlines of the conservative news press. Nor did right-leaning think tanks such as
Marshall,  American  Enterprise,  Cato  and  Heartland  report  on  another  potential
controversy. Neither was there a rebuttal in the scientific literature. But most citizen
scientists on Watts’ blog had already made up their minds. Read a comment made on
Wattsʼ blog wattsupwiththat.com (Watts, 2013a):
Of course, it’s an established and accepted scientific fact that the MWP was a worldwide
warm period; warmer than the present. We don’t need doubtful proxies, flawed studies or
so called climate experts to  tell  us that.  The Vikings grew potatoes  on Greenland,  for
goodness sake!
If these peers were genuinely interested in the science of climate reconstruction, they
would  follow up  on  McIntyreʼs  deconstruction  and  (fly  to  Greenland  to)  replicate
pollen proxy series. And if they wanted to repeat an institutional constructivist critique
on the Consortiumʼs politicking and aim at a Congressional investigation, they would
have  to  hope  for  a  Republican  majority.  But  there  was  no  visible  critique  on  the
processes by which the PAGES 2k Consortium authorised its findings. Because their
conclusions  have not  yet  been cited by politicians pledging for  emission regulation
schemes, climate sceptics have for the time being ʻaccepted’ its science of continental-
scale temperature variability during the past two millennia.
6.5  The BEST instrumental temperature reconstruction
In the chapter “Observations: Atmosphere and Surface” the AR5 assessed a re-
analysis of surface temperature reconstructions produced by an independent team of
scientists  at  Berkeley  University  (Rohde  et  al  2013).  In  2010,  highly  credentialed
physicists from Berkeley’s renowned Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, among
them the Nobel Prize winner Saul Perlmutter and Enrico Fermi Award winner Arthur
Rosenfeld, decided to “carefully stud[y] issues [on instrumental climate reconstruction]
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raised  by  skeptics”  (Muller,  2012).  Led by the  esteemed  physicist  Richard  Muller,
BEST re-analysed  the  hitherto  authoritative  but  increasingly  criticised  instrumental
climate reconstructions produced at CRU, NOAA/NCDC, and NASA/GISS. These all
showed a marked 20th century warming as predicted by the theory of AGW, and based
on this convergence of opinion, in 2007 the AR4 concluded that the planet has warmed
by 0.74 degrees Celsius since the year 1900. According to Richard Muller, authoritative
scientific closure over this number and its causes was necessary for the political debate
to continue (cited in Revkin, 2012):
I  hope that  the  Berkeley  Earth analysis  will  help settle  the scientific  debate  regarding
global warming and its human causes. Then comes the difficult part: agreeing across the
political and diplomatic spectrum about what can and should be done.
While reaching the same conclusion using different methods was taken by the
IPCC as cause for greater confidence in  these instrumentally  based reconstructions,
sceptics countered that all three projects shared much of the same data, and so were
hardly  independent.  In  order  to  independently  replicate  instrumental  climate
reconstructions they began to examine the weather observatories which produce the
underlying data (see Chapter 4,  pages 90-91). As strong proponents of the so-called
UHI hypothesis they argued the observed warming to be attributable to urbanisation
around observatories, and not to GHG emissions. As critics of the IPCC they claimed
that at least two studies (De Laat & Maurellis, 2004, 2006; McKitrick & Michaels,
2004) which document a  statistical  correlation  between temperature and patterns  of
socio-economic  development  (urbanisation)  were  purposefully  ignored  by  its  lead-
authors – they were so excluded from the ʻconsensusʼ. The blending out of this research
would seriously undermine the 0.74 degrees warming trend, wrote the climatologist and
fellow of the Cato Institute Patrick Michaels (2009):
Imagine if there were no reliable records of global surface temperature. Raucous policy
debates such as cap-and-trade would have no scientific basis, Al Gore would at this point
be little more than a historical footnote, and President Obama would not be spending this
U.N. session talking up a (likely unattainable) international climate deal in Copenhagen in
December. Steel yourself for the new reality, because the data needed to verify the gloom-
and-doom warming forecasts have disappeared.
Subscribing  to  the  linear  model  in  which  climate  policy  follows  climate  science,
Michaels ridicules his ideological adversaries who have invested much political capital
in an international climate deal.
To help settle the scientific debate, the BEST team sought to reduce four distinct
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biases which are thought to have adversely affected the existing reconstructions: The
ʻUHI biasʼ as explained above, the ʻtime of observation biasʼ which holds that a change
in observation hours results in different mean temperatures,  the ʻstation move biasʼ
which holds that the relocation causes a ʻjumpʼ in its temperatures, and the ʻchange of
instrumentation biasʼ  which holds  that a  change in  thermometer type  introduces  an
ʻoffset  biasʼ.  Because  sceptics  called  for  a  (1)  non-activist,  (2)  inclusive  and  (3)
transparent re-analysis, BEST performed its reconstruction in ways that answer to these
demands.
(1)  First  Muller  seized  upon  the  revelations  of  ‘Climategate’ to  demarcate
himself and his project from the activist climate scientists. “They are advocates and no
longer scientists. The bad effect of this is that the public then loses some of its trust in
science, and that is deeply unfortunate,” Muller remarked in a  Congressional hearing
(HCSST, 2011: 116). At BEST, he announced, “[n]one of the scientists involved has
taken a  public  political  stand on global  warming […] our  goal  is  to  not  have  any
political views, not to become advocates, simply do the best job we can on the science”
(HCSST, 2011: 116). And Richard Muller (2011a)
get[s] even more upset when some other people say, oh, science is just a human activity.
This is the way it happens. You have to recognize, these are people. No, no, no, no. These
are not scientific standards. You don’t hide the data. You don’t play with the peer review
system. We don’t do that at Berkeley.
As we have seen in Chapter 5 these statements of demarcation in order to affirm one’s
expert authority are typical of scientists who appear at the legislative stage of decision-
making.  Muller’s  insistence on Mertonian norms also relates to  the ideal  of ‘sound
science’, which denies the scientists any agency in the construction of knowledge.
(2) By calling upon the climate sceptics Anthony Watts and Steven Mosher to
participate in BEST, Richard Muller also sought to enrol outsiders who had previously
been marginalised or eliminated from the IPCC venue. The Berkeley scientists showed
particular  interest  in  Wattsʼ expertise  on UHI bias;  they used  data  provided by his
Surface  Stations  Project  to  weight  temperature  records  in  accordance  with  station
quality. In his research Watts (2012a) found that approximately 90% of the examined
1,000 stations had been “compromised by encroachment of urbanity in the form of heat
sinks and sources, such as concrete, asphalt, air conditioning system heat exchangers,
roadways, airport tarmac, and other issues.” Unlike climate modellers and scientists
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who “refuse to get out of the office, to examine firsthand the condition of the network”
(Watts, 2012b), Watts could claim to have performed an empirical observation in the
spirit  of  ʻsound  scienceʼ.  What  is  more,  the  Surface  Station  Project  conveniently
connected  Muller’s  BEST  with  Wattsʼ  extended  peer  community:  for  the
documentation  of  the  encroachment  of  urbanity  Watts  had  to  enrol  dozens  of
uncredentialed volunteers in a photographic survey.38  To the meteorologist and critic of
the IPCC, Roger Pielke Sr. (2012a),
the BEST use of Anthony’s data illustrates that the surface station project led by Anthony is
a robust scientific endeavor […] Anthony Watts is as much a part of the climate science
community as are those who wrote the IPCC reports. It is just that those who wrote those
reports consciously decided to exclude viewpoints such as Anthony’s.
And Richard Muller acknowledged Wattsʼ contribution (HCSST, 2011: 41):
Without  the  efforts  of  Anthony Watts  and  his  team,  we  would  have  only  a  series  of
anecdotal images of poor temperature stations, and we would not be able to evaluate the
integrity of the data. This is a case in which scientists receiving no government funding did
work  crucial  to  understanding  climate  change.  Similarly  for  the  work  done  by  Steve
McIntyre. Their ‘‘amateur’’ science is not amateur in quality. It is true science, conducted
with integrity and high standards.
Whether  Wattʼs  revised  data  would  leave  the  desired  impact  on  the  global
temperature  index,  which  is  the  entity  both  sides  in  the  political  debate  are  most
concerned with, remained to be seen. The innumerable point measurements were once
again  moulded  into  5°x5°  grid  boxes  spanning  the  globe,  turning  ʻreal  dataʼ into
ʻmodels of dataʼ. And because it is unlikely that Wattsʼ data from 1,000 corrected (out
of 39,000) stations would leave any trace in the corrected global temperature index, in
the UK the engineer Tim Channon prepared to follow Wattsʼ example. Assuming the
scientific  value  of  these  projects,  Jerry  Ravetz  (2010)  celebrated  the  inclusion  of
sceptics and their volunteers as examples of PNS.
(3) In the name of openness and transparency the BEST team posted all raw
data and their analysis code online, arguably so as to lower the barriers to entry into
climate science. Muller also announced the projectʼs sources of funding, notably the
Koch Foundation which is  a group known for having supported climate sceptics in
science and politics, such as the Heartland Institute. Committed to total transparency
the  scientists  went  yet  one  step  further  and  publicly  released  their  findings  before
38 The photographs of weather stations do not follow any discernible standard but are released online
with information on 22 photo properties including ISO, shutter time, saturation, exposure in order to
evoke their objectivity. (http://surfacestations.org; Last accessed on 23 December 2013)
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anonymous reviewers had a chance to either reject or accept them. They justify this
move with the urgency of decisions (in post-normal times): “I believe that the findings
are too important to wait for the year or longer that it could take to complete the journal
review process,” explained Mullerʼs daughter and executive director of BEST Elizabeth
Muller (cited in Revkin, 2012). A year later formal peer review in the newly launched
journal  Geoinformatics  &  Geostatistics eventually  confirmed  the  results.  “A New
Estimate  of  the  Average  Earth  Surface  Land Temperature  Spanning  1753 to  2011”
(Rhode et al 2013) depicted a temperature increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius from 1753-
2011, and a rise of 0.9 degrees Celsius from 1950-2010. Figure 6.3 shows that the
BEST results essentially agreed with previous estimates of 0.81 to 0.93°C for the 1950-
2000 period (figure 6.3, p. 148).
The pre-release of its results meant that by the time of its formal publication in
2013 BEST was little newsworthy. As early as 2011 Muller expressed “surprise [...] that
the new results agreed so closely with the warming values published previously by
other teams in the US and the UK” (Muller, 2011b), claiming “...the issues raised by
skeptics, such as possible biases from urban heating, data selection, poor station quality,
and data adjustment do not unduly bias the results.” “Essentially all of the warming of
the past 250 years is caused by humans,” Muller (2013) concluded in a key-note speech
at a gathering for information around climate change policy and carbon markets. Unlike
in  Congress,  where  the  disinterested  physicist  refrained  from  making  such  strong
statements, on the many informal venues he frequented, Muller concluded that “you
should not be a skeptic, at least not any longer” (Muller 2011a). As far as Muller was
concerned scientific closure over global warming has been achieved, clearing the path
for a rational policy response, which BEST should spearhead. In late 2013 the Centre
for Policy Studies (CPS), a free-market British policy think tank, published Richard and
Elizabeth  Mullerʼs  study  “Why  Every  Serious  Environmentalist  Should  Favour
Fracking.” With BEST the  linear  model  of  climate science  and climate policy  was
revived; the Mullersʼ study should convince both the left and the right of fracking as the
most rational course of action.39 
39 Fracking is the process of drilling and injecting fluid into the ground at a high pressure in order to
fracture shale rocks to release natural gas. Because the burning of natural gas as energy source emits
less CO2 than does the burning of coal,  anyone concerned about  climate  change should endorse
fracking, argue the Mullers.
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Figure 6.3: The BEST 250 years temperature reconstruction. “Land temperature with 1-
and 10-year running averages. The shaded regions are the one- and two-standard deviation
uncertainties calculated including both statistical and spatial  sampling errors. Prior  land
results from the other groups are also plotted. The NASA GISS record had a land mask
applied; the HadCRU curve is the simple land average, not the hemispheric-weighted one,
Source: http://www.berkeleyearth.org (Accessed on 13 November  2013).
Reactions to BEST
Because BEST was conceived explicitly as a response to their critique, climate
sceptics gave their praise in advance. Wrote Anthony Watts in early 2011(b):
I’m prepared to accept whatever result they produce, even if it proves my premise wrong.
I’m taking this bold step because the method has promise. So let’s not pay attention to the
little yippers who want to tear it down before they even see the results. I haven’t seen the
global result, nobody has, not even the home team, but the method isn’t the madness that
we’ve seen from NOAA, NCDC, GISS, and CRU, and, there aren’t any monetary strings
attached to the result that I can tell. If the project was terminated tomorrow, nobody loses
jobs,  no large government programs get  shut down,  and no dependent programs crash
either. That lack of strings attached to funding, plus the broad mix of people involved
especially those who have previous experience in handling large data sets gives me greater
confidence in the result being closer to a bona fide ground truth than anything we’ve seen
yet.
On  Watts’ blog  Fred  Singer  voiced  his  agreement  with  the  meteorologist  (Watts,
2011a):
The Project is in the hands of a group of recognized scientists, who are not at all “climate
skeptics” — which should enhance their credibility […] I applaud and support what is
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being done by the Project — a very difficult but important undertaking. I personally have
little faith in the quality of the surface data, having been exposed to the revealing work by
Anthony Watts and others. However, I have an open mind on the issue and look forward to
seeing the results of the Project in their forthcoming publications. As far as I know, no
government or industry funds are involved — at least at this stage.
Their  advance  enthusiasm  for  BEST,  notably  for  the  lack  of  involvement  by
government which they accuse of politicising climate science so as to further a state-
socialist agenda, makes their subsequent hostility to its findings when they were issued
all the more interesting.
Once  Wattsʼ premise  was  proven  wrong  by  the  released  results,  he  quickly
criticised their station siting method. A new and improved rating method for weather
stations would show less warming for US stations, and thus should have been employed
by BEST, argued the meteorologist (2012b). Next Watts resented Mullerʼs presentation
of  preliminary  conclusions  in  a  Congressional hearing,  arguing  “...todayʼs  hearing
presenting  preliminary  results  seems  rather  topsy  turvy”  (Watts,  2011c).  “But  post
normal science political theater is like that,” he added. According to Watts, scientists
are only allowed to release their unpublished research if they respect IPRs. And since
he shared his  data  with Muller in  confidence,  he felt  his  right  to publish first  was
undermined. Muller’s strategy would rather resemble a “PR blitz” which Watts (2011c)
emphatically disapproved of. 
Conservative think tanks joined in to bash Muller and BEST. Patrick Michaels
of the Cato Institute lamented its “massive pre-peer-review public relations campaign”
before criticising BEST’s omission of sea surface temperature: “As a result of these and
other peccadilloes, the BEST team has yet to publish one peer-reviewed paper, despite
conspicuously  dominating  the  op-ed  pages  for  a  year  now.”  In  conclusion,  “BEST
really does not tell us much that is new,” Michaels (2012) stated, discounting the team’s
effort. For the Marshall Institute’s CEO William O’Keefe (2011),
releasing results to the media before independent review stretches credibility […] If the
study had not been partially funded by the Koch Foundation which is characterized as
being skeptical that human activities are the primary cause of global warming, Muller’s
research probably would have received zero attention.
Writing  for  the  Heartland  Institute,  James  Taylor  dismissed  BEST  as  “the  very
definition of meaningless.” According to Taylor (2011) Muller did not even remotely
address the issues presented by global warming sceptics:
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It is very difficult to imagine that someone like Richard Muller is so clueless about the
position of global warming skeptics. Is Muller really living so deeply under a rock that he
truly has no idea about the substance of skeptics’ objections,  or  is  Muller  deliberately
presenting a straw man argument with the intent of deceiving casual observers about the
true nature of the global warming debate?
In the scepticsʼ view, Richard Muller, who calls himself a converted sceptic arguably in
order to shore up his credibility as critic of mainstream climate science, never was a
true sceptic. 
Mainstream climate scientists  too take issue with Muller the convert.  To the
climate modeller William Connolley (2012) “all of that is bollocks.” “What Muller is
saying,” Connelley went on, “is that he read a few sceptic blogs, didn’t bother read any
of the scientific literature, and so decided to run his own project. So is that his model
for converting sceptics?” For Roger Pielke Sr.  (2012b) “[Mullerʼs]  comments show
what  occurs  when scientists  with excellent  research credentials  within their  area of
scientific expertise go outside of their area of knowledge.” In Eric Steigʼs opinion “the
Berkeley results are newsworthy  […] only because Muller had been perceived as an
outsider (driven in part by trash-talking about other scientists), and has taken money
from the infamous Koch brothers.” “As far as the basic science goes,” Steig continued,
“the results could not have been less surprising if the press release had said ‘Man Finds
Sun Rises At Dawn’” (Steig, 2011). “The basic scientific results have been established
for a long time now, so I do not see the results of Muller et al as being scientifically
important.  However,  their  result  may  be  politically  important,”  affirmed  the
atmospheric physicist Ken Caldeira (2012, also Santer, 2012). Following the release of
BEST, Michael Mann (2012b) noted on his Facebook account:
It’s great that he reaffirmed what we already knew. But for him to pretend that we couldn’t
trust this entire scientific field until Richard Muller put his personal stamp of approval on
their conclusions is, in my view, a very dangerously misguided philosophical take on how
science works.
It turns out that scientists and sceptics agree over the scientific and political value of
BEST: it is deemed little newsworthy and it did not bring about closure of the debate as
Muller hoped it would.
In  the  next  section  I  analyse  their  reactions  to  BEST,  the  PAGES  2k
Consortium,  and the  IPCC AR5.  I  discuss  what  openness,  transparency and public
participation in  science,  as heralded by PNS as theory of  expertise,  can add to  the
scientific debate on climate reconstruction.
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6.6  Discussion
After the hockey stick controversy and ‘Climategate’ two demands were made
of  new climate  science.  On the  one  side  climate  sceptics  argued for  a  Team B to
reconsider  climate  reconstruction  and  its  much  criticised  IPCC assessment.  On the
other side critics urged for more openness and transparency. These should be the new
markers  of  the  trustworthy  (climate)  expert,  making  more  or  less  redundant  the
traditional ones we considered in Chapter 5. The two new projects presented in this
chapter, PAGES 2k Consortium and BEST, answered to these demands. The IPCC on
the other hand is neither new nor open about the processes by which it arrived at its
policy-relevant conclusions. Despite its promises to act on the IAC recommendations,
its review process was anything but transparent.  It continued to disallow outsiders to
study  its  consensus  formation  (cf.  Hulme  & Mahony,  2013)  arguably  because  the
inevitable micro-politics of consenting could be interpreted as a politicisation of science
– in  light  of  the sceptical  deconstruction of climate science,  ‘Climategate’,  and the
perceived loss of trust, the IPCC wanted to keep the image of a pure science alive. In
this chapter, then, the IPCC has served as a decoy or as a negative example to which the
PAGES 2k Consortium and BEST are compared to – if openness and transparency in
the form of a new scientific ethos make climate science more trustworthy, the IPCC
cannot be trusted; it is not authoritative. 
Taking into account the sceptics’ demands, independent scientists of the PAGES
2k  Consortium  openly  and  transparently  addressed  critique  on  previous  studies
extending  multi-proxy  reconstructions  in  both  space  and  time.  Yet  despite  inviting
outsiders to participate, and contrary to claims by PNS theoreticians, the public has not
been interested in arguably the most contentious time period in climate history. The
PAGES 2k Consortium had to go without the scepticsʼ expertise on climate proxies as
neither  McIntyre  nor  any  citizen  peer  signed  up  to  the  project.  And  it  is  hardly
discussed on those blogs which represent the internet-driven democratisation of climate
science.  The  reason  for  this  ignorance  can  be  found  in  its  comparably  humble
conclusions and lack of public endorsement. The PAGES 2k Consortium authors did
not claim to have closed the scientific debate, they did not claim to have produced
policy-relevant knowledge that puts an end to scepticism, and politicians have not (yet)
cited the study in their avowal of orthodox climate policy.
Addressing the scepticsʼ demands head on, in BEST independent physicists and
151
outsiders  to  the  consensus  re-analysed  the  much  criticised  work  of  CRU,
NOAA/NCDC, and NASA/GISS. To avoid negative social relations they showed their
working and released all data and conclusions on their webpage. Muller also drew from
Wattsʼ Surface Stations Project and his citizen peersʼ local expertise. He hoped that its
socially  more  adequate  construction  would  make  the  results  more  trustworthy,
especially in front of a sceptical audience. And yet it failed. BEST failed to persuade
climate sceptics because Richard Muller proclaimed its results to be politically relevant
– “you should not be a sceptic, at least not any longer”. If he had not made such public
statements,  his  scientific  claims  would  have  faced  less  resistance.  But  apparently
Muller  truly  had  no  idea  about  the  substance  of  sceptics’  objections  which  are
motivated by their rejection of governmental proposals to regulate GHGs. This suggests
that even an open and transparent IPCC would do little to cool the debate. Its self-
proclaimed  political  relevancy,  and  the  politicians’ endorsement  of  its  assessments,
keeps the heat on and scepticism alive.  
But why did BEST fail to charm the convinced climate scientists who celebrated
both the PAGES 2k Consortium and IPCC AR5? The reason lies in Mullerʼs arguments
on why BEST should be trusted. Like the sceptics, many convinced scientists consider
the authority of science to be foundational, to rest safely in its method, not in its social
construction. Therefore it should not matter that the credentialed physicist Muller gave
his approval – “unless a physicist has spent some time reading atmospheric science and
climate texts and journal articles, the physicist is unlikely to know much of anything
about  how  the  climate  system  works,”  confirmed  Curry  (2012),  –  that  the  Koch
Foundation gave the money, and that the papers were pre-released for extended peer
scrutiny. In fact, and as we have seen in Chapter 5, these are the very arguments climate
scientists and their protégées used to employ against sceptics who come from a pure
physics background and do not publish in the climate scientific literature. Pretending to
stand  above  the  fray,  Mann  considered  such  arguments  for  or  against  scientific
authority a very dangerously misguided philosophical take on how science works – and
yet we have seen him employ them against his critics.
The signal achievement of BEST, then, is not its science but is revealed through
Mullerʼs attempted reconstitution of legitimate climate scepticism: by re-constituting
which people in which institutions and through which media can authoritatively discuss
climate  science,  Muller  made  blatantly  obvious  that  the  debate  over  climate
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reconstruction  is  only  marginally  about  the  science.  The  scientifically  little
controversial  debate  to  which  Muller  contributed  provided  many  opportunities  for
stealth issue critics of climate policy to challenge their political opponents, the stealth
issue advocates of emission reduction schemes (Pielke, Jr., 2007). Open critics of such
climate  policies  would  have  no  reason  to  challenge  (the  re-analysis  of)  climate
reconstruction. For example, opponents of fracking hardly challenge the ‘legitimisingʼ
BEST  science.40 But  because science has become a key argument in climate policy-
making, stealth issue critics debate the foundations of its authority.
The ‘post-normal’ process by which Muller sought to authorise his science for
the political debate has not only estranged sceptics and mainstream climate scientists
but entails several boundary paradoxes. 
First, Muller and his cohort Watts offer no markers or mechanisms by which
citizen  peers  can  be  demarcated  from politically  motivated  critics. Because  citizen
peers have no credentials (per definition), both the scientists and the sceptics, if they
adhered to their own standards, should dismiss their  ʻlay expertiseʼ. In fact, most of
Watts’ peers did not even attempt to give critical reviews. Read a ‘review-comment’ on
Watts unpublished research on station siting methods (Watts, 2012b):
What we all suspected UHI does have a tremendous effect on surface temps reading so we
can conclude maybe 50% of the warming not significant well in the USA there is no AGW
so there is no global either AGW thank you Mr Watts!
Revealing his ad hoc preference for UHI over  AGW, this comment by veterinarian
Rogelio Diaz exemplifies the sorts of opinionated, ill-founded critique many sceptical
peers contribute. In the face of such lay claims Collins & Evans’ proposition to exclude
non-scientists based on epistemic grounds seems only reasonable.
Second, the opening up of the review process offers no mechanism by which to
demarcate  a  scientific  from  a  non-scientific  publication.  The  BEST  double-truth
strategy – peer review serves to demarcate soberly vetted scientific knowledge from an
emotionally charged public who have been discussing the pre-release on various blogs
– is dismissed by both sides as not properly scientific. What would be the value of a
pre-release that is not eventually published in the certified scientific literature?
Third,  pre-peer-reviewed  publications  entail  a  conflict  between  the  goals  of
openness, the norm of communalism and the (intellectual property) right  to publish
40  see, e.g., http://www.dangersoffracking.com/ (Accessed 12 June 2014)
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one’s  own  data  first. As  Michael  Mann  once  explained  to  members  of  Congress
(HCEC, 2006: 764),
[a]sking scientists to release their codes before they have had an opportunity to apply them
to a number of potential interesting problems is asking them to sacrifice their competitive
advantage. This would be no different than asking Microsoft to release the code for its
latest operating system as soon as it reaches the market. Microsoft is not about to do that,
and  most  people  would  consider  a  requirement  that  Microsoft  freely  dispense  its
intellectual property – its codes – as antithetical to the principles of a free market. The
argument is no different in the case of scientists and their computer codes or other tools of
their trade.
Watts agreed with Mann when he criticised Muller for having presented his data in
Congress. But Watts’ citizen peers could turn that critique against the sceptic himself:
according to IPRs the photographers would have the right to publish their data first.
Sure enough, because of their shared political commitment against climate policy, they
refrain from doing so. This also explains why Mann shared his data with like-minded
colleagues rather than with Steven McIntyre.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I examined the promise new ‘post-normal’ scientific practices of
climate reconstruction hold for the contentious politics of climate change. My findings
suggest  that  the  hopes  invested  in  an  open,  transparent  and  inclusive  climate
reconstitution will not materialise. In fact, the opening up of a proclaimed politically
relevant science entails more problems and paradoxes than it solves. The participation
of amateurs alongside formally qualified scientists and the likely conflict between the
goals of openness and IPRs yet  again require  new boundaries.  And if  closure of a
scientific  controversy  requires  openness,  openness  will  require  control  since  the
extension of the peer community means that more people will smuggle their political
views into esoteric scientific debates. 
The  logical  next  step  would  be  to  draw  a  boundary  around  the  body  of
technically-qualiﬁed-by-experience  contributors  to  technical  decision-making.  But
since Collins and Evans’ markers of expertise too have become contested, we should
instead examine the assumptions uniting these theories of expertise. Both Funtowicz &
Ravetz and Collins & Evans assume that political decisions rest to a significant
degree  upon  the  authority  of  the  facts  and  experts  informing  them,  i.e.,  an
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authoritative closure of a scientific controversy is important only if the legitimacy
of political decisions depends on it. Their theories of expertise testify to the belief
in  the  linear  model  of  science  and  society  always.  They  have  not  been
substantiated with empirical data; they are ʻnormative theories’, an oxymoron. 
Bt what if political closure over climate policy does not primarily depend on the
authority  of  science  qua  science,  whether  normal  or  post-normal?  In  the  next  and




7.1 Summary and discussion of the main findings
I  started  my  thesis  with  ‘Climategate’ as  evidence  for  the  politicisation  of
climate science.  A few days before the COP15, the hacked emails  caused even the
convinced  public  to  question  the  basis  for  its  trust  in  climate  scientists  and  the
institutions charged with addressing climate change. And the ‘shocked’ climate sceptics
triumphed, since in a vain effort to close off political debates (and arguably to regain
popularity)  influential  politicians  had  cited  from  what  turned  out  to  be  politicised
scientific research. By quoting amongst other ‘IPCC science’ the hockey stick study,
many Western leaders (Bush, 2000; Blair, 2004; Gore, 2006) had hoped to convince the
electorate  of  the  rationality  of  their  policy  position.  They  followed  a  strategy
modernists  of  all  stripes have employed for decades  and centuries;  they  seized  the
authority of science to justify a controversial political programme of action.
In  Chapter  2  I  criticised  climate-concerned  analysts  for  their  asymmetrical
approach  to  the  climate  debate  (e.g.,  Oreskes  &  Conway,  2010).  Historians  and
sociologists of science have ignored or brushed over the sceptics’ claims against the
scientific consensus on the theory AGW as if they mattered little. What is more, their
arguments against climate scepticism and the political economy of their science have
been reversed by sceptical  analysts  who spot a  political  agenda behind mainstream
climate  science,  as  has  been  revealed  in  the  ‘Climategate’ email  disclosures.  As  a
consequence, the focus has shifted from difficult scientific questions onto the scientists
themselves,  turning in principle  esoteric  scientific  debates into discussions over the
epistemic  and  normative  markers  of  expertise,  and  eventually  proposals  for  an
extension of the body of relevant experts. As we have seen in Chapter 6, these are no
safe epistemic places  to stay and sceptics like Anthony Watts  and Steven McIntyre
continue to insist on the primacy of ‘sound science’. 
I  set  up  the  substantial  part  of  this  thesis  in  opposition  to  the  existing
sociological accounts and followed David Bloor’s advice to remain agnostic about the
truth  value  of  science.  But  I  also  argued  that  one  must  take  the  scientific  critique
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seriously in order  to  understand why sceptics ultimately reject  those analyses:  they
continue to dismiss any official accounts of  ‘Climategate’ (such as IAC, 2010; Muir,
2010) for failing to address the remaining ‘hard’ scientific questions.
In Chapter 3 I began my symmetrical investigation with an examination of the
idea of ‘sound science’ to which both the accused scientists, the sceptics, as well as
their respective political protégées subscribe to. I then described the philosophies of
‘sound science’ and showed that in the hands of climate sceptics that idea is explicitly
married to a logical empiricist philosophy: to sceptics any differences between a priori
and a posteriori statements, real data and modelled data, and observations and theory
are understood to be in kind, not in degree. And for them to be credible, empirically
sound observations must be independently replicated. Contrary to the claims made by
the critics of climate scepticism, these demands are anything but unreasonable per se.
In  fact,  the  scientists,  who  the  historians  and  sociologists  so  passionately  defend,
subscribe to the very same principles.
The  sceptics  qua  empiricists  criticise  computer  experiments  which  most
obviously defy these ideals. Climate modellers make no empirical observations in the
strict sense but favour a theory-based approach to understanding the climate system,
claiming  their  authority  from  first  physical  principles.  In  other  words,  modellers
constitute  the  phenomenon  of  climate  change  quite  differently  from  classical
experimenters, some of who are climate sceptics. And these often highly credentialed
contrarians are anything but crooks who know little about science; their  critique on
climate models is based on a serious philosophy of science (see also Pearce, 2013). But
the  existence  of  two  epistemic  approaches  (classic  and  computer  experiments)  has
complicated scientific closure and unfairly casts a negative light on anyone who dares
to criticise climate models. And yet also within the epistemic community of classical
experimentalists scientific closure has not been reached. 
In Chapter 4 I examined the hockey stick as a classical, empirical test of the
theory of AGW. From a scientific point of view, the study by climatologists Mann,
Bradley and Hughes became interesting because of the scepticsʼ insistence on empirical
verification.  If  a critical  observation in the form of climate reconstruction does not
adhere to empiricist logic, it must not be used as evidence of AGW, it may even falsify
the  theory.  And  if  the  original  hockey  stick  experiment  cannot  be  independently
replicated, it will have to be discarded, argue the doyens of ‘sound science’. 
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I  first  described  the  arduous  scientific  work  that  goes  into  reconstructing
temperature changes on various spatial  and temporal scales: assumptions have been
made, data have been manipulated, and unknowns were accepted, whether prematurely
or  not,  in  order  to  arrive  at  global  temperature  series. In  scientific  practice,  the
differences  between  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  statements,  between  real  data  and
modelled data, and between observations and theory are always in degree, not in kind.
At some point the scientist has to accept in principle synthetic a priori statements as
sufficiently  scientific.  But  to  the  sceptics  this  has  been  quite  outrageous  and  they
turned  to  the  single  observations  of  which  there  were  thousands.  Once  again  their
insistence  on  logical  empiricist  ideals  allowed  them  to  find  ever  new  bones  of
contention,  making  exact  replication  an  impossible  task.  And  yet  the  sceptics’
experiments are not ‘sound science’ either.
Chapter 4 confirmed that the  logical empiricist demands for purity cannot do
justice to how science must necessarily work – strict adherence would make science
impossible. As a consequence, the idea of ‘sound science’ is not adequate for arriving at
policy consensus on climate, since agreement about climate science is to some degree
itself conventional and so cannot be invoked to explain that consensus. And since the
politics has infected the science of climate change – disagreement over their practical
implementation  of  sound  principles  has  offered  an  opportunity  to  smuggle  value
judgements into esoteric scientific debates about bristlecone pines, ʻimpureʼ weather
stations and so forth – it is fruitless to look solely at facts to close off political debates
about carbon taxes and energy policy.
Because  the  facts  are  never  pure,  expert  reviewers  are  asked  to  find  an
authoritative consensus the scientists in the field can more or less agree with. For this
reason ‘Wave Two’ sociologists of science have studied not endless methodological
quarrels  but  the  strategies  by  which  experts  form  consensus  and  convince  a  lay
audience of scientific closure. But by arguing for a normative theory of expertise to
discriminate between real and non-experts, the sociologists Harry Collins and Robert
Evans  (2002)  have  simply  substituted  the  irresolvable  question  over  what  the  true
evidence is with the no less difficult question over who the real experts are. In Chapter
5 I examined how hand in hand with the scientific debate over the purity of facts that
boundary work was performed in several Congressional hearings, during which either
side  of  the  political  divide  participated  in  the  drawing  of  boundaries  around  the
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normative core of ʻproperʼ climate expertise. Although Collins and Evans offer a new
conceptual  language  in  the  analysis  of  scientific  controversies,  their  markers  of
experienced-based  expertise  too  become  contested.  Their  normative  theory  cannot
entirely eliminate the political either. It too will always fall short of a demand for purity
as it simply adds another layer prone to deconstruction by the political opponent.
Eventually my protagonists acknowledged and agreed that although they guide
sound scientific  conduct,  norms should  not  matter.  Instead,  uncompromising  open-
access policies was the proposed mechanism by which science would be re-authorised
qua science. They so failed to notice that the demand for openness too is a particular
norm, or culturally contingent tradition of policy legitimation (cf. Jasanoff, 2005), to
which  the  sceptics’  favourite  target,  the  IPCC,  is  not  answerable.  As  an
intergovernmental organisation the IPCC is not accountable to any national public, nor
the  FoIA.  But  instead  of  discussing  these  highly  pertinent  questions  of  knowledge
politics, the goal of authorising science to achieve political closure once again attracted
most attention.
In the final analysis chapter I asked whether an open and transparent science
would  resolve  the  controversy  on  climate  reconstruction  and  pave  the  way  for
bipartisan action.  To this  end I  presented  two projects  which  had tackled scientific
questions. With improved methodology and updated data, the PAGES 2k Consortium of
dozens of climate scientists reconstructed global climate change over 2,000 years. They
published their results in a science journal as a work in progress. Scientific closure,
they acknowledged, is relative at best. In the BEST project on the other hand, highly
credentialed  physicists  and  ‘converted  sceptic’  Richard  Muller  reconstructed
temperatures since AD 1750, and in their view closure was achieved both scientifically
and politically.  Climate  sceptics  largely ignored the  PAGES 2k Consortium – once
again  the  principles  of  ‘sound science’ served to  oppose  expert  consensus  on their
climate reconstruction – but zeroed in on BEST. Although BEST followed demands of
openness  and  transparency,  sceptics  denounced  its  self-proclaimed  scientific  and
political closure. Also, in the view of both sceptics and mainstream scientists, BESTʼs
attempt  to  get  the  epistemic  and  normative  markers  of  expertise  ‘right’ at  once
diminished the credibility of its facts. The authority of science would rest in its method,
they agreed.
Because the debate between the convinced and the sceptics is political at  its
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heart,  the  opening up of  climate science as  PNS has  not  led to  its  resolution.  The
sceptics refuse to accept the science of climate reconstruction  because it  is  used as
legitimation  of  public  policy.  They  resist  regulatory  climate  policy  via  the
deconstruction of its ‘knowledge base’, whether normal or post-normal. 
This finding  supports  a  key  argument  made by  analysts  who dismissed  the
scepticsʼ charges against AGW. But these historians and sociologists have arrived at
that conclusion for the wrong reasons. If they expanded their analyses to BEST, they
would have to dismiss Muller for his lack of formal training in climate science and for
his political engagement. They would have to brush off his claims to expert knowledge
since he has not yet published in the climate science literature. They would have to
criticise BEST for being funded by the Koch brothers, who openly support the climate
change denial  machinery. They would have to expand this critique onto any science
with links to for instance the renewable energy industry. And with the revelations of
‘Climategate’, they would have to dismiss the ‘hockey team’ for the violation of norms
they hold to be binding upon scientists. But because their science can be brought into
alignment with their wish for governmental intervention, these analysts do not attack
BEST or the ‘hockey team’. They chose an a-symmetrical approach because it offers a
convenient argument against their ideological opponents from the right.
Since it is perceived as a threat to rational policy-making, these analysts along
with climate-concerned scientists fear that the symmetry principle and its agnosticism
devalues the authority of their science in that process (cf. Dunlap & Catton, 1994). The
deconstruction  of  so  much  climate  science  has  only  reinforced  worries  that  such
critique has been usurped by the wrong people, that it has run out of steam (Latour,
2004b). However, had not analysed scientific arguments agnostically, I would not have
arrived at this thesis empirical part’s main conclusion. Theoretical sociological claims
about expertise and its role in the climate debate are practically inadequate ,  and
no science, whether open or closed, is going to resolve the contentious politics of
climate change. In the climate debate, normative theories of expertise have failed to
achieve their primary goal that is to bolster the authority of science in decision-making.
Whilst Collins and Evans’ aim to demarcate political from technical questions and to
authorise experts qua unchallenged experts (intentionally) failed to take into account
the inherent politics of knowledge production (Jasanoff, 2003), Funtowicz & Ravetz’
attempt to open up that process to outsider participation (intentionally) deters those
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boundary workers. It seems as if science has become so important to decision-makers
in  the  US,  attaining  a  quasi-religious  status,  that  these  debates  over  scientific
knowledge  production  (and  who  is  allowed  to  read  and  interpret  its  ‘scriptures’)
inevitably pits purists and traditionalists against pragmatists and reformers.
Because there is no easy resolution to the debate of how knowledge should be
produced (cf.  Durant,  2011;  Owens,  2011),  following up on this  thesis,  one should
study scientific controversies using different conceptual frameworks. For example, in a
comparative  case  study  (Yin,  2014)  one  should  ask  what  political  institutions  and
mechanisms have allowed climate scepticism and scientific controversies about climate
reconstruction to rise to such prominence. Using the concept of the co-production of
science  and social  order  (Jasanoff,  2004),  one  should  inquire  into the  relationships
between  politics,  interest  groups,  and  science  in  other  democracies  where  climate
policies are on the political agenda (e.g., Mahony, 2013). The analyst would include to
‘scientists constrained to attempt to do normal science in a post-normal situation’ the
‘normal’ and constraining political  cultures as explanatory variable.  The analysis  of
scientific controversies and changing knowledge production regimes would go hand-in-
hand with a critical examination of the premise underlying science-based climate policy
as ideology, and how it  serves to mask the value-laden character of such decision-
making in the service of the status quo – to what end should publics participate in
science? The examination of an esoteric scientific controversy would open up a whole
lot of other questions which have more to do with politics than with science (cf. Healy,
1999; Demeritt, 2006; Irwin, 2006; Levidow, 2007). 
This  thesis  already  contains  an  answer  to  the  first  question  (What  political
institutions  and  mechanisms  have  allowed  climate  scepticism  and  scientific
controversies about climate reconstruction to rise to such prominence), but since much
of the data came from the US, my conclusions speak almost exclusively to that specific
political context. In fact, the title of this thesis could have been “Climate reconstruction
and the making of authoritative scientific knowledge in the US,” since in the US more
so than anywhere else  climate reconstruction became a public domain science.  The
selection  of  data,  biased  by my personal  fascination  with  climate  history,  certainly
influenced, if not limited, the explanatory power of my thesis. If I had decided to study
“Climate modelling and the  making of  authoritative scientific  knowledge,”  I  would
have focused on different characters or blogs. Importantly, I would have included a
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range of UK Parliamentary hearings which would have added a comparative political
dimension.
In the next section I reflect on how the US culture of adversarialism, which is
mirrored in the Congressional hearings, and the organised scepticism of special interest
groups have generated controversy and provided a fertile soil for climate scepticism.
And because the US science-sceptical discourse gives support to similar debates also in
other countries (e.g., Klaus, 2006; Lawson, 2009; Plimer, 2009; Vahrenholt, 2012), I
draw some tentative conclusions of how ‘Climategate’ may influence climate policy-
making in Europe where decision-making over similar risks used to look differently.
7.2 After ‘Climategate’: The Americanisation of the climate debate
The climate change controversy is typical for how US American society arrives
at  public  truth  fit  for  decision-making  (Jasanoff,  2005);  it  epitomises  US  civic
epistemology. Three observations support this claim.
First, the recourse to science in difficult political decisions characterises debates
over governmental  regulations in the US. Such an approach to decision-making has
great normative force, noted Jasanoff (2005: 265), since “[i]t allows governing bodies
to claim the cognitive high ground, a place from which they can be seen to be acting for
the  benefit  of  all  without  bowing  to  any  particular  interests  of  the  governed.”
Sometimes science has indeed been indispensable to the description of risks and in the
search for solutions, the hole in the earth’s ozone layer serving as the prime example of
science-based  decision-making  (Grundmann,  2001;  2005;  Parson,  2002).  But  the
scientisation  of  a  great  host  of  not  primarily  technical  decisions  has  provoked  a
politicisation of science by special interest groups, in turn leading to the politiciansʼ
notorious  insistence  on  ʻsound  scienceʼ.  And  while  many  requirements  for  ‘sound
science’ have been written into US legislation on scientific risk assessment, leading to
high and unreasonable expectations about the role it can play in the development of
public  policies  (Herrick,  2004),  a  similar  discourse  is  notably  absent  from the  UK
Parliamentary hearing on ʻClimategateʼ.
Second, the requirement for openness and transparency paired with a distrust in
experts  and  regulators  is  diagnostically  US American,  and  the  findings  herein,  for
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example in the politicians’ pledges for an open and transparent Red Team, support that
notion. The UK on the other hand has historically favoured a closed-door approach to
regulation (cf. Brickmann et al 1985; O’Riordan, 1985, Lövstedt & Vogel, 2001), but at
least since the BSE scandal also UK publics have been keeping a zealous watch over
the  government-expert  relationship,  forcing government  officials  to  rebuild  expert
credibility  through  new  institutional  forms,  such  as  public  participation  exercises
(Jasanoff  2005:  261). And  with  ‘Climategate’ that  erosion  of  trust  in  regulators
continues. Speaking to that erosion of trust and echoing those in  the US are calls for
more openness and transparency across all levels of regulatory decision-making: “The
American experience is instructive here,” concluded the Independent Climate Change
Emails Review (Muir, 2010: 94). But openness and transparency makes public policies
all the more precarious as it provides opportunities for its opponents to undermine the
policy by deconstructing the science.
Third, whereas  Jasanoff  describes  Congressional  hearings  on  science  as  an
mechanism by which scientists are held to to account – the possibility of subpoenaing
testimony  should  discourage  scientific  foul  play,  –  my  study  shows  them  as  an
instrument politicians use in order to seek the authority of experts  to (de)legitimise
controversial public policy. The Democrats have convened hearings and invited ʻtheirʼ
experts hoping that a scientific consensus would legitimise their policy proposals. In
turn the Republicans have convened hearings to which they invited those experts who
issue  statements  questioning  respective  consensus.  Once  again  this  happened  in
hearings on climate science convened by the Republicans James Inhofe, Ed Whitfield
and Joe Barton. Seizing the Republican majority in both chambers, their hearings on
climate history and the hockey stick study functioned as a veto put on a legislative
process  that  has  been facing resistance  long before  climate  reconstruction  attracted
politicians’ attention (see, e.g., Byrd-Hagel, 1997). 
Subpoenaing  testimony  from intimidated  scientists  in  order  to  influence  the
policy process has proven inefficacious at best, since neither party takes the opponent
experts’ rare advice seriously, and counter-productive at worst, since it reinforces the
stalemate  between  Democrats  and  Republicans.  And  arguably  the  purpose  of
Congressional  hearings  is  anything  but to  expand  or  clarify  the  scope  of  choice
available to decision makers, nor to convince neutrals or to win over the other side to
one’s point of view, but to show and confirm solidarity with one’s own side (Kahan,
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2010; Kahan et al 2011). Similar dynamics can be observed in climate science: instead
of deliberating in an open discourse with the scientiﬁc community, the scientists asked
for  solidarity.  The  Congressional  discussions  over  the  breakdown  of  the  scientific
scepticism so masks that breakdown of democratic deliberation. By comparison, when
the UK Parliamentary seeks scientific advice controversy within science is given less
attention.  And  rarely  do  politicians  try  to  catch  out  the  witnesses  with  ‘gotcha’
questions, since other than in the US in the UK the election of expert witnesses is a
consensual decision.
Although the happenings surrounding the hockey stick controversy are typical
of the US, ‘Climategate’ also speaks to the changing character of European regulatory
regimes in which science has become ‘more and more important’ but at the same time
‘less  and  less  sufficient’  as  trust  in  institutional  authority  and  codified  expertise
declines, i.e., the scientisation of environmental politics in the EU has begun to mirror
affairs  in  the  US  (cf.  Löfsted  &  Vogel,  2001).  In  the  cross-Atlantic  discourse  of
ecological  modernisation  (Thatcher,  1990;  Bush,  1992),  which  sees  environmental
protection  and  economic  development  as  mutually reinforcing  goals  and  regards
scientiﬁc expertise as the key to environmental progress, debates over the authority of
climate  science  are  likely  to  continue.  These  scientific  controversies  are  being
connected to technical debates over the (global) environmental impact and the costs and
benefits  of  carbon-based life.  Two years  after  the  watersheds  of  ‘Climategate’ and
Copenhagen, at the COP17 in South Africa’s Durban, Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General
of the UN, once again urged carbon-technocrats to act on the basis of science (cited in
Hulme, 2012: 2):
It would be difficult to overstate the gravity of this moment. Without exaggeration, we can
say: the future of our planet is at stake. The science is clear. The WMO has reported that
carbon  emissions  are  at  their  highest  in  history  and  rising.  The  IPCC  tells  us,
unequivocally, that greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced by half by 2050 – if we are
to keep the rise in global temperatures to 2 degrees [Celsius] since pre-industrial times.
You are the people who can bring us from the edge.  The world is  looking to you for
leadership. 
This very modern idea, born in Europe, perfected in the US, and reiterated at every
international climate conference, is at the heart of the ‘Climategate’ affair. The final
section of the conclusion wraps up the findings and speaks in support a new direction
of climate policy (Prins  et al 2010) which puts less burden on science to deliver the
undeniable truth.
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7.3 The breakdown of orthodox climate policy
Following in the footsteps of the Montreal  Protocol  on the Depletion of the
Earth’s Ozone Layer, scientific evidence of climate change has provided policy-makers
with an authoritative rationale to act on global warming primarily via the reduction of
GHG emissions prescribed in an international treaty. Viewed as science-based public
policy issue,  the reduction of GHG emissions became a business-style management
exercise in which nation states like companies have to work towards a fixed target – it
beckons after the successful completion of the task a nice bonus in the form of climate
stability. With the Kyoto Protocol, describing a mix of governmental regulation and
market-based  solutions,  scientific  evidence  would  be  brought  into  alignment  with
politically and economically viable options (e.g., Stern, 2006; EPA, 2009a, 2009c). 
Politicians  typically  weigh  the  scientific  evidence  and  their  policy  options
against  a  potential  loss  or  gain  of  salience,  credibility,  legitimacy,  economic,
administrative and political viability (cf. Hall, 1989). For example, in the GMO debate
the legitimacy of public opposition to the foodʼs underlying political economy had to
be acknowledged and has, for the time being, kept genetically modified food out of
European supermarkets. In the MMR debate UK health authorities seem unimpressed
by irreducible scientific uncertainties surrounding the vaccineʼs safety. Authorities are
much more concerned with the economic and public health costs a measles outbreak
entails, as well as with the associated loss of credibility. In the tobacco smoke debate,
which was about indoor air quality as much as nicotineʼs stimulative and disruptive
effect on neurons, Democrats recognised the political viability of a smoking ban. 
In  the  case  of  climate  change it  initially  seemed as  if  the  science  could be
brought into alignment with a new green economical spirit. In the 1990s climate change
may indeed have filled the vacuum which the evaporated cold-war nuclear threat left
behind (Ross, 1991). And during (or maybe because of) the emerging war on terror, in
the early 2000s, political leaders found in it an opportunity to re-position themselves
and to do good: Heavily criticised for his engagement in the war in Iraq, Tony Blair
took up climate change arguably in order to regain credibility among the left. For Al
Gore climate change even became a personal matter, which should eventually bring
him and the IPCC the Nobel Peace Prize – a very modern recognition indeed. Also
Hollywood celebrities  rallied  for  action  on  the  ʻmost  important  issue  of  our  daysʼ.
These  were  the times in  which the  hockey stick graph became an icon for  climate
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activists, many of which express a genuine fear of a coming catastrophe.
Once it became clear that the only ways by which the Kyoto targets would be
achieved  were  rigid  self-discipline  and  coercion  in  the  form  of  carbon  taxes,  the
underlying  ideological  differences  came  to  the  fore.  Unsurprisingly,  most  vocal
opposition against  the  potentially  far-reaching grasp of  the  ‘Climate  Leviathan’ has
come  from  conservative  quarters  of  society,  as  climate  change  would  “provide  a
marvellous excuse for worldwide, supra-national socialism,” noted Margaret Thatcher
(2002: 449). Other than opposition to policies based on capitalist science, for instance
the  commercialisation  of  GMOs,  opposition  to  policies  based  on  climate  science
became popular among the right-leaning electorate. As a consequence, in the US more
so  than  anywhere  else  climate  change politics  became  primarily  understood in  the
context of the Republican-Democrat opposition. But because the ideological trenches
Republican  climate sceptics  and their  political  opponents  dug themselves into were
very deep, the only rational solution, or so both sides thought, would be science-based.
It  is  thus  little  remarkable  that  a  Republican  together  with  a  former  Democrat
introduced the Climate Stewardship Act – it too pretends to be based and legitimated by
the authority of science. 
Since  Kyoto  came  into  force  the  impracticability  of  large-scale  emission
reductions within the capitalist  political  economy, notably its addiction to economic
growth (Pielke,  Jr.,  2011), and the geopolitical  stalemate between industrialised and
industrialising nations, notably between the US and China, have presented a sobering
reality for international and national political negotiators. Over the years several nations
and big emitters have pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol. Russia, for instance, has not
joined the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, which started in 2013. It decided to
discontinue its participation because the US, China but also India as the world’s major
emitters of GHGs still refuse to commit themselves to reduce their emissions. For the
latter the gross inequity in patterns of development serves as a compelling argument
against a treaty that favours the historically biggest emitters. For many of these reasons
the many parties at the COP15 failed to reach a binding agreement. Quite evidently, in
Copenhagen the science of climate change could not be brought into alignment with
those  wider,  conflicting  political  and  economic  rationales.  That  plan  did  not  work
(Sarewitz, 2011). 
But even if science can formally be made compatible with powerful economic
166
interests (Stern, 2006), a climate policy based on an ideology-free, God-like gaze upon
the world runs into many more problems as it continues to meet the always situated and
local investments societies have been making for decades and centuries (cf. Jasanoff,
2010). Ever more issues troubling the world have been woven into the tangled knot
called climate change politics, observe Prins et al (2010): “the loss of biodiversity, the
gross  inequity  in  patterns  of  development,  degradation  of  tropical  forests,  trade
restrictions, violation of the rights of indigenous peoples, intellectual property rights
[…]. ” Most of all, climate change is an opportunity for the global South to remind the
North that capitalism destroys their livelihoods as dirty industries and emissions are
simply outsourced, leading to further material insecurity in the global South. Less than
half a year after Copenhagen, at the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in
2010, the People’s Agreement of Cochabamba criticised the political economy head on:
The capitalist  system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless
growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits, separating
human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature, transforming
everything  into  commodities:  water,  earth,  the  human  genome,  ancestral  cultures,
biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights of peoples, and life itself. Under capitalism, Mother
Earth is converted into a source of raw materials, and human beings into consumers and a
means of production, into people that are seen as valuable only for what they own, and not
for what they are.41
Disagreement about climate change is intimately connected to these ideologies
and values we hold dear and want to defend, the things we believe in, the risks we face
from environmental threats, the ways we govern on regional, national and increasingly
global scales, and the ways we envision future life on this planet (Hulme, 2009). As
ʻwicked problemʼ climate change evades a  silver  bullet  solution,  argue Rayner and
Prins (2007). Several scholars instead suggest pragmatic no regrets policies which all
involved parties can in principle agree on (Prins  et al 2010).  These policies do not
tackle  global  warming  directly  via  emission  reduction  targets.  Environmental  and
human health benefits rather emerge as positive side-effect of policies dealing primarily
with energy security and the modernisation of inefficient energy producers. In this view
climate policy should be connected with established institutions and forms of decision-
making, for instance with national health policy-making. A focus on health and energy
security also aligns with the humanitarian ambitions of some climate sceptics.
The advantage of this approach to climate change is that policies do not hinge
41  http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/ (Accessed on 19 March 2013)
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on scientific truth; they do not provoke endless deconstruction exercises and debates
about the authority of science and scientific experts. In fact they allow the science to
reclaim its right to be wrong. And whether this conclusion has been arrived at for the
wrong reasons – sceptics  might  claim that  they were correct  in  their  opposition  to
climate science – does not matter a whole lot. Such policies are an advancement over
the  stalemate  a  orthodox  and  party-political  driven approach to  climate  policy  has
reinforced, at least in the US.
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